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This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. This 
topic has recently attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the world and currently 
remains one of the most discussed topics in Banking. The core of the dissertation is 
constituted by three papers. The first paper generalizes the main achievements in the field of 
relevant study using the approach of meta-analysis. The second paper provides an empirical 
analysis of the effect of banking corporate governance on dividend payout. Finally, the third 
paper investigates empirically the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on 
corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. 
The dissertation uses a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate 
governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of listed banks from 
15 European countries for the period 2005-2010. The empirical papers employ such 
econometric approaches as Within-Group model, difference-in-difference technique, and 
propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. 
The main empirical results may be summarized as follows. First, we provide evidence that 
CEO power and connection to government are associated with lower dividend payout ratios. 
This result supports the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the 
safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the 
expense of minority shareholders. 
Next, we find that government bailout during 2007-2010 changes the banks’ ownership 
structure and helps to keep lending by bailed bank at the pre-crisis level. Finally, we provide 
robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive government money. These 
findings show the important role of government when overcoming the consequences of the 
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1.1 Objectives of the dissertation 
This dissertation investigates corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. 
Although the study on dividend policy of non-financial firms has more than 50 years of 
history,1 the research on dividend policy of banks is relatively young. Before the banking 
crisis of 2007-2008, the research on banking dividend policy was mostly limited to analyzing 
the relationships between banking dividend policy and bank financials, such as bank value, 
risk, and performance. The study on banking corporate governance was rather scarce during 
this period (Becher et al (2005)). 
The situation changed following the crisis. High remuneration of executives and large 
dividends to shareholders in poor performing banks attracted the attention of numerous 
scholars all over the world (Acharya (2011); Boyallian and Ruiz-Verdu (2012); Bebchuk et al. 
(2010)). After the crisis, banking dividend policy was analyzed in tight relationship with 
banking corporate governance. Poor corporate governance and unjustified dividend policy in 
banks were named between the main reasons of the banking crisis (BIS (2010); Mülbert 
(2010); Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011)). 
The situation in banking required government intervention. Such government bailout 
measures as equity investment and nationalization changed ownership structure of bailed 
banks.2 Government bailout was usually followed by restructuring of corporate bodies, 
restrictions on dividends and executives’ compensation, and other managerial disciplining 
                                                          
1 Starting from the fundamental work of Modigliani and Miller (1961). 
2 For example, state became full owner of Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley plc (the mortgage book), and 
Fortis Bank Nederland Holding. 
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measures. However, assignment of bailout money did not solve problems in all bailed banks: 
part of the banks participated in the so called ‘risk shifting’ behavior, when bank distributes 
large dividends for shifting risks from owners to creditors ((Acharya et al. (2011); Onali 
(2012)). Other part of the banks continued paying generous bonuses, share-based 
compensation, and large retirement packages for their top executives (Bebchuk et al. (2010)). 
The failures in governing public bailouts resulted in questioning the ability of bank regulators 
to carry out their roles effectively (Calderon and Schaeck (2012); Brei and Gadanecz (2012)). 
Currently, banking corporate governance and dividend policy remain between the most 
discussed topics in Banking. 
Banking dividend policy and corporate governance may be related for a variety of reasons. 
In this dissertation, we focus on explanation provided by entrenchment hypothesis.3 The 
entrenchment hypothesis argues that managers who fear disciplinary actions tend to pay 
higher dividends as a protection against such actions (Zwiebel (1996); Fluck (1999); Allen et 
al. (2000)). However, powerful managers may not need to pay dividends to discourage 
monitoring if monitoring from minority shareholders is weak. In this case, entrenched 
managers can invest in non-value maximizing projects with cash that minority shareholders 
would prefer to receive in the form of dividends. The literature on nonfinancial firms provides 
support to the entrenchment hypothesis (Hu and Kumar (2004)). The literature finds also that 
dividends dampen expropriation of minority shareholders in Western Europe (Faccio et al. 
(2001)). 
In addition, when the firm is a bank, the objectives of managers and shareholders can enter 
into conflict with the objectives of other powerful stakeholders, such as depositors and 
regulators.4 Monitoring from minority shareholders is not the only concern of bank managers, 
and monitoring from regulators may acquire a more prominent role. In particular, banking 
regulators have bank safety and financial stability as the main concern, and low dividend 
                                                          
3 Alternative hypothesis is the rent extraction hypothesis (La Porta et al. (2000); Faccio et al. (2001); Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003)). It suggests that dividends are larger for banks where the controlling shareholder can extract 
wealth from the minority shareholders. In countries where there is a high level of protection for the rights of 
minority shareholders, dividends tend to be higher (La Porta et al. (2000)). As the power of the controlling 
shareholder increases, dividends decrease (i.e., there is rent extraction) – however, the presence of a second large 
shareholder offsets rent extraction from the controlling shareholder (Faccio et al. (2001); Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003)). Other hypotheses that explain the relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance are 
the signaling hypothesis (Bhattacharya (1979); Litzenberger and Ramaswami (1982); John and Williams (1985); 
Miller and Rock (1985)), and the free-cash flow hypothesis (Jensen (1986)).   
4 Bank executives are subject to the scrutiny of different stakeholders. Schaeck et al. (2012) provide evidence of 




payout ratios (dividends to equity) tend to increase the bank capital buffer (other things being 
equal). Therefore, banking regulators tend to favor conservative dividend policies, which may 
lead to expropriation of minority shareholders in the form of lower payout ratios. 
Banking regulation has strong relationships with both dividend policy and corporate 
governance. The literature documents that deregulation of banks during the pre-crisis years 
caused the basic restructuring of banking regulators themselves (Wilcox (2005)). This, in 
turn, helped maintaining poor corporate governance policies – the policies that encouraged 
excessive risk-taking and inefficient distribution of wealth in banks (Levine (2012)). The 
crisis of 2007-2008 increased regulation over banking and caused a series of government 
bailouts accompanied by different restrictions, and managerial disciplining measures in bailed 
banks. These measures resulted in significant changes in banking corporate governance, 
ownership structure, and dividend policy.  
Despite importance and relevance of the topic, literature on the relationship between 
banking corporate governance and dividend policy is rather scarce. Moreover, the empirical 
literature is often limited to U.S. banks, because of a dearth of corporate governance data for 
European banks. Finally, the literature lacks investigation on the effects of government 
bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. 
This dissertation aims to address these gaps in the literature. First, we generalize the main 
achievements in the field of relevant study. Second, we analyze the effect of banking 
corporate governance on dividend payout using managerial entrenchment theory. Finally, we 
investigate the effect of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance and 
dividend policy of banks. 
The core of the dissertation is constituted by three papers: a meta-analysis paper and two 
empirical papers addressing the above mentioned issues in the context of the European 
banking sector. 
The first study investigates the relationship between dividend policy and value in a bank. It 
complements to a broad research that started with the fundamental work of Modigliani and 
Miller (1961) and was followed by refuting the Dividend Irrelevance argument for financial 
firms (Miller (1995); Casey and Dickens (2000)). Using the approach of meta-analysis we 
group and analyze the relevant empirical studies developed during the last twenty years. We 
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group the studies according to precise research questions and similar constructs used for value 
and dividend policy in a bank. 
The second study analyzes the relationship between CEO power and dividend policy in 
European banking. The literature on CEO entrenchment and dividend policy finds that 
entrenched managers tend to distribute higher payout ratios to discourage monitoring from 
minority shareholders. We discriminate between the ‘monitoring’ and the ‘expropriation’ 
perspectives on managerial entrenchment and employ two different proxies for CEO power: 
CEO ownership, and board duality. We investigate the role of CEO power on bank dividend 
policy using a Within-Group model (also named Fixed-Effect model). We use a unique hand-
collected data set for a sample of 109 listed banks in European Union-15 (EU-15) countries 
for the period 2005-2010. 
Finally, the third study investigates the effects of government bailout on banking. The 
literature on non-financial firms finds that connection to government performs as ‘helping 
hand’, since firm benefits from government ownership or the presence of a government 
official on the board (Cheung et al. (2009); Frye and Iwasaki (2011)). We analyze whether 
bailed banks benefited from government bailout during 2007-2010 using a Helping Hand 
hypothesis. Next, we analyze whether government support was accompanied by increased 
control over the management of bailed banks using Managerial Disciplining hypothesis, 
which argues that the government sends its representatives to poorly performing firm to 
constrain firm managers from looting the firm. We use a difference-in-difference technique 
and propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. 
We benefit from a unique hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance, 
ownership structure and compensation structure for a sample of 129 European listed banks for 
the period 2005-2010. 
Our contribution to the literature is as follows. The first study contributes to the literature 
in at least three ways. First, by summarizing the results of relevant empirical papers, the study 
confirms the positive effect of dividend distribution on bank value. Thus, the study provides 
momentum for resolving the conflict between two opposite schools by supporting the ideas of 
positive theorists’ school. Second, the study confirms a negative and significant relationship 
between the bank’s market-to-book ratio and dividends per share. This result provides an 
important practical guidance for equity investors. Finally, the study confirms a negative and 
significant effect of cutting dividends on market value of large banks. This result supports the 
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Too-Big-To-Fail argument, implying higher stability and reliance on regulatory help for large 
banks. This result shows also that Too-Big-To-Fail problem should be seriously analyzed and 
addressed by implementation of adequate regulatory measures. 
The second study gives different contributions to the literature, especially to the literature 
on the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. First, we 
provide evidence that CEO power is associated with lower dividend payout ratios. External 
monitoring from a widely-held financial institution has a positive effect on payout ratios, 
while internal monitoring from independent directors decreases payout ratios. Second, we 
find that when the government is the largest owner or there is a government official on the 
board, dividend payout ratios are lower. These results support the view that banking 
regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and powerful bank CEOs 
can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of minority shareholders. The results 
are robust to different econometric techniques, including fixed-effect panel data estimators, 
and a combination of difference-in-differences with matching techniques. 
The third study contributes to the literature, especially to the literature on government 
bailout in banking, in at least two ways. First, we find that government bailout helped to 
overcome capitalization problems in bailed banks and keep lending by bailed banks at the pre-
crisis level. However, we find no significant improvement of the new loans’ quality in bailed 
banks following bailout. Second, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the 
banks that receive government money: government implements restrictions on dividend 
payouts and managerial compensation and appoints its representatives as ‘watchdogs’ on the 
boards of bailed banks following bailout. These results are consistent with the Helping Hand 
and the Managerial Disciplining hypotheses and show high quality of governance of public 
bailouts in European countries. The results are robust to different econometric techniques, 
including propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching 
estimator. 
 
1.2 Structure of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. We explain the first study in 
Chapter 2. The chapter is constituted by several sections, respectively: the introduction that 
6 
 
explains the main objectives of the study; the section that discusses the studies on the 
relationship between bank value and dividend policy; the section that analyzes two 
dimensions of the relationship; the section on quantitative meta-analysis procedures; results 
section; and the discussion section.  
Chapter 3 describes EU-15 banking sector as a research context for the second paper. We 
illustrate main structural characteristics of banks across countries and legal origins. Then, we 
describe the differences in banking ownership structure in different EU-15 countries. We pay 
particular attention to board and CEO characteristics. Finally, we analyze the structure of 
compensation of CEO and management board across countries and legal origins. 
We explain the second study in Chapter 4. The chapter has several sections, respectively: 
the introduction that explains the main objectives of the study; the section on literature review 
and hypotheses that discusses relevant literature and introduces the hypotheses to be tested; 
the section on methodology and data with an illustration of the data, model and the 
methodology used in the analysis; the results section; and the conclusions section. 
Chapter 5 describes EU-15 banking sector with a focus on government bailout, as a 
research context for the third paper. We provide statistics on the amounts of bailout and repay 
across countries and legal origins. We compare corporate governance, ownership, and other 
characteristics across bailed and non-bailed banks. Moreover, we distinguish a group of 
delisted banks and analyze whether bailout money helped to save bailed banks.  
We explain the third study in Chapter 6. The chapter is constituted by several sections and 
has the same structure as Chapter 4: introduction, literature and hypotheses, methodology and 
data, results, and conclusions sections. 
Finally, Chapter 7 draws the conclusions of all three of the studies, on the basis of the 








Bank value and dividend policy relationship: Connecting studies in two dimensions 
 
 
This chapter investigates the relationship between value and dividend policy in a bank, 
based on relevant empirical literature developed during the last twenty years. It complements 
to a broad research that started with the fundamental work of Modigliani and Miller (1961) 
and was followed by refuting the Dividend Irrelevance argument for financial firms (Miller 
(1995); Casey and Dickens (2000)). The approach of meta-analysis employed here allows 
studies to be grouped and analyzed according to precise research questions and those with 
similar constructs.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The problem of assessing the true value of a bank has become one of the most hotly 
debated topics in academic and public literature during recent years. The crisis of 2007-2008 
demonstrated the weaknesses of the banking sector and required reviewing the main corporate 
policy decisions influencing bank value. While decisions on capital policy have caused fierce 
debate and resulted in numerous research papers, those on dividend policy have received less 
attention. Theoretical debate on the fundamentals of the latter has remained modest, although 
before and during the financial crisis the dividend decisions undertaken in banks caused 
depletion of regulatory capital and even led to banking failures. Therefore, investigating 
which banks pay dividends, and how and why they do so, is still important for prediction and 
prevention of future banking problems. 
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The current meta-analysis aims to shed more light on banking dividend policy and, in 
particular, on its relationship with bank value. The relationship analyzed in the paper 
embraces two different types, or dimensions, of the interaction between dividend policy and 
bank value. On the one hand, dividend payout affects bank value, one reason being that it 
involves the distribution of part of the capital. On the other hand, bank value is traditionally 
one of the main factors in banking dividend policy.5 The meta-analytical approach employed 
here allows us to compare studies on two different dimensions of the relationship, in order to 
summarize the main achievements of previous research works and to combine the different 
results into an integrated model.  
Previous research related to dividend policy in banks is rather scarce when compared to 
that in non-banking firms. The latter is found to be complex and conclusive, and includes 
several papers that attempt to integrate numerous theories of firm dividend payout into a 
single explanatory model.6 However, banking dividend policy still remains a puzzling topic, 
with many unfilled gaps and no complex or conclusive results (Baker et al. (2008)). 
Therefore, systematizing the previous research achievements is of considerable importance in 
order to enhance the accumulation of knowledge in banking dividend policy study. 
The specifics of the banking industry imply that most conclusive research on non-banking 
firms cannot be applied to the analysis of dividend policy in banks. This implication is 
supported in the previous literature by numerous arguments referring to the fundamental 
differences between banking and non-banking firms, which makes comparison of their 
respective dividend policies impossible. For example, firstly, analysis of dividend policy is 
more complicated in banks than in non-banking firms as banks are special market agents with 
monitoring functions. Because banks have access to internal information on their clients, their 
dividend policy is affected by clients’ financial states and is informative about future 
permanent changes in the economy (Bessler and Nohel (2000)). Secondly, banking dividend 
policy is strongly driven by the clientele effect and signaling motives. According to this view, 
a bank attracts a particular type of investor who expects regular dividend distribution and 
assesses the bank that makes payouts as conservative, and the bank that cuts dividends as 
risky (Cornett et al. (2008)). Thirdly, previous empirical analysis suggests that banking 
dividend policy does not support the Dividend Irrelevance argument established for industrial 
                                                          
5 For example, see the papers of Mucherjee and Austin (1980), Dickens et al. (2003), and Theis and Dutta 
(2009). 
6 For instance, see Dividend matrix suggested by Damodaran (2011). 
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firms by Miller and Modigliani in 1961 (Miller (1995); Casey and Dickens (2000)). Fourthly, 
because of strict capital requirements banking dividend payout is strongly affected by the 
level of an individual bank’s capital adequacy (Acharya et al. (2009); Onali (2010)). Finally, 
dividend policy is more important for a bank than for a non-banking firm since a bank 
continues to distribute dividends even in difficult times and in spite of suffering losses 
(Bessler and Nohel (1996); Acharya et al. (2009)). 
It is worth also pointing out that dividend policy is more complicated in banking than in 
non-banking firms, being driven by additional factors that do not influence non-banking 
firms, and therefore it should be investigated separately. The current research aims to 
summarize and systematize the results of previous studies on the relationship between 
dividend policy and value, focusing only on papers providing empirical evidence for banks. 
The primary literature review, examining how the relationship between bank value and 
dividend policy was addressed in previous studies, reveals mixed results. On the one hand, 
there is a high level of agreement amongst the researchers about the significance of the effect, 
in particular the importance of: 1) bank value factor for determining the level of dividend 
distribution; and 2) dividend payout for bank value changes. On the other hand, empirical 
evidence on the directionality of the effects is contradictory. 
For instance, if we consider the first dimension of the relationship – how bank value affects 
dividend payout – many research projects have employed bank value (or size)7 as the main 
explanatory factor in dividend policy. One of the earliest works of this kind was that of 
Mucherjee and Austin (1980), who demonstrated that larger bank size is associated with 
higher dividend payout. Later, Collins et al. (1994), and Dickens et al. (2003) provided 
empirical support for a positive and significant effect of bank value on the level of dividend 
distribution. The work of Georgieva and Wilson (2010), however, focused on dividend 
omission behavior, and found that a small-sized bank has a higher propensity to avoid paying 
dividends compared to a large one. Many other examples in earlier literature also revealed the 
significant effect of size on banking dividend policy. 
However, the previous research works do not agree about the direction of the effect of 
bank value on dividend policy. While the papers of Mucherjee and Austin (1980), Collins et 
al. (1994), and Dickens et al. (2003) demonstrate a positive correlation between bank size and 
                                                          
7 While analyzing bank value, many papers refer to ‘size’ estimate calculated by total assets. 
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dividend payout, the works of Esteban and Perez (2001), and Brogi (2010), show the 
opposite, indicating that a smaller bank is associated with larger dividend distribution. Since 
the previous research provides significant results for either a positive or negative relationship, 
the true direction of the effect still remains unclear, and therefore further investigation into the 
reasons for the contradictory results is required. This investigation can be performed under a 
meta-analytical framework, by considering studies on the same question together, or by 
splitting them into smaller groups of comparable studies, which employ similar approaches 
for their empirical research.8 
Studies on the second dimension of the relationship – how dividend payout affects bank 
value – demonstrate closer agreement amongst researchers about the direction of the effect. 
For instance, the papers of Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999), Gropp and Heider (2009), and 
Rousseau (2010) show positive changes in bank value after an increase in dividend payout. 
These papers support the ideas of the positive theorists’ school, implying that dividend payout 
is advantageous to bank value. However, there are also two other theoretical schools in the 
literature, one of them predicting negative effect of payouts on bank value, and the other 
supporting the Dividend Irrelevance argument. Thus, empirical evidence proving the 
theoretical ideas of the two latter schools can also probably be found, and a systematic 
literature review is required. 
Amongst the studies on the second dimension of the relationship, there are several works 
that provide the first attempts to connect the two dimensions of the relationship into one 
overall system of interrelation.9 These works analyze the consequence of dividend news 
announcements for bank value in relation to different-sized banks. For example, Bessler and 
Nohel (1996) investigate market reaction to dividend cutting by large and small banks and 
demonstrate a stronger effect for large banks. Analysis of the interrelation between value and 
dividend policy is interesting as it reveals the advanced level of the study and can lead to a 
better understanding of the directionality of the effects in the relation.  
The system of interrelation considers the second dimension of the relation as a 
continuation of the first. Since each small or large bank analyzes possible market reaction to 
its dividend decisions, it tries to make the best dividend policy choice to increase its value. 
                                                          
8 For instance, using different estimates for bank value and dividend payout constructs makes the studies on the 
relationship non-comparable and even contradictory. 
9 In the current research, the term ‘interrelation’ is used together with such terms as ‘continued relation’, ‘mutual 
relation’, and ‘two-way relation’ and has a similar meaning. 
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Realization of a particular type of dividend policy in a bank implies a circle of such planning-
decision-outcome events as to link the two parts of the interaction into a system of continued 
relationship. Bank size as one of the main strategic factors of dividend policy determines 
adoption of particular sets of dividend decisions for different-sized banks. Conversely, the 
propensity to follow a particular dividend policy defines the subsequent growth of bank value 
as a result of market disposition after a satisfactory dividend decision, or decrease in value 
otherwise. The literature about linking the two dimensions of the relationship into a single 
system of interrelation is of considerable importance and should be further analyzed.  
To summarize, research on the interaction between bank value and dividend policy 
comprises three parts: 1) the first dimension of the relationship – how bank value affects 
dividend payouts; 2) the second dimension of the relationship – how dividend payout affects 
bank value, and 3) the interrelation between the two dimensions, which links the previous 
two. Thus, understanding the directionality of the effects in the relationship is a rather 
complex task requiring comparison of the empirical evidence from all the three possible 
relationship types. However, such complex analysis could lead to a better understanding of 
some inconclusive and contradictory results that have appeared in earlier literature.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a further look at 
the problem of analyzing the two dimensions of the relationship between bank value and 
dividend policy in the previous literature and introduces the linking perspective. Section 2.3 
summarizes the main groups of relationships analyzed, demonstrating them in graph form, 
and then introduces the research questions and the dependent and independent constructs. 
Section 2.4 describes quantitative meta-analysis procedures on a sample of seventeen research 
works, which have appeared in journals or as conference papers or working papers during the 
last twenty years. Section 2.5 introduces the main findings of the current meta-analysis. 
Finally, Section 2.6 provides a discussion of the results and a conclusion. 
 
2.2 Two dimensions of the relationship between bank value and dividend policy 
Research on the relationship between value and dividend policy has a long history, going 
back to the fundamental work of Miller and Modigliani (1961). Since that time, a number of 
papers have examined the seminal theory’s fairness in its implications for real working firms. 
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Most of these studies covered observations of industrial companies only, intentionally 
excluding banks from the analysis. As a result, empirical study on the banking sector is based 
on a relatively modest sample of papers. 
However, during the last two decades interest in the study of banking value and dividend 
policy interaction has remained steady, and indeed has increased since the banking crisis of 
2007–2008, raising the number of research works conducted in the following years to dozens.  
This research can be divided into two parts according to the dimensions of the relationship 
analyzed. 
2.2.1 The first dimension of the relationship: The effect of bank value on dividend 
payout 
A large number of papers investigate the effect of bank size on dividend payout policy. For 
example, the papers of Dickens et al. (2003), and Theis and Dutta (2009) are of this type. 
However, the studies on the first dimension differ amongst themselves by analyzing 
various dividend policy options for banks. For instance, they investigate the effect of bank 
size on such dividend decisions as: 1) increasing payout, 2) keeping the same level of payout 
as in the previous period, 3) reducing payout, and 4) not paying dividends. It is obvious that 
the bank size factor interacts with different dividend policy options in different ways. 
Therefore, the current analysis divides the studies into two groups, focusing on either positive 
or negative dividend decisions undertaken by a bank, and investigates them separately. The 
first group covers the papers that study positive dividend policy options, i.e. same-level and 
increased payouts. The second group covers papers analyzing negative dividend decisions, i.e. 
reduced or no dividend distribution. For example, the paper of Dickens et al. (2003) belongs 
to the first group, and analyzes the impact of bank size on the level of dividend payout, while 
the paper of Georgieva and Wilson (2010) belongs to the second group, and investigates the 
effect of bank size on the propensity to omit payment of dividends. Such grouping is justified 
as it follows the previous authors’ decision not to distinguish between: 1) increased and 
similar level of dividend payout (i.e. positive dividend decisions), or 2) reduced or no 
dividends (i.e. negative dividend decisions).  
Analysis of the empirical results within the two different groups of papers reveals some 
contradictory findings. In particular, the studies in the first group provide empirical support 
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for either a positive or negative relation between bank size and dividend distribution level. 
While some research papers report a positive sign for the direction of the effect, i.e. a higher 
dividend payout for large banks (Collins et al. (1994); Dickens et al. (2003)), other papers 
report the opposite (Esteban and Perez (2001); Brogi, (2010)). Arguments about positive and 
negative directions of the effect are based on various factors and theories, although the 
interpretation of some factors looks both ways and is used for explaining both the positive and 
negative relationships.10 
Analysis of the main theoretical arguments employed to explain the positive relationship 
between bank value and dividend payout level reveals several significant factors:  
1) Insider shareholdings – small banks are usually held by insider shareholders, and 
profits are not shared among them as dividends but invested in future projects or 
used for forming reserve funds (Dutta (1999)); 
2) Agency problem – small banks are run by friendly groups of shareholders and 
managers, and most privileges are shared between them in the non-dividend form, 
so that minor shareholders suffer (Casey and Dickens (2000)); 
3) Moral hazard – large unprofitable banks bear higher credit risk than small banks, 
but continue to pay high dividends in order to escape negative market reaction 
(Brogi (2009)); 
4) Too-Big-To-Fail concept – large banks have lower bankruptcy probabilities, and 
thus higher returns and dividend yield (Dickens et al. (1999)); 
5) Investment opportunities11 – small banks have better investment opportunities, 
and thus only a small part of their profits is shared as dividends (Dutta (1999)). 
The opposite view, that there is a negative relationship between bank value and dividend 
payout level, predominantly uses diverse theoretical arguments. However, the Agency 
problem theory and Growth opportunities factor (employed also to explain the positive 
relationship) here receive a different interpretation and are used to support a negative effect of 
bank size on dividend distribution. There are several noteworthy factors: 
1) Bank leverage – large banks have to serve their high leverage, which results in 
reduced profits and dividends (Junarsin and Ismiyanti (2009)); 
                                                          
10 For instance, the literature uses Agency problem theory and Growth opportunities factor for explaining both 
positive and negative directions of the effect of bank value on dividend policy. 
11 It is known also as ‘growth opportunities’ argument. 
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2) Product and territorial diversification – large banks tend to diversify their 
businesses, which results in decreased profitability and lower dividend payouts 
(Gupta and Jain (2004); Ameer (2007)); 
3) Reserves-forming by management – the management of large banks eschews 
dividend payments and increases reserves (Gupta and Jain (2004)); 
4) Agency problem – in order to minimize the Agency problem small banks tend to 
pay higher dividends (Ameer (2007)); 
5) Growth opportunities – small banks have greater growth opportunities and expect 
more future returns, and thus signal positive expectations to the market by 
distributing larger dividends (Ameer (2007)); 
6) Shareholders’ character – small banks attract shareholders who are interested in 
high dividend payouts (Gupta and Jain (2004)). 
As both theoretic views discussed above are supported by several empirical studies, and 
both provide strong arguments for either a positive or negative direction of the effect, they are 
further considered as two opposite streams of research within the first part of the studies on 
the first dimension of the relation. The following meta-analysis thus aims to analyze the 
underlying differences in the way of addressing the studies empirically, in order to understand 
the reasons for the conflicting empirical results. 
2.2.2 The second dimension of the relationship: The effect of dividend policy on bank 
value 
Research on the second dimension of the relationship includes papers that investigate how 
a dividend decision (i.e., its official announcement) affects the valuation of a bank. Studies 
have been conducted by a diverse group of researchers independently from work on the first 
dimension. They have mainly used distinct variables for the dependent and independent 
constructs and have employed distinct approaches and techniques, which were not utilized by 
researchers focusing on the first dimension. Although studies on both dimensions of the 
relationship have experienced independent growth, the writers of the current meta-analysis 
consider that sharing of the main theoretical and empirical achievements between the two 
parts of the research could enhance their further development. 
Studies on the second dimension of the relationship can also be divided into two different 
groups of papers analyzing diverse dividend policy options and their effect on bank value. 
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The first group focuses on the effect of positive dividend decisions (retaining the same level 
and increasing the level of dividend payout) on bank value changes, while the second group 
investigates how negative dividend decisions (reducing and omitting dividends) influence 
bank value. 
Review of the theoretical fundamentals of both groups reveals no general agreement 
amongst the researchers on the expected directionality of the effect. This disagreement 
reflects the existence of three schools, predicting different directions for the effect of dividend 
policy on bank value. The first consists of positive theorists who predict a positive effect of 
increasing dividend payout on a bank’s market valuation (Cornett et al. (2008); Acharya et al. 
(2009)). The second school suggests that increasing dividend payout reduces bank value, and 
therefore the relationship is negative (Nnadi and Akpomi (2006); Goodhart et al. (2009)). The 
third school subscribes to the Dividend Irrelevance argument of Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
implying an insignificant effect of dividend policy on value. Examination of previous papers 
that analyze the second dimension of the relationship reveals several works belonging to the 
first two schools. However, no reference is found in recent banking literature to the third 
school’s ideas. The inadequacy of the Dividend Irrelevance argument for banks was 
demonstrated by Miller in 1995, and since that time the argument has not attracted any 
followers in banking dividend policy research. 
The positive relationship demonstrated by the first school is supported in the previous 
literature by several arguments. Overall, these arguments can be called the ‘Signaling’ 
argument, although they receive different formulations, for example: 
1) Signaling of the strong current state of a bank (Collins et al. (2009); Cornett et al. 
(2008)); 
2) Maintaining shareholders’ confidence (Kato et al. (2002)); 
3) Decreasing agency problems (Ameer (2007); Casey and Dickens (2000)). 
The main idea of the Signaling argument is that through a high level of dividend 
distribution a bank informs the market about its future positive expectations and maintains the 
confidence of investors, who then respond to generous payouts by increasing stock value. 
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The followers of the second school, on the other hand, predict that increasing the level of 
dividend payout decreases bank value. Arguments for this negative relationship are also 
sound and are based on the following: 
1) Dividend payment means distribution of part of the capital and, thus, reduction of 
bank value (Onali (2009)); 
2) Decision to pay dividends signals small growth opportunities in a bank (Dickens et 
al. (2003)); 
3) Dividend payment during a crisis, when a bank suffers severe losses, increases 
default risk (Goodhart et al. (2009); Onali (2009)). 
The theoretical discussion between the two schools has a long history, and arguments on 
both sides are convincing. However, the main focus of the current meta-analysis is not 
theoretical but empirical evidence as the highest measure of the underlying theory’s strength. 
The empirical studies of Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999), Gropp and Heider (2009), and 
Rousseau (2010), demonstrate the positive effect of dividend distribution on bank value, 
thereby supporting the ideas of the positive theorists’ school. Observation of other empirical 
results in the field could reveal opposite results, and therefore a systematic literature analysis 
is required. As the current research aims to collect, analyze and summarize the previous 
empirical evidence, it can play an important part in revealing the true effect of dividend 
payout on bank value and thus solving the conflict between the two schools. 
Studies on the second dimension of the relationship include several works that denote a 
new stage in the research, by investigating a two-way interrelationship between bank value 
and dividend policy. One such work is that of Bessler and Nohel (1996), who analyze market 
reaction to decisions to cut dividends in relation to different-sized banks, and demonstrate a 
stronger decrease in market value for large banks. Another is that of Foerster and Sapp 
(2006). The impact of their paper is the establishing of a new term ‘continued relationship 
between dividends and the price of equity’ and the providing of empirical evidence for its 
positive direction. The positive relationship lies in the fact that since the market acknowledges 
in advance the improving conditions for a strongly performing bank and raises its share 
prices, the potential of the bank to pay dividends increases (Foerster and Sapp (2006)).  
Finally, the paper of Rousseau (2010) shows a developed version of the model of Foerster and 
Sapp (2006) and includes two regressions on both dimensions of the relationship analyzed. 
Estimations of the two regressions reveal that the relationships are positive and significant. 
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Thus, the result can be considered as empirical evidence for stronger positive market reaction 
to dividend distribution by large banks.12 
To sum up, linking the two dimensions of the relationship is important for the purpose of 
understanding better the directionality of the effects in the relationships between bank value 
and dividend policy, and because it is required by the current state of research. Moreover, it is 
supported by previous researchers who provided the first attempts to connect the two 
dimensions into a system of interrelation. The following section of the paper provides more 
detail about the perspective of such linkage, after first summarizing the main types of 
relationships analyzed, and introduces the research questions. 
 
2.3 Linking different dimensions of the relationship between bank value and 
dividends 
Analysis of the literature reveals two large sections of studies focusing on different 
dimensions of the relationship between dividend policy and value in banking. The first section 
includes the majority of papers and analyzes the effect of bank value on dividend policy – the 
first dimension of the relationship. The second section covers the papers investigating how 
different dividend decisions affect bank valuation – the second dimension of the relationship. 
These two sections of studies were developed mostly by researchers who conducted their 
analyses independently and by using diverse analytical methods and approaches. 
In addition, several research papers provide some initial attempts to connect the two 
dimensions into a system of mutual relations (Bessler and Nohel (1996); Foerster and Sapp 
(2006); Rousseau (2010)). As these works indicate a new stage in banking dividend policy 
study and are different from the two previous areas of research, they are separated into a 
distinct third section focusing on the two-way relationship between value and dividend policy 
in banks. 
Further, analysis of the first and the second sections of studies reveals within each section 
two groups of papers investigating different dividend policy options undertaken in banks. One 
option comprises positive dividend decisions such as similar and increased dividend payout 
                                                          
12 However, the research of Rousseau (2010) cannot be considered as a complete study on the continued 
relationship as it provides neither theoretical background nor discussion for the results obtained. 
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levels, while the second option covers negative dividend decisions such as reducing and 
omitting dividends. As the interaction of bank value with opposing dividend policy options 
demonstrates different signs for the effect, the studies cannot be considered together and will 
be analyzed separately within the four groups (two groups in each section). Thus, the first 
group includes works investigating the effect of bank size on positive dividend decisions, 
while the second group covers papers analyzing the effect of bank size on negative dividend 
decisions. The third and fourth groups focus on studies investigating how bank value changes 
after undertaking positive and negative dividend decisions, respectively. 
In total, five groups of studies are analyzed, the fifth group investigating the continued 
relationship between bank value and dividend payout. Figure 2.1 summarizes the main 
dimensions of the relationship: 























The research questions addressed in the current meta-analysis correspond to the five 
different interactions discussed above. They are following: 
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1) What is the effect of size on a bank’s propensity to retain the same level or increase 
the level of dividend payout? 
2) What is the effect of size on a bank’s propensity to omit or reduce the level of 
dividend payout? 
3) How does the decision to keep the same level or increase the level of dividend 
payout affect bank value? 
4) How does the decision to omit or reduce dividend payout affect bank value? 
5) What is the directionality of the effects in the continued relationship between bank 
value and dividend policy? 
Defining the five groups of studies and focusing precise research questions on them is 
essential in order to obtain accurate results of the analysis within each group. However, 
another possible source of contradiction amongst the empirical evidence within studies of the 
same group should also be considered.  Since the papers employ various constructs for bank 
value and dividend policy, and measure them differently, the results obtained can vary 
significantly and even be contradictory. Therefore, the current research examines the 
estimates for bank value and dividend policy constructs used in the previous literature. Papers 
employing the same constructs are organized into subgroups of comparable papers in order to 
see whether contradictory results are driven by construct differences. 
2.3.1 Bank value construct 
Previous studies on the two dimensions of the relationship employ several different 
measures for bank value construct, including Book Value, Market Value, Market-to-Book 
ratio or Other Bank Value estimates. 
The most frequently used bank value measures are based on book estimates. One such 
measure, natural logarithm of book total assets, was employed in the papers of Collins et al. 
(2009), and Gropp and Heider (2009), to analyze how dividend distribution differs in relation 
to bank value. Other measures of bank size estimated on the basis of book values are ‘fixed 
assets to total assets ratio’ (Junarsin and Ismiyanti (2009)), and a dummy variable for large 
banks (Slovin et al. (1999)). As all the measures above rely on book values, they are grouped 
together under Book Value (BV) estimate. 
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Another group of measures for bank size is based on market values (Market Value, MV), 
such as market value of bank stocks (Rousseau (2010)), or stock value change during a 
trading day (Black et al. (1995)). The distinct feature of this group of measures is that they are 
informative about a bank’s actual market valuation, and transfer market opinion about a 
bank’s investment projects, the risk, and the expectation of future profits and dividend 
payouts. However, during periods of overestimation and underestimation Market Value 
measures do not show a fair bank value. 
The third type of estimates is Market-to-Book ratio (M/B). Comparing market value and 
book value of a bank has an important implication since the ratio is highly informative about 
the market assessment of a bank. A higher ratio for large banks means that stocks are 
expensive due to market recognition and low level of risk, while small banks usually do not 
have a long listing history and are associated with high risk level. However, there is an 
alternative way of interpreting Market-to-Book ratio in the literature. This involves using the 
measure as a proxy for bank growth opportunities and expects a negative relationship with 
bank size (higher growth opportunities for small banks). Since Market-to-Book ratio can be 
interpreted either positively or negatively in relation to bank size, the estimate is separated 
into a distinct group for analysis.  
Measures of bank size that cannot be included in the three groups above can be placed in 
the fourth group, Other Bank Value estimates. For example, this group includes natural 
logarithm of revenues (used by Dickens et al. (2003); Theis and Dutta (2009)), which is 
strongly linked to a bank’s performance and cannot be compared with measures referring to 
bank assets. 
A summary of bank value estimates that are observed in the current meta-analysis is 
presented in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Summary of bank value estimates used in the meta-analysis. 
Variable Description 
BV– Book Value All measures estimated on the basis of book values 
MV – Market Value All measures estimated on the basis of market values 
M/B – Market-to-Book ratio Market value of total assets to book value of total assets 




2.3.2 Dividend policy construct 
Previous research papers used four precise measures for banking dividend policy analysis. 
They are: Dividend Yield (Dyield), Dividends-to-Earnings (DP) ratio, Dividends-to-Equity 
(DPE) ratio, and dummies for Dividend Cutting and Dividend Paying. 
The most widely used measure is Dividend Yield, which indicates the amount of dividends 
paid for each unit of the investments. Correlation between bank size and Dividend Yield 
makes it possible to investigate the cost of equity for large and small banks. From the 
investor’s point of view, the measure provides an answer to the question whether a large 
bank’s shareholders receive more benefits from their investments than investors in a small 
bank. 
The second type of estimates is Dividends-to-Earnings (DP) ratio. This estimate 
demonstrates what proportion of a bank’s earnings is shared with investors, and is therefore 
considered as a measure of a bank’s generosity in its dividend policy. Dividends-to-Earnings 
ratio does not perform well when observations include periods of negative or zero earnings, 
so its application is limited. However, it is effective for comparing dividend payouts between 
large and small banks functioning under normal economic conditions. 
The third measure – Dividends-to-Equity (DPE) ratio – eliminates the weaknesses of the 
previous estimate and allows treatment of all observations for which earnings are positive or 
negative. Dividends-to-Equity ratio is informative about the whole set of conditions possible 
in banking practice and is effective for answering such questions as: What sized banks on 
average pay higher dividends?; and What sized banks on average avoid paying dividends 
more often? 
Finally, several research papers use dummies for Dividend Cutting and Dividend Paying 
that represent corresponding events of reducing (or not paying) and retaining the same level 
of (or increasing) dividends in banks. 
A summary of dividend policy estimates that are observed in the current meta-analysis is 





Table 2.2  Summary of dividend policy estimates used in the meta-analysis. 
Variable Description 
Dyield – Dividend Yield Dividends paid per share 
DP – Dividends-to-Earnings Dividends paid to earnings ratio 
DPE – Dividends-to-Equity Dividends paid to equity ratio 
Divcut and Divpay Dummies for dividend cutting and dividend paying, which are 
equal to 1 for the corresponding event, and 0 otherwise 
 
 
2.4 Quantitative meta-analysis procedures 
2.4.1 Sample selection 
In order to answer the five research questions above, an electronic search of relevant 
empirical studies was performed. 
The search was based on seven electronic databases, which include research papers 
published or written between January 1990 and January 2011. In order to exclude from the 
large sample any irrelevant literature that focuses on either bank value or banking dividend 
policy without relating them, an adapted version of the step-by-step literature search 
procedure of Newbert (2007) was employed. Eventually, the literature search consisted of the 
following principles and steps: 
1) Search for published journal articles, conference papers and working papers only. 
2) Operate with seven databases: ProQuest, EBSCO, Scopus, Econlit, Emerald, SSRN 
and NBER, in order to receive as many appropriate results as possible. 
3) Search for articles published between 1990 and 2010. 
4) Search for relevant studies by keywords using one of the two strategies below 
(depending on the search system of a database):  
a. Search for any keyword in the title or abstract of papers;  
b. Search for a full phrase in the title, abstract and full text of papers. 
5) Search for papers on the relationship between bank value and dividend policy with 
the following keywords and full phrases: 
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a. Defining the study field as banking by the keyword ‘bank*’ in order to 
eliminate irrelevant items; 
b. Focusing on publications that study bank value with keywords: ‘bank* 
value’, ‘bank* size’ and ‘bank* stock’; 
c. Eliminating studies on bank value that do not observe dividend policy with 
the keyword ‘dividend*’; 
d. Focusing on publications that consider dividend distribution as a function of 
banking dividend policy with one of the keywords: ‘policy’, ‘choice’, 
‘payment’, ‘repayment’, ‘reduction’, ‘cut’, ‘omission’, ‘level’, ‘size’; 
e. Eliminating irrelevant articles by including one of the ‘relationship’ 
keywords: ‘relation’, ‘relationship’, ‘interrelation’, ‘correlation’, 
‘influence’, ‘effect’, ‘affect’, ‘determine’; 
f. Ensuring empirical content with one of the ‘methodological’ keywords: 
‘data’, ‘empirical’, ‘test’, ‘statistical’, ‘finding’, ‘result’, ‘evidence’. 
6) Eliminate duplicate articles through databases. 
7) Ensure theoretical and empirical relevance by reading all remaining abstracts. 
8) Ensure theoretical and empirical relevance by reading all remaining papers. 
The search for relevant papers using keywords and full phrases within the search systems 
of seven databases after elimination of duplicates and irrelevant articles resulted in a sample 
of fifteen papers. While ProQuest, EBSCO, Scopus, SSRN and NBER databases were found 
to be convenient sources of research papers, providing four, three, one, six and one relevant 
papers, respectively, searches within Econlit and Emerald gave no useful results. The list of 
papers was completed by two other relevant articles located in the references of the fifteen 
initial papers, giving a final sample of seventeen papers. The majority of the research works 
in the sample are journal papers. The other six papers are introduced as working papers and 
conference papers without providing further information about their publication. 
The empirical results presented in the previous papers were grouped under the five 
research questions. Papers containing results that were relevant for investigating more than 
one research question were included in all applicable groups. For each study, the dependent 
and independent constructs, expected and observed directions of the effect, p-value, t-





The meta-analysis used in the current research is based on the methodology described by 
Rosenthal (1991), and follows its main analytical procedures. 
This method has the advantage of providing complex answers to the questions about the 
directionality and significance of the effects in the interaction between banking value and 
dividend payout based on the previous empirical evidence. Answering the questions is not 
possible if we simply compare the papers in a standard literature review, since the studies 
differ significantly by: 1) analyzing the two diverse dimensions of the relationship, 2) 
observing opposite dividend policy options, and 3) employing various types of estimate for 
the bank value and dividend policy constructs. 
The meta-analytic procedures employed here follows several fixed steps:13 summarizing 
the empirical evidence of previous studies on the relationship, determining the variables of 
interest and verifying their effect on the relationship, and developing hypotheses for a group 
of comparable studies on the relationship. 
In order to avoid the main limitation of the meta-analytical method, that it raises problems 
associated with an investigation of the effect size,14 the current research focuses only on 
estimation of the directionality and significance of the effects in the interactions between the 
variables of interest. Therefore, the first step of the analysis involves collecting data on 
directions and p-values of the effects from previous empirical studies grouped under the five 
research questions. 
Further, another possible problem with the meta-analysis method is eliminated by a 
division of studies grouped under the same research question into subgroups of studies that 
use the same types of empirical estimates for bank value and dividend policy constructs. 
Since the ways of measuring the main constructs differ significantly in the papers, this could 
result in non-comparability of p-values for empirical studies of the same group. Thus, 
splitting the papers into subgroups is crucial for understanding the underlying differences in 
the empirical results. 
                                                          
13 Following Rosenthal (1991), and Sobrero and Schrader (1998). 
14 Since the type of results reported differs significantly between the studies, obtaining indicators that partial out 
the effect of covariates becomes problematic if not impossible. The problem of analyzing the effect sizes 
becomes even more severe if consider the presence of difference covariates in the different studies (Rosenthal 
(1991); Sobrero and Schrader (1998)). 
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Finally, the current research considers the so-called ‘File Drawer problem’ demonstrated 
by Rosenthal (1991) and implying a possible bias that could affect the meta-analysis results if 
they focused only on published empirical papers. Since papers that show significant empirical 
evidence are more likely to raise the interest of a journal they are published more often, and 
therefore the impact of non-significant empirical evidence on the results of meta-analysis may 
be undervalued (type I error). For dealing with the File Drawer problem, the current research 
first includes working papers and conference papers from SSRN and NBER databases in the 
analysis, and then employs the corresponding testing procedure suggested by Rosenthal 
(1991). 
To sum up, the main advantage of using meta-analysis in the current research is that it 
allowed us to summarize previous empirical studies, which are not comparable under the 
usual literature review process. The application of the method is associated with several 
problems that could bias the results, but these problems are minimized by use of procedures 
suggested in specialized and authoritative literature. 
2.4.3 Data coding 
As the current meta-analysis focused on the directionality and significance of the effects in 
the studies, for each of them the direction of the effect and one-tailed p-value were recorded. 
If the exact p-value was not reported in the study, the available data on t-statistics were used 
to define the corresponding p-value from the statistical tables of distribution. If t-statistics 
were not reported, either, the available data on standard errors were used in order to calculate 
t-statistics before defining the p-value. 
For each p-value, the corresponding normal deviate Z-score was determined from the 
statistical tables. Decisions about the sign of the Z-score were based on the underlying 
hypothesis predicting either positive or negative direction of the effects. The expected sign of 
the hypothesis was determined from the whole set of studies in a group (or subgroup) of 
papers. For instance, if the majority of studies in a group demonstrated a positive direction for 
the interaction between the two constructs, the hypothesis predicted a positive effect. In that 
case, each study showing a positive relationship was coded with positive Z-score while each 
study demonstrating a negative relationship was coded with negative Z-score. On the other 
hand, if most studies in a group revealed a negative direction for the interaction between the 
two constructs, the hypothesis predicted a negative effect. Thus, in that case each study 
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showing a positive relationship was coded with negative Z-score while each study 
demonstrating a negative relationship was coded with positive Z-score. 
When more than one test was performed in a study for the same sample, a combination 
procedure was used. First, the integrated Z-score was calculated by summarizing all 
individual tests’ Z-scores. Then the p-value associated with the integrated Z-score was 
calculated from the statistical tables. For instance, this procedure was employed when the 
same model with its slightly different functional forms was tested several times for the same 
sample. However, when a model was tested for different samples the reported results were 
coded as separate studies with p-values and Z-scores corresponding to each sample (for 
example, Black et al. (1995)). 
The current research distinguishes several types of estimates for bank value and dividend 
policy constructs, and argues that studies using different measures cannot be compared. 
Therefore, if studies within the same paper employed several different measures for the 
dependent (and/or independent) constructs, during the coding procedure they were not 
combined in order to calculate a common Z-score. Instead, a distinct Z-score and 
corresponding p-value were reported for each study using a particular measure for bank value 
and/or dividend policy.15 For example, in the research work of Onali (2009) the effect of bank 
book value on dividend payout is analyzed using two different measures for dividend policy 
constructs: DP (dividends paid to earnings ratio) and DPE (dividends paid to equity ratio). In 
the meta-analysis procedure studies using the two types of dividend policy estimates were 
coded separately. 
2.4.4 Statistical tests 
Recording the Z-scores and p-values for all the studies in the sample allowed testing of the 
heterogeneity, in other words checking the possibility of combining studies on the same 
research question. If the empirical results were homogeneous, this implied that each study in 
the group demonstrated the effect predicted by the underlying hypothesis and high level of 
significance. Finding homogeneity in the studies was followed by several additional tests, 
which aimed to verify the main test result. 
                                                          
15 The separate coding of studies with distinct measures for the main constructs is necessary but is associated 
with a duplication problem. In order to avoid the problem, the positive results of testing will be verified by 
supplementary testing procedure based on calculation of common p-value for studies on the same sample (even 
if the studies use different measures) and comparing the two results. If supplementary test reveals negative 
result, the possibility of combining the studies will be rejected. 
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In the current research the test of the heterogeneity of the corresponding Z-scores 
(Rosenthal (1991)) was performed for the studies grouped under each of the five research 
questions. First, the average Z-scores for five groups were computed. Then, for each study on 
a particular research question, the squared difference between the individual and average Z-
scores was calculated. Finally, the sum of all individual squared differences was used to 
obtain a group’s p-value from a 𝜒2 statistics with N-1 degrees of freedom: 
 ∑ (𝑍𝑖 − 𝑍𝑚)𝑁𝑖=1 .         [1] 
If the p-value obtained from the test was small, it was concluded that studies on the 
research question were heterogeneous and could be grouped together. However, in this case 
the reasons for the heterogeneity had to be analyzed. One possible reason arose when studies 
demonstrating the same direction of effect for the relation had significant but very different p-
values.16 For example, when one study had significant one-tailed p-value equal to 0.05 while 
another had significant p-value equal to 0.0001, the test result could reveal heterogeneity. 
Since in this case both studies confirmed a significant relationship in the same direction, they 
could be grouped together. However, if one of the studies showed no significant result (p>0.1) 
while another was significant, the possibility of grouping the studies together was rejected. 
As the previous literature employs several different types of estimates for bank size and 
dividend policy constructs, grouping these studies together could reveal the second reason for 
the heterogeneity. In this case, heterogeneous studies on the same research question were 
divided into the smaller subgroups of the studies that used similar measures for bank value 
and dividend policy constructs. Then the heterogeneity test was performed for each subgroup. 
Importantly, the test results on both group and subgroup levels enabled us to understand 
whether the contradictory empirical evidence was related to differences between the 
constructs used in the studies. 
The homogeneity result for studies in the same group (or subgroup) of papers was verified 
by additional testing methods (Rosenthal (1991)) aimed at identifying whether the result was 
systematic or random. Each test analyzed the probability that the p-value of the studies was 
obtained while the null hypothesis of no relationship between the dependent and independent 
constructs was true. The additional tests had both advantages, allowing them to perform well 
under certain conditions, and disadvantages, limiting their application in other cases. In order 
                                                          
16 Following Sobrero and Schrader (1998). 
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to obtain accurate results on the systematic character of the homogeneity, first, the 
appropriateness of employing each additional testing procedure for a certain group (subgroup) 
of papers was analyzed. Then, on the basis of the whole range of the results the relationship 
was confirmed or rejected. Table 2.3 summarizes the additional tests employed in the current 
research and lists their advantages and limitations. 
Table 2.3  Additional testing methods (following Rosenthal (1991)). 
Method Computation Advantages Limitations 
Adding Logs �−2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑝 Easy, used when 𝑁 ≤ 5  Not applicable for 
opposite sign results 
Adding p’s (∑𝑝𝑛)




Usually used, easy  - 
Adding 
weighted Z’s 
𝑑𝑓1𝑍1+𝑑𝑓2𝑍2 + ⋯+ 𝑑𝑓𝑛𝑍𝑛 
� 𝑑𝑓12 +  𝑑𝑓22 + ⋯+  𝑑𝑓𝑛2  Allows weighting the  study’s impact to overall test result  - 
Testing mean 
p 
(0.50 − ?̅?)�√12𝑁� Easy Not applicable when 




�𝑆(𝑍)2 /𝑁 No assumption of unit variance Not applicable when 𝑁 ≤ 5  
 
The final testing procedure employed in the meta-analysis was a File Drawer test 
suggested by Rosenthal (1991). The logic of the File Drawer test is that published journal 
articles represent only a small fraction of all studies performed on a research question. Thus, 
the test attempts to determine the actual number of the studies carried out, with the following 
computation procedure: 
 𝑁 (𝑁 𝑍� 2−2.706)
2.706  ,          [2] 
N = number of all published studies (qualitative and quantitative) in the sample. 
As the current meta-analysis sample included both published and unpublished works, the 





Previous literature on the relationship between bank value and dividend policy reveals no 
concordance amongst the empirical results. The studies investigate the two different 
dimensions of the interaction between value and payout, and consider various dividend policy 
options. This makes comparison of the results within a normal literature review difficult if not 
impossible. Moreover, the different studies demonstrate contradictory directions of effect for 
the same relationship. For instance, the works grouped under Question 1 reveal two streams 
of research supporting either the positive or negative effect of bank size on dividend payout. 
Further, the empirical results differ between one another by the level of significance. 
Therefore, when two studies show the same direction of the effect and one is significant while 
the other is not, their results cannot be compared. Finally, the empirical evidence is based on 
different degrees of freedom. As a result, comparing and summarizing the main achievements 
of previous research works can become a particularly complicated task for the literature 
reviewer. 
However, the meta-analysis used here is an appropriate and effective instrument for 
comparing the previous research in the study field. It is based on the use of strict sampling 
and testing procedures suggested in specialized and authoritative literature, and provides 
precise answers to the five research questions. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the studies reviewed through the five research questions analyzed. It 
provides general information about each study (in particular, author, year of publication, 
country and period of sample observation), specifies the number of samples if a study 
analyzes more than one, lists dependent and independent constructs and intermediary 
constructs where necessary, shows expected and observed directions of the effect, one-tailed 
p-values and degrees of freedom for each study. 
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Table 2.4  Summary of the studies reviewed on each of five research questions. 










df Country Period 
1. What is the effect of size on a bank’s propensity to retain the same level or increase the level of dividend payout? 
1 Collins et al. (1994)   Dyield   MV + + 0.2090 932 USA 1977–1985 
2 Collins et al. (1994)   Dyield   M/B  - - 0.9999 932 USA 1977–1985 
3 Collins et al. (2009)   DPE   BV - - 0.6249 56 USA 1994–1997 
4 Dickens et al. (2003)   Dyield   Other 
Bank 
Value 
+ + 0.0001 670 USA 1998–2000 
5 Dickens et al. (2003)   Dyield   M/B - - 0.9999 670 USA 1998–2000 
6 Esteban and Perez (2001)   DPE   BV - - 0.9985 479 Europe, 22 countries 1991–1998 
7 Foerster and Sapp (2006)   Dyield   Other 
Bank 
Value 
+ + 0.0228 81 Canada 1885–2003 
8 Foerster and Sapp (2006)   Dyield   Other 
Bank 
Value 
+ + 0.0001 81 Canada 1885–2003 
9 Gropp and Heider (2009)   Divpay   BV + + 0.0210 2414 European Union, USA 1991–2004 
10 Gropp and Heider (2009)   Divpay   M/B + + 0.0001 2414 European Union, USA 1991–2004 
11 Junarsin and Ismiyanti 
(2009) 
  Dyield   BV + - 0.5000 662 Indonesia 2000–2004 
12 Onali (2009)   DP   BV + + 0.0061 790 Europe (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK) 
2000–2007 
13 Onali (2009)   DPE     BV + + 0.0050 802 Europe (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK) 
2000–2007 
14 Onali (2010)   DPE   BV + - 0.5271 2721 EU, USA 2000–2008 
15 Rousseau (2010)   Dyield   MV + + 0.0023 1085 USA 1866–1897 
16 Theis and Dutta (2009)  Dyield  Other 
Bank 
Value 
- - 0.9633 92 USA 2006 
17 Theis and Dutta (2009)   Dyield   M/B - - 0.9082 92 USA 2006 






2. What is the effect of size on a bank’s propensity to omit or reduce the level of dividend payout? 
1 Georgieva and Wilson 
(2010) 
  Divcut   BV - - 0.0032 690 USA 2009–2010 
2 Georgieva and Wilson 
(2010) 
  Divcut   M/B - - 0.1335 690 USA 2009–2010 
3. How does the decision to keep the same level or increase the level of dividend payout affect bank value? 
1 Filbeck and Mullineaux 
(1999) 
  MV   Divpay + + 0.0608 41 USA 1976–1994 
2 Gropp and Heider (2009)   BV   Divpay + + 0.0210 2414 European Union, USA 1991–2004 
3 Gropp and Heider (2009)   M/B   Divpay + + 0.0001 2414 European Union, USA 1991–2004 
4 Onali (2009)   BV   DP + + 0.0176 909 Europe (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK) 
2000–2007 
5 Onali (2009)   BV   DPE   + + 0.0050 928 Europe (France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK) 
2000–2007 
6 Onali (2010)   BV   DPE + + 0.0050 2968 EU, USA 2000–2008 
7 Rousseau (2010)   MV   Dyield + + 0.1164 1102 USA 1866–1897 
4. How does the decision to omit or reduce dividend payout affect bank value? 
1 Black et al. (1995) Sample 1 MV   Divcut - - 0.2622 17 USA 1974–1977 
2 Black et al. (1995) Sample 2 MV   Divcut - - 0.0878 42 USA 1978–1987 
3 Slovin et al. (1999)   MV   Divcut - - 0.0001 62 USA 1975–1992 
5. What is the directionality of the effects in the continued relationship between bank value and dividend policy? 
1 Bessler and Nohel (1996)   MV Divcut BV - - 0.0016 53 USA 1974–1991 
2 Slovin et al. (1999)   MV Divcut BV - - 0.0116 54 USA 1975–1992 
3 Slovin et al. (1999)   MV Divcut MV + + 0.8473 54 USA 1975–1992 







The initial visual inspection of the studies revealed mixed evidence for the directions of the 
effects for the relationships analyzed under Questions 1 and 5. As the results reported in each 
of the two groups supported contradictory directions of an effect, the significance levels 
recorded were heterogeneous. On the other hand, the studies analyzed under Questions 2, 3 
and 4 demonstrated agreement in the directions of the effects. However, only studies under 
Question 3 reported the homogeneity of the significance levels, implying a strong positive 
effect of dividend payout on bank value changes. 
Tests for the heterogeneity of Z-scores for the five groups of studies support the primary 
conclusions on the statistical basis (Table 2.5). The heterogeneity test for the studies grouped 
under Question 1 revealed statistically different p-values (𝜒217=113.82, p<0.0001) implying 
that the studies could not be grouped together. All studies on Question 2 showed a negative 
relationship; nevertheless the heterogeneity test failed to support the opportunity of grouping 
them together: 𝜒22=1.30, p=0.2542. As previously explained, heterogeneity can be observed 
even in cases where the difference between two significant p-values of individual studies is 
too high. However, comparison of the p-values of the two studies on Question 2 revealed that 
one of them was not significant (p=0.1335), and therefore the test result was valid.  
Tests for the heterogeneity of the studies grouped under Question 3 revealed the most 
important result of the current meta-analysis, demonstrating that all studies of the group could 
be compared and combined between one another (𝜒27=4.60, p=0.5960).17 The homogeneity of 
the seven studies was verified by the additional testing procedures, which all confirmed the 
relationship. The studies on Question 3 determined the First result of the current meta-
analysis, showing a positive and significant effect of dividend distribution on bank value. This 
result is important as it helps to resolve the conflict between the positive theorists and their 
opponents, on the one hand, and provides practical guidance for bank managers, on the other 
hand.  
The First result: The effect of dividend payout on bank value is positive and statistically 
significant. 
The heterogeneity test for the studies grouped under Question 4 revealed that they cannot 
be combined (𝜒23=5.87, p=0.0531). Although the three studies in the group showed a negative 
                                                          
17 Supplementary testing procedure also supported the result ( 25=2.14, p=0.7100). 
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effect of cutting dividends on bank value, one of the results was not significant (p=0.2622), 
and therefore the heterogeneity test result is valid. Finally, performing the test for the studies 
grouped under Question 5 demonstrated their heterogeneity (𝜒23=9.02, p=0.0110), supporting 
the result of the primary observation about non-comparability of studies showing different 
directions of the effects for the relationship. 
As previously explained, one possible reason for heterogeneity is the use of various types 
of estimates for the dependent and independent constructs by different studies on the same 
research question. There were four different types of estimates for bank value18 and four 
estimates for dividend policy,19 as noted above in the literature analysis. It was supposed that 
combining the studies that used diverse estimates could provide biased results. Therefore, as a 
further step in the analysis we performed the heterogeneity test for the subgroups of studies 
(defined within the five groups) that employed similar measures for the dependent and 
independent constructs.  
Defining the subgroups was useful for analyzing the studies on Questions 1 and 5 due to 
the variability of the measures employed in them. However, subgrouping was not applicable 
for studies on Questions 2 and 4 as analysis in each group employed common measures for 
bank value and dividend policy constructs. Therefore, the studies grouped under Questions 2 
and 4 were deemed to be heterogeneous, and no further analysis was conducted. 
The effect of bank size on a bank’s decision to omit or reduce the level of dividend 
payout is negative but statistically heterogeneous. 




                                                          
18 Book Value, Market Value, Market-to-Book ratio and Other Bank Value estimates. 




Table 2.5 Heterogeneity and additional tests for the studies on the five research questions.  
Comparing Combining  File 
Drawer 
Test Result Test Result Test 
  Adding Logs Adding p’s Adding Z’s Adding wZ’s Mean p Mean Z   




The studies reviewed 
may not be combined 
- - - - - - Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
2. What is the effect of size on a bank’s propensity to omit or reduce the level of dividend payout? 
𝜒22=1.30 
p=0.2542 
The studies reviewed 
may not be combined 
- - - - - - Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
3. How does the decision to keep the same level or increase the level of dividend payout affect bank value? 
𝜒27=4.60 
p=0.5960 
The studies reviewed 
















4. How does the decision to omit or reduce dividend payout affect bank value? 
𝜒23=5.87 
p=0.0531 
The studies reviewed 
may not be combined 
- - - - - - Relation not 
confirmed 
- 
5. What is the directionality of the effects in the continued relationship between bank value and dividend policy? 
𝜒23=9.02 
p=0.0110 
The studies reviewed 
may not be combined 







Table 2.6 Heterogeneity and additional tests for the subgroups of the studies determined within the groups on the five research 
questions. 




  Test Result Tests Result Test 













1. What is the effect of size on a bank’s propensity to retain the same level or increase the level of dividend payout? 
1. BV to all 
dividend 
constructs  
Collins et al. (2009) 
Esteban and Perez (2001) 
Gropp and Heider (2009) 








may not be 
combined 















may not be 
combined 








Collins et al. (1994) 
Dickens et al. (2003) 
Gropp and Heider (2009) 






may not be 
combined 




4. Other Bank 
Value 




Dickens et al. (2003) 
Theis and Dutta (2009) 
Foerster and Sapp (2006) 





may not be 
combined 











Gropp and Heider (2009) 
































Collins et al. (2009) 








may not be 
combined 









Collins et al. (1994) 
Collins et al. (1994) 
Dickens et al. (2003) 
Dickens et al. (2003) 
Foerster and Sapp (2006) 
Foerster and Sapp (2006) 
Junarsin and Ismiyanti (2009) 
Rousseau (2010) 
Theis and Dutta (2009) 






may not be 
combined 









Collins et al. (1994) 
Dickens et al. (2003) 
























5. What is the directionality of the effects in the continued relationship between bank value and dividend policy? 





Bessler and Nohel (1996) 
























Investigation of the different estimates employed in the studies for the dependent and 
independent constructs, and analysis of their possible combinations revealed eight subgroups 
of studies for Question 1 and one subgroup for Question 5. Table 2.6 lists all possible 
subgroups defined within each group of studies and reports the heterogeneity test results for 
them. 
According to Table 2.6, the subgrouping provides different results for studies investigating 
Question 1. For instance, several subgroups still show contradictory directions of the effect 
and low p-values for the heterogeneity test (subgroups 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7). Therefore, the studies 
in these subgroups cannot be combined. Although subgroup 2 demonstrates agreement 
amongst the studies in the directions of the effect, the heterogeneity test reveals no combining 
opportunity. Comparison of the significance levels of the studies shows that the heterogeneity 
test result is valid as one of the results is not significant (p=0.2090). Thus, the studies in 
subgroup 2 cannot be placed together, either. 
However, analysis of subgroups 5 and 8 provides some valuable results. The three studies 
in subgroup 8 investigated the effect of M/B ratio on Dyield and demonstrated its positive 
direction. Although the heterogeneity test revealed that the studies could not be grouped 
together (𝜒23=3.83, p=0.1473), comparison of the individual significance levels demonstrated 
that the test result was biased by a large difference between the significant p-values (0.0001, 
0.0001 and 0.0918). Therefore, the studies could be grouped together. The additional testing 
procedures confirmed the relationship. Moreover, the File Drawer test suggested that possibly 
there are another 28 papers on the relationship analysis.  
The Second result: The effect of Market-to-Book ratio on Dividend Yield is negative and 
strongly significant. 
Another result arises from the analysis of studies in subgroup 5. The two studies suggested 
that the decision to pay dividends (Divpay dummy) is positively affected by bank value. 
Although the heterogeneity test implied that the studies cannot be combined (𝜒22=1.75, 
p=0.1859), the individual significant p-values (0.0001 and 0.0210) demonstrate the contrary. 
The additional testing procedures also supported the relationship. This result confirms an 
overall positive effect of bank value on the decision to distribute dividends (not to be 
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confused with the measures considering the level of dividend distribution such as Dyield or 
Divpay).20 
The Third result: The effect of bank value on the decision to pay dividends – Divpay is 
positive and statistically significant. 
One subgroup was defined within a group of studies that were concerned with the analysis 
on the interrelation between bank value and dividend policy (Question 5). The two studies 
investigated the effect of cutting dividends on Market Value of the different-sized banks 
(estimated by Book Value) and demonstrated a negative relationship. The heterogeneity test 
revealed that the studies could be put together (𝜒22=0.23, p=0.6315). The additional testing 
procedures also confirmed the relationship. The File Drawer test suggested that there might be 
another eight studies investigating this research problem. 
The result above implies that for banks with a large book size cutting dividends has a 
stronger negative consequence, while for smaller banks cutting dividends is more likely to 
receive moderate market reaction.  
The Fourth result: The effect of negative dividend decision on bank market valuation is 
stronger for large banks (defined on the basis of Book Value). 
Summing up, the current meta-analysis produced several important results based on 
analysis of previous empirical studies. First, increasing the level of dividend distribution leads 
to a further increase in bank value. Second, banks with high Market-to-Book ratio distribute 
smaller dividends per share. Third, large bank value is associated with higher probability of 
dividend distribution. Fourth, large banks have stronger negative market reaction to their 
stocks after cutting dividends. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
The results of the current meta-analysis have several important implications from 
theoretical, practical and methodological points of view.  
                                                          




2.6.1 The theoretical perspective 
First of all, the results obtained are important from the theoretical perspective. Since 
several relationships were confirmed by the meta-analysis, they can be used for better 
understanding of the directionality of the effects in the interaction between value and dividend 
policy in banks. Although other relationships are not confirmed their analysis also allows us 
to derive some noteworthy results. 
Question 3 results discussion 
Investigation of the studies grouped under Question 3 supports a positive and significant 
effect of dividend payout on bank value (the First result). Since this result indicates that 
dividend distribution is good for banks, it provides strong empirical support for the ideas of 
the positive theorists’ school. The analysis result is based on strict sampling and testing 
procedures. Moreover, it has high external validity as observations include banks from 
different countries (European countries, USA) and includes operating times during normal 
and crisis periods. Therefore, the current meta-analysis result may have a significant impact 
on resolving the conflict between the two opposing schools that predict either positive or 
negative direction of the effect for the relationship, and demonstrates that practical evidence is 
quite ambiguous. 
Question 1 results discussion 
Analysis of the group of studies on Question 1 did not provide a strong significant result. 
Instead, the studies demonstrated contradictory directions of the effect and diverse 
significance levels, implying that the effect of bank size on dividend distribution is not very 
evident. The result supported the existence of two streams of research in the literature, the 
first suggesting that large banks are associated with higher payout and the second arguing the 
opposite. Comparison of the studies by country and period of observation did not clarify the 
reasons for heterogeneity. However, splitting the studies into several subgroups that use the 
same measures for the dependent and independent constructs provided some interesting 
results. One of the subgroups showed negative and significant effect of Market-to-Book ratio 
on Dividend Yield (the Second result). According to the previous literature this result can be 
given two different interpretations. One interpretation considers M/B ratio as a measure of the 
expensiveness of stocks, and indicates that a bank with a higher ratio tends to distribute fewer 
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dividends per share because of high market recognition and the absence of any need to 
maintain shareholders’ confidence. If we follow this view, the finding provides strong support 
for the Agency cost theory as it was interpreted by the second stream of the research on the 
first dimension of the relationship. The other interpretation regards M/B ratio as a measure of 
growth opportunities, and suggests that a bank with better projects tries to reserve cash for 
investment purposes and avoids high payouts to the shareholders. According to the latter view 
the Second result supports the Growth Opportunities argument employed by the second 
stream of the research on the first dimension, for explaining negative interaction between 
bank size and payout.  
Another result from the subgroup analysis showed that the effect of bank value on the 
decision to pay dividends is positive (the Third result). As the finding is based on two studies 
reported in the same paper, it is considered that the result’s theoretical importance is limited, 
and therefore it is not discussed here. 
The meta-analysis of the studies on Question 1 allows us to conclude that while there is 
strong negative interaction between the two estimates for the dependent and independent 
constructs (M/B ratio and Dyield), other relationships are not significant and cannot be 
confirmed. Therefore, the overall impact of bank size on dividend policy is not clear, and 
probably there are other factors that have a stronger effect on determining the level of 
dividend payout in a bank. 
Question 2 results discussion 
The studies grouped under Question 2 analyzed the effect of bank size on negative 
dividend policy decisions and demonstrated a negative relationship, suggesting fewer 
dividend cuts for large banks. This result is explained in the literature by the so-called ‘Too-
Big-To-Fail’ concept, which asserts that large banks have greater stability and higher 
reluctance to cut dividends even during periods of crisis. However, as the studies in the group 
are heterogeneous in their significance levels, more empirical support is required to confirm 
the relationship and the underlying theoretical concept. 
Question 4 results discussion 
The studies grouped under Question 4 also demonstrated agreement in the direction of the 
effect as they all showed the negative effect of cutting dividends on bank value. This result is 
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not surprising when we consider a bank’s special market role and the high importance of 
dividend payouts for a bank. In order to avoid negative market reaction or to shift risks from 
owners to creditors the bank continues to pay dividends in spite of suffering losses, and stops 
payout completely only shortly before it fails. Such behavior is described in the literature by 
the Positive Signaling and Risk Shifting theories. It is obvious that cutting dividends in a risk-
shifting and positive-signaling bank is considered as an indicator that the bank is close to 
failure, and leads to panic sales of shares. Analysis of the relationship is essential for 
verifying the underlying theories; however, because of the heterogeneity of the significance 
levels the result of the current research cannot be considered as complete. More new empirical 
evidence on the relationship can probably provide support for Risk Shifting and Positive 
Signaling arguments or reject their practical significance. 
Question 5 results discussion 
Finally, the fifth group of studies represents the most interesting part of the research 
connecting the two dimensions of the relationship into the interrelation system. The studies in 
this group tested the hypothesis that a large bank experiences stronger market reaction to its 
dividend policy choices, but showed mixed results. However, subgrouping of similar papers 
revealed a strongly significant negative effect of bank book size on changes of market value 
after dividend reductions. This result supports, on the one hand, the ‘Too-Big-To-Fail’ 
argument, implying higher stability and reliance on regulatory help for large banks, and, on 
the other hand, such theories as Signaling or Risk Shifting, explaining the development of 
latent problems in dividend-paying banks. The intuition of the relationship suggests that a 
large bank, relying on its reputation and external support in the event of crisis, continues to 
participate in further risk-taking activities and uses dividends as a mechanism for 
manipulating shareholders’ confidence or shifting risks from owners to taxpayers. Since a 
large bank allows the problems to increase to their critical points, cutting dividends indicates 
that the bank is no longer able to control the situation and has no regulatory support. 
Therefore, if a large bank reduces its dividend, this receives overreaction in the market when 
compared to the moderate reaction to dividend restriction by a small bank. 
The significant negative effect derived from the interrelation analysis can be considered as 
a link between the groups of studies analyzed by Questions 2 and 4. The former showed 
negative heterogeneous results for the relationship between bank size and dividend cutting (a 
large bank restricts its dividends more rarely) while the latter demonstrated negative 
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heterogeneous results for the effect of restricting dividends on bank value. Although the 
studies in each of the two groups cannot be put together, and the underlying relationships are 
not confirmed, the Fourth result of the meta-analysis implies that their results are probably 
close to the truth. It is likely that, with more new empirical analyses, the relationships 
analyzed by Questions 2 and 4 can be confirmed.  
2.6.2 The practical importance 
The practical importance of the research lies in the correct interpretation and application of 
the analysis results by all interested parties. The First result, that dividend distribution leads to 
further growth of bank value, is beneficial for banking management. As an increase in value 
for the owners is the primary aim of an honest manager, he or she should try to adopt the best 
possible dividend payout policy, which means an optimal balance between forming reserves 
and sharing profits. The Second result is highly useful for bank owners and potential investors 
as it implies that banks with a high M/B ratio distribute fewer dividends per share. If the 
investor is interested in high dividend return for a unit of investments, he or she should avoid 
buying stocks in a bank with a high M/B ratio. However, if dividend yield is not important for 
the investor who evaluates a bank according to the level of safety or growth opportunities, a 
high M/B ratio signals good investment choice. The Third result, implying that large bank size 
is associated with higher probability of dividend distribution, could also be essential from the 
investor’s point of view, although this result should be interpreted together with other banking 
signals. 
Lastly, the Fourth result refers to the interrelation analysis and has several practical 
applications. First of all, the result is beneficial for banking management, as the relationship is 
driven by two reasons related to particular management behavior in large banks: 1) poor or no 
previous dividend cutting experience, so that the market considers dividend restriction as a 
kind of outstanding negative event and overreacts, 2) information asymmetry that arises 
because a dividend cutting announcement is not accompanied by further information and 
explanation of the reasons (investment needs, forming reserves, etc.) The conclusion is that a 
large bank associated with the highest degree of information asymmetry should be interested 
in building effective and honest communications with its investors instead of simply relying 
on dividend as a communication tool. Second, the result is useful for different investors, as 
comparing the changes in large and small banks’ stocks during a period of banking dividend 
cuts is informative about the depth of an imminent crisis. Third, the result indicates such 
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regulatory faults as the Too-Big-To-Fail problem. Since a large bank relies heavily on 
regulatory support, it is not concerned about limiting its participation in risky projects or 
restricting dividends. However, if a bank is refused external help, cutting dividends can 
accelerate its failure. The main fault of the banking regulation system is that it allows excess 
reliance on its support by large banks, which, in the end, makes the regulators responsible for 
large banking failures. Demonstration of the concept on the empirical basis within the current 
research suggests that the Too-Big-To-Fail problem should be seriously analyzed and 
addressed by the implementation of adequate legal and practical measures. 
2.6.3 The methodological importance 
Finally, the methodological importance of the current meta-analysis lies in the justification 
for the grouping procedure, in particular: 1) distinguishing the studies on the two dimensions 
of the relationship, 2) distinguishing the studies that focus on different dividend policy 
options, and 3) defining groups for the studies that analyze the interrelation between bank 
value and dividend payout. Such grouping allows us, for instance, to confirm a positive effect 
of dividend payout on bank value (Question 3, the First result). Moreover, the results of the 
meta-analysis support the division of the studies of one group into several smaller subgroups, 
based on similar estimates for the dependent and independent constructs used. In particular, 











Research context: European banking industry 
 
 
After the crisis of 2007-2008, the dividend policy of banks was analyzed in tight 
relationship with corporate governance. Banking dividend policy and corporate governance 
were between the most hotly discussed topics in Banking. Poor corporate governance and 
dividend policy of troubled banks attracted the attention of numerous scholars all over the 
world (Acharya (2011); Boyallian and Ruiz-Verdu (2012); Bebchuk et al. (2010)). Moreover, 
poor corporate governance and unjustified dividend policy in banks were named between the 
main reasons of the banking crisis (BIS (2010); Mülbert (2010); Ferrarini and Ungureanu 
(2011)). 
Despite importance and relevance of the topic, the literature on the relationship between 
banking corporate governance and dividend policy is rather scarce. Moreover, the empirical 
literature lacks investigation on European banking, because of a dearth of corporate 
governance data for European banks. 
We develop this chapter in order to give more information on European banking sector and 
show its diversity. This chapter describes European banking sector as a research context for 
the second paper (Chapter 4). The description is based on a new hand-collected data set for 
109 listed banks21 located in 15 EU countries for the period 2005-2010.22 We focus on such 
banking characteristics as ownership structure, corporate governance, and executives’ 
compensation across different countries and legal origins. Following La Porta et al. (1998) we 
analyze four legal origins: English (Ireland and the UK), French (Belgium, France, Greece, 
                                                          
21 We describe our sampling procedure in Chapter 4.  
22 We provide detailed information on our data in the Appendix 1 (Table A1). 
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Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), German (Austria and Germany), 
and Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). 
 
Table 3.1 illustrates the main structural characteristics of banks across countries and legal 
origins. It employs two measures for bank size: number of employees, and total assets. 
Looking at these measures, we find that large banks dominate the banking sector in English 
legal origin countries, while small banks are mostly prevalent in Scandinavian countries. 
Banking sector in German and French origin countries is dominated by medium-sized banks. 
When looking at country level, large banks dominate the banking sector in the UK, France, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, while small banks dominate the banking 
sector in Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Denmark and Portugal. Medium-sized banks are 
mostly prevalent in Austria, Ireland, Italy and Sweden. 
The banks in English origin countries distribute larger dividends on equity (more than 6%) 
compared to banks in Scandinavian, French and German origin countries (about 4%, 4% and 
3%, correspondingly). When looking at country level, the banks in Sweden demonstrate the 
highest level of dividends per equity (about 9%), followed by banks in the UK, France and 
Finland (about 7%, 6% and 6%, correspondingly). The smallest dividend payer banks are 
located in Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark. 
Table 3.1 Main characteristics of EU banking. 
Country N of bank observations N of employees 
Total assets, 
mil.EUR DPE, % 
Austria  35 21087 62.93 1.26 
Belgium 16 39956 496.93 2.84 
Denmark 64 3367 44.58 1.44 
Finland 20 3695 20.42 6.13 
France 48 42421 614.99 6.46 
Germany 54 18227 309.77 3.71 
Greece 47 10424 33.03 1.93 
Ireland 12 19808 166.34 3.97 
Italy 121 15237 94.52 3.68 
Luxembourg 8 9171 40.38 1.01 
Netherlands 25 31845 330.93 4.69 
Portugal 23 10160 51.74 3.14 
Spain 48 37308 233.82 5.20 
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Sweden 24 14684 216.99 9.48 
United Kingdom 53 88824 691.31 6.69 
Total: 598 26011 229.94 4.06 
      
Legal origin     
English 65 76082 594.40 6.19 
French 336 23253 212.71 3.98 
German 89 19324 212.70 2.75 
Scand 108 5926 78.42 4.10 
 
Table 3.2 illustrates differences in banking ownership structure in the EU-15 countries. 
Banks in English origin countries usually have dispersed shareholding structure (75% and 
52% of all observations in Ireland and the UK, correspondingly). Usually these banks do not 
have any large shareholder with a 10% or more share stake (henceforth, large owner). In 
comparison, the banks in German origin countries have highly concentrated share ownership 
(The probability of dispersed ownership is only about 11%). In 89% of the observations, they 
have the first large owner. In 48% of the observations, they have also the second large owner. 
In all observed countries, the largest share stake usually belongs to a widely-held financial 
institution. The probability that financial institution is the largest owner ranges in different 
countries between 52-100%. The probability of family largest share ownership is relatively 
high in Spain, Portugal, the UK, Germany and Denmark (between 20-29%). The probability 
of government largest share ownership is relatively high for banks in Ireland, Finland, 
Belgium, Germany and Sweden (more than 15%). In most observed countries, the probability 
that non-financial institution holds the largest share stakes equals zero (The exceptions are 
Italy and Portugal). ‘Other type of the largest owner’ indicates ownership by a trust, related 
fund or foundation (including employee foundation and charity foundation). The probability 
that other type owner holds the largest share stake in a bank is relatively high in Austria and 



















































Austria  0 1.00 0.83 0 0 0.83 0 0.17 
Belgium 0 1.00 0.75 0 0.25 0.75 0 0 
Denmark 0.38 0.63 0.19 0.21 0.07 0.52 0 0.21 
Finland 0.30 070 0.40 0 0.30 0.60 0 0.10 
France 0.21 0.79 0.44 0 0.04 0.96 0 0 
Germany 0.19 0.81 0.24 0.22 0.17 0.61 0 0 
Greece 0.16 0.84 0.26 0 0.15 0.85 0 0 
Ireland 0.75 0.25 0 0 0.36 0.64 0 0 
Italy 0.36 0.64 0.21 0.06 0 0.74 0.09 0.12 
Luxembourg 0 1.00 0.13 0 0 1.00 0 0 
Netherlands 0.28 0.72 0.25 0 0 1.00 0 0 
Portugal 0.17 0.91 0.48 0.26 0 0.61 0.13 0 
Spain 0.31 0.69 0.13 0.29 0 0.58 0 0.13 
Sweden 0 1.00 0.38 0 0.17 0.83 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 0.52 0.50 0 0.23 0.12 0.65 0 0 
Total: 0.28 0.73 0.28 0.11 0.08 0.72 0.02 0.07 
         
Legal origin         
English 0.56 0.45 0 0.19 0.16 0.65 0 0 
French 0.26 0.74 0.28 0.09 0.04 0.78 0.04 0.06 
German 0.11 0.89 0.48 0.13 0.10 0.70 0 0.07 
Scand 0.28 0.72 0.27 0.12 0.14 0.61 0 0.14 
 
Table 3.3 illustrates the breakdown of a large number of board characteristics by country 
and legal origin. Board characteristics vary according to board organization structure, size, 
and composition, representation of different parties on the board, internal share ownership, 
and gender structure. 
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The main board specifications are the organization structures and size. Most banks in 
English and French origin countries have large one-tier boards23 (in average 14 members). 
Their boards usually comprise executive members (21-37% of board members), CEO (with 
the probability of 60-100%), and are less independent24 (only 50-55% of board 
independence). The probability that chairman performs CEO functions (board duality) is 
relatively high in these countries (about 16-17%). In comparison, banks in German and 
Scandinavian countries predominantly have a two-tier board structure and a smaller Board of 
Directors (henceforth, BoD) (approximately, 8-11 members). While the average percentage of 
executive directors on the board is very small (0-3%), the board independence is high (79-
95%). The average probability of board duality does not exceed 1%. 
The remuneration committees are present in all banks in Ireland, Sweden and the UK 
during the entire period of observations. Banks in all remaining countries (except for Austria 
and Germany) set up the committees starting from 2008-2009 only. 
Representation of different parties on the board is another relevant board feature. 
Government officials25 have seats on the boards of banks in Austria, Belgium, Greece, 
Sweden, and the UK. Part of the banks in Austria has a government representative on the 
board during the entire period of observation, while the other part has no government official 
on the board during the whole period.26 Most banks in Sweden have no state representative; 
although, government official has a seat on the board of Nordea Bank AB during the whole 
period of observations because Sweden state holds either the first (during 2005-2008) or the 
second (during 2009-2010) largest share stake in the bank. Government officials have seats on 
the boards of all banks in Belgium starting from 2008-2009. State representatives have seats 
on the boards of several banks in Greece and the UK starting from 2008-2009, too. In several 
banks government representation is related to significant state share ownership resulting from 
government bailout.27 However, in other banks government representation is not related to 
                                                          
23 In the Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.2), we give a more detailed explanation of how we distinguish between one-
tier and two-tier board structure. 
24 In the Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.3) we give a more detailed explanation of how we define ‘independent 
directors’. 
25 In the Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.1), we give a more detailed definition of the variable Government Official on 
the Board. 
26 Government representation is not related to large government ownership in these banks, since Austrian state 
does not hold any large stake in them.   
27 For instance, government owns significant stakes in some banks that have government representatives on their 
boards: one bank in Belgium (Ageas), two banks in Greece (Agricultural Bank of Greece and Attica Bank SA) 
and one bank in the UK (Lloyds Banking Group Plc).  
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state ownership. The number of government representatives on the board ranges between 0 
and 3, with the highest number for Austria. 
Looking at employee representation, we observe the difference between, on the one hand, 
English and French, and, on the other hand, German and Scandinavian legal origin countries. 
Banks in German and Scandinavian countries demonstrate a high probability of employee 
representation (90% and 67%, correspondingly), and relatively large number of employee 
representatives on the BoD (6 and 2, correspondingly). In comparison, all banks in English 
origin countries and most banks in French origin countries have no employee representative 
on the BoD (The exceptions are France and Greece where employee representatives have 
seats on the boards of banks with the probabilities of 52% and 10%, correspondingly). 
Table 3.3 compares also the gender structure of the boards across countries and legal 
origins. The number of females on the BoD is relatively high in English origin countries, 
some Scandinavian countries (namely, Sweden and Finland), and Belgium and Spain. The 
lowest average number of women on the BoD is observed in Germany, Luxembourg and 
Italy. The number of women on the management board (MntB) is relatively high in Sweden 
and Finland. The probability of female CEO is the highest in Sweden (25%), followed by 
France, Spain, and Denmark, where women govern banks with the probability of 2%. The 
sample provides no observation for female CEO in English and German legal origin 
countries. 
Finally, the heterogeneity in corporate governance may be observed looking at internal 
share ownership. CEO share ownership and management board share ownership are relatively 
high in Portugal, Germany, and the UK. BoD share ownership is also high in these countries, 
and in addition, in France and Spain. Banks in Scandinavian countries have the lowest levels 
of internal share ownership.  
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Table 3.3 Board characteristics. 
























































Austria  0 0 0 0 99.16 0.09 14.20 0.55 1.13 0.84 6.00 0.88 0.37 0 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Belgium 1.00 0 1.00 18.91 32.96 0.75 18.81 0.31 0.56 0 0 1.31 0.13 0 3.40 0.00 0.00 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 84.09 0.22 6.51 0 0 0.92 3.05 0.60 0.05 0.02 0.73 0.12 0.09 
Finland 0.20 0.05 0.20 2.43 68.04 0.45 8.25 0 0 0.11 0.11 1.45 1.65 0 1.35 0.51 0.42 
France 0.50 0.35 0.50 9.19 48.11 0.75 13.00 0 0 0.52 1.27 1.29 0.53 0.02 11.94 0.25 0.05 
Germany 0 0 0 0 92.45 0.02 9.44 0 0 0.94 6.52 0.10 0.00 0 9.68 7.50 7.45 
Greece 1.00 0.29 1.00 27.71 26.20 0.67 13.27 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.95 0.15 0 7.85 6.72 6.63 
Ireland 1.00 0.17 1.00 22.67 70.76 1.00 15.00 0 0 0 0 1.92 0.00 0 0.10 0.04 0.02 
Italy 0.87 0.05 0.34 27.93 51.40 0.41 14.61 0 0 0 0 0.39 0.12 0 8.25 0.86 0.80 
Luxembourg 1.00 0.50 1.00 38.78 28.00 0.50 12.33 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0    
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 93.75 0.52 8.04 0 0 0 0 0.88 0.00 0 0.09 0.89 0.39 
Portugal 0.74 0.26 0.74 21.23 58.49 0.78 19.00 0 0 0 0 0.52 0.26 0 14.79 14.64 14.30 
Spain 1.00 0.19 1.00 20.78 50.63 0.85 14.26 0 0 0 0 1.40 0.26 0.02 15.27 5.71 4.83 
Sweden 1.00 0 1.00 13.90 70.18 1.00 11.18 0.27 0.27 0.45 1.86 2.77 1.45 0.25 2.68 0.51 0.35 
United 
Kingdom 1.00 0.17 
1.00 40.04 51.81 1.00 13.96 0.04 0.04 0 0 1.47 0.42 0 8.03 7.41 5.91 
Total: 0.59 0.11 0.49 16.07 64.27 0.54 12.58 0.07 0.11 0.30 1.45 0.93 0.29 0.02 7.00 3.14 2.81 
                  
Legal origin                  
English 1.00 0.17 1.00 36.83 55.31 1.00 14.15 0.03 0.03 0 0 1.56 0.34 0 6.56 6.05 4.82 
French 0.78 0.16 0.60 20.55 50.02 0.61 14.13 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.22 0.83 0.20 0.01 9.64 2.97 2.67 
German 0 0 0 0 95.10 0.05 11.36 0.20 0.42 0.90 6.33 0.40 0.15 0 5.89 4.56 4.53 




Table 3.4 illustrates the breakdown of CEO characteristics by country and legal origin. We 
refer to such CEO characteristics as age, education, previous experience in the bank, tenure, 
share ownership, founder CEO and others. Average bank CEO is 54 years old, has 6 years 
tenure, holds about 3% of bank shares, and has previous career in the same bank with the 
probability of 73%. CEO is also a founder of a bank for about 5% of all observations. 
The oldest CEOs are observed in French origin countries (especially, Portugal, Belgium 
and France), while the youngest CEOs are observed in Scandinavian countries (especially, 
Sweden). However, average CEO tenure is the longest in Scandinavian countries (especially, 
Denmark – more than 11 year), while it is relatively short in French and English origin 
countries (around 5-6 years). In Belgium and Ireland average CEO tenure does not exceed 3 
years. The reason for short CEO tenure in French and English origin countries is a large 
number of CEO replacements during 2005-2010. The probability of forced CEO turnover is 
the highest in English origin countries (more than 6%), while it is less than 1% in 
Scandinavian countries.  The highest probability of forced CEO turnover is observed in 
Belgium, Ireland and France (13%, 25% and 8%, correspondingly). 
In most observed countries, the CEOs come to power after many years of career 
development. In other countries, the bank founders become CEOs. In Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Germany the probability that CEO has a previous career in the same bank is 
relatively low, while the probability that CEO is also a bank founder is high (48%, 16% and 
11%, correspondingly). 
CEO share ownership is relatively high in English origin countries (due to generous equity 
compensation schemes) and German origin countries (partly due to founder CEOs, and partly 
due to equity compensation schemes). CEO share ownership is relatively low in Scandinavian 
countries, where no CEO is a bank founder. 
Level of education is another CEOs’ feature of interest. The last column of Table 3.4 
illustrates the distribution of Ph.D. holder CEOs across different countries and legal origins. 
The probability that CEO holds a Ph.D. degree is the highest in Germany (55%), Austria 
(54%), and the Netherlands (44%). Overall, for 55% of all observations the CEOs in German 
origin countries hold Ph.D. degrees. The probability that CEO has a Ph.D. degree is relatively 




Table 3.4 CEO characteristics. 
























Austria  57 9.00 0.06 0.03 0 1.00 0.01 0.54 
Belgium 56 2.56 0.31 0.13 0.06 0.81 0.00 0.31 
Denmark 54 11.56 0.11 0.02 0 0.80 0.09 0 
Finland 53 3.65 0.15 0 0 0.70 0.42 0.25 
France 56 5.15 0.15 0.08 0 0.90 0.05 0.10 
Germany 53 7.51 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.34 7.45 0.55 
Greece 55 4.07 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.59 6.63 0.35 
Ireland 54 2.42 0.33 0.25 0 0.92 0.02 0.08 
Italy 53 4.14 0.20 0.02 0.03 0.79 0.80 0.15 
Luxembourg 56 9.14 0.14 0 0 1.00  0 
Netherlands 53 4.68 0.12 0.04 0.16 0.40 0.39 0.44 
Portugal 60 7.74 0.13 0.04 0.48 0.59 14.30 0.05 
Spain 54 6.44 0.15 0.02 0 0.68 4.83 0 
Sweden 46 4.63 0.13 0 0 0.75 0.35 0 
United 
Kingdom 54 7.38 0.09 0.01 0 0.83 5.91 0 
Total: 54 6.21 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.73 2.81 0.19 
          
Legal origin         
English 54 6.46 0.14 0.06 0 0.85 4.82 0.02 
French 55 4.93 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.73 2.67 0.17 
German 54 8.10 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.60 4.53 0.55 
Scand 52 8.50 0.12 0.01 0 0.77 0.23 0.05 
 
CEO compensation structure is another feature that illustrates the diversity in corporate 
governance across analyzed countries and legal origins. Table 3.5 provides information on 
CEOs’ cash compensation, salary, bonus, stock and option grant. In English and German 
origin countries the CEOs receive relatively high cash compensation, salary and bonuses, 
while compensation of Scandinavian CEOs is relatively modest. The highest average cash 
compensation for CEOs is observed in Austria (2980), Germany (2102), the UK (2334), and 
Spain (3036). The lowest average cash compensation is observed in Denmark (575), Sweden 
(523) and Portugal (850). 
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In addition to cash compensation, in English and German origin countries the CEOs 
receive also a share-based compensation with the probabilities of 70% and 35%, 
correspondingly. In comparison, in French origin countries the probability of share-based 
compensation for CEOs is lower than 15%. In Belgium and Portugal the probability of share-
based compensation equals zero. The probability of CEO option grant program ranges 
between 9-56% in different countries (the exception is Portugal where such probability equals 
zero). 
Table 3.5 provides also information on the management board cash compensation, salary, 
bonus, stock and option grant. In English and German origin countries the managers receive 
relatively high cash compensation, salary and bonuses, while Scandinavian managers receive 
relatively modest cash compensation. Average cash compensation of managers is high in the 
UK (8884), Spain (7596) and Greece (6988). It is low in Denmark (1154), France (2807) and 
Sweden (3713). In English origin countries, the managers receive share-based compensation 
with the probability of 74%. In French origin countries, this probability barely exceeds 20%.  
The disclosure of executives’ compensation information varies across different countries. 
While in most observed countries, the banks report aggregate information on the management 
board compensation, in other countries, the banks provide information for individual 
management board members. Greek banks do not provide information on CEO compensation. 
Luxembourg banks disclose no information related to compensation of CEO and the 




Table 3.5 Compensation of CEO and management board. 
































Austria  2983 1163 1431 0 0.50 3864 3023 1648 0.17 0.09 
Belgium 1456 814 540 0 0.56 6072 3727 2269 0.20 0.73 
Denmark 575 567 42 0.22 0.15 1154 1023 95 0.18 0.19 
Finland 1159 581 567 0.61 0.28 4230 933 117 0.65 0.25 
France 1118 584 522 0.26 0.24 2807 1767 1046 0.25 0.28 
Germany 2103 821 1242 0.40 0.15 6363 2841 3203 0.32 0.22 
Greece - - - - - 6988 10447 0.4 0 0.88 
Ireland 1610 848 518 0.67 0.33 4228 2182 1205 0.67 0.42 
Italy 1652 659 421 0.05 0.27 3726 2372 978 0.09 0.26 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - - - - 
Netherlands 1123 611 323 0.26 0.30 4313 2505 1541 0.30 0.30 
Portugal 850 555 413 0 0 6488 3120 3367 0.13 0.26 
Spain 3036 1296 1669 0.36 0.09 7596 3332 3616 0.38 0.09 
Sweden 523 367 73 0.26 0.32 3713 2994 184 0.21 0.32 
United 
Kingdom 2335 954 1314 0.72 0.30 8884 3620 4736 0.75 0.60 
Total: 1637 756 746 0.30 0.24 4861 2801 2222 0.30 0.29 
           
Legal origin           
English 2201 935 1167 0.71 0.31 8024 3355 4084 0.74 0.57 
French 1660 742 638 0.15 0.23 4946 2905 1937 0.20 0.28 
German 2215 865 1266 0.35 0.20 5422 2892 2765 0.26 0.16 




Summarizing the results above, we conclude that there is a high diversity in dividend policy, 
ownership structure, corporate governance, and compensation structure in the EU-15 banking. 
This diversity is observed on the levels of countries and legal origins across a large number of 
features. 
The sole common feature across different countries and legal origins is the largest 
ownership by a widely-held financial institution. In all observed countries, the largest share 
stake usually belongs to a widely-held financial institution. Another feature that seems to be 
similar across different countries and legal origins is under-representation of women on the 
corporate bodies of banks. The proportion of women directors and women managers is far from 
being half of the BoD size and management board size, correspondingly. The probability of 
female CEOs is also extremely low.  
 
Next chapter introduces the second study. It focuses on such corporate governance 
characteristic as CEO power and analyzes its effect on dividend policy in European banks. The 
chapter employs different proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, board duality, CEO tenure, 
and unforced CEO turnover events. The chapter analyzes also how the effect of CEO power on 











Are CEO power, monitoring incentives, and dividends related? 
Evidence from a regulated industry28 
 
 
The existing literature on CEO entrenchment and dividend policy argues that entrenched 
managers tend to distribute higher payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority 
shareholders. Empirical literature finds that in Western Europe dividends dampen expropriation 
of minority shareholders. What happens if monitoring from regulatory authorities is in conflict 
with the interest of minority shareholders? In banking, monitoring from minority shareholders 
may impose weaker pressure on bank CEOs than monitoring from regulators. The latter are 
prevalently concerned about protection of the creditors of the bank (depositors) and bank 
soundness, and therefore may favor conservative dividend policies (in particular, low ratios of 
dividends to equity). Therefore, entrenched CEOs may distribute lower dividend payout ratios 
to deter scrutiny from regulators. Low payout ratios also allow using excess cash for private 
benefits of the CEO. 
In this chapter, we investigate the role of CEO power on bank dividend policy in a sample 
of 109 listed banks in the EU-15 (Western Europe) countries for the period 2005-2010. We 
employ different proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, board duality, CEO tenure, and 




                                                          
28 This study has been submitted to Journal of Corporate Finance. It was developed in collaboration with Prof. 




The existing literature on dividend policy and expropriation from insiders in non-financial 
firms documents that dividends dampen expropriation of minority shareholders in Western 
Europe (Faccio et al. (2001)). The literature on managerial entrenchment posits that entrenched 
managers distribute higher dividend payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority 
shareholders (Hu and Kumar (2004)). Therefore, in Western Europe dividend payout ratios 
should be higher for firms where expropriation from powerful insiders is more likely. 
 Is this true even for banks? Do powerful (entrenched) CEOs distribute higher dividend 
payout ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders?  
When the firm is a bank, the objectives of managers and shareholders can enter into conflict 
with the objectives of other powerful stakeholders, such as depositors and regulators.29 
Monitoring from minority shareholders is not the only concern of bank CEOs, and monitoring 
from regulators may acquire a more prominent role. In particular, regulators may favor low 
ratios of dividends to equity, since large ratios would increase default probability. Accordingly, 
high dividend payout ratios may attract more scrutiny from regulators. Therefore, the relation 
between CEO power and payout ratios in banks is not necessarily positive. In fact, entrenched 
CEOs may distribute lower payout ratios to deter scrutiny from regulators. This idiosyncrasy of 
the banking sector warrants an investigation of the role of dividends in shaping the dynamics of 
the agent-principal relation in banking. To this day, however, a study of the relation between 
CEO power and dividends in banks is still missing.30 
In this chapter, we test these two perspectives on managerial entrenchment by investigating 
the association between CEO power and dividends in European banks. To discriminate 
between the ‘expropriation’ and the ‘monitoring’ perspectives on managerial entrenchment, we 
employ two different proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, and board duality. We expect a 
U-shaped relation between payout ratios and CEO ownership, regardless of whether the 
‘expropriation’ or ‘monitoring’ perspective is valid. We allow for this nonlinear relation by 
                                                          
29 Bank executives are subject to the scrutiny of different stakeholders. Schaeck et al. (2012) provide evidence of 
shareholder discipline for risky institutions, while there is no evidence of discipline from debt holders and 
regulators.  
30 Since CEOs tend to be risk-averse (Smith and Stulz (1985)), entrenchment should reduce bank risk taking. 
Entrenchment can thus reduce the probability of bank default and, in the presence of government-sponsored safety 
nets (such as deposit insurance), may benefit the public as a whole. Recent contributions provide evidence of a 
nexus between CEO power and bank risk-taking (Pathan (2009)), and CEO compensation incentives and bank 
risk-taking (Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011)).  
58 
 
including the square of CEO ownership in our regressions. Using board duality as an additional 
proxy allows us to discriminate between the ‘monitoring’ and the ‘expropriation’ perspective. 
The former is consistent with a positive relation between board duality and payout ratios, while 
the latter is consistent with a negative relation. In robustness checks, we also employ CEO 
tenure and unforced CEO turnovers as alternative proxies for CEO power. We also control for 
other standard determinants of dividend payout ratios, such as size, profitability, and growth 
opportunities (Fama and French (2001)).31   
We bring to bear a new hand-collected dataset on bank ownership structure and corporate 
governance for 109 listed banks from EU-15 countries and combine this dataset with data 
collected from Bankscope on dividends and other variables that are believed to influence 
dividend policy.  
There are several reasons we choose to home in on the relation between CEO power and 
dividend payout ratios of EU-15 (i.e. Western Europe) banks. First, we focus on Western 
Europe because the existing literature documents that in Western Europe dividends dampen 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Faccio et al. (2001)). Therefore, we would expect that 
for firms, for which there is a higher probability of expropriation from insiders (in this case, the 
CEO), dividend payout ratios are higher. Second, the topic of corporate governance in financial 
institutions (Erkens et al. (2012)), and European banks in particular (Arnaboldi and Casu 
(2011)),32 has recently drawn attention from both academics and policy makers. Poor corporate 
governance can increase the probability of bank failures, with potentially large negative 
externalities due to contagion risk, disruption of the payment system, and costs deriving from 
deposit insurance (BIS (2010); Mülbert (2010)).33  For these reasons, bank directors should 
comply with higher and broader standards of care (Macey and O’Hara (2003)). Despite this, 
the relation between dividend policy and corporate governance in European banks is an under-
researched topic, probably because of a lack of corporate governance data for European banks.  
By way of preview, our findings can be summarized as follows.  
                                                          
31 Blau and Fuller (2008) develop a model that emphasizes the trade-off between dividends and financial 
flexibility. Managers that believe the firm has good future growth opportunities may desire a higher level of 
financial flexibility. 
32 Corporate governance can be defined as ‘the allocation of authority and responsibilities, i.e. the manner in 
which the business and affairs of a bank are governed by its board and senior management’ (BIS (2010), p. 5). 
33 However, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned to 
those of shareholders did not perform better during the crisis. Their findings are at odds with the view that lack of 
alignment between CEOs and shareholder incentives was at the root of the financial crisis.   
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First, we find a U-shaped relation between CEO ownership and payout ratios: for 
percentages of CEO ownership below five and a half percent, CEO ownership is negatively 
related to payout ratios. After this critical level, the relation becomes positive. These findings 
are consistent with both a ‘monitoring’ perspective (i.e. CEO power is positively related to 
dividends) and an ‘expropriation’ perspective (i.e. CEO power is negatively related to 
dividends). However, results for other proxies of CEO power support the ‘expropriation’ 
perspective, suggesting that powerful CEOs tend to distribute lower payout ratios. In particular, 
we find a negative relation between board duality and payout ratios and between CEO tenure 
and payout ratios, and a positive relation between unforced CEO turnovers and payout ratios. 
The results are robust to different econometric specifications (including different sets of control 
variables and using different econometric techniques), although the results for CEO tenure are 
weaker. We show that endogeneity in the form of reverse causality is unlikely to have driven 
our results. Using a combination of difference-in-differences and matching techniques, we find 
confirmation that board duality negatively affects payout ratios, while unforced CEO turnover 
events positively affect payout ratios.  
Second, we provide robust evidence that when a widely-held financial institution is the 
largest owner of the bank dividend payout ratios increase, indicating that external monitoring 
from other financial institutions can reduce expropriation. This is consistent with Faccio et al 
(2001), who document that in Western Europe affiliation to a group can dampen expropriation. 
However, internal monitoring from independent directors reduces payout ratios. The latter 
result is consistent with the fact that internal monitoring in banks could have bank safety as the 
primary objective.  
Finally, when the government is the largest owner or there is a government official on the 
board, dividend payout ratios are lower, suggesting that the government is incentivized to put 
bank safety and the interest of creditors before the interest of minority shareholders. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature and develops 
the hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and the data set. Section 4.4 reports the 





4.2  Literature review and hypotheses 
Powerful CEOs can invest in non-value maximizing projects (i.e. projects with a negative 
Net Present Value, NPV) to increase their own utility (e.g. for empire-building objectives).34 
Shareholders can monitor CEOs to prevent expropriation, but monitoring can be too costly if 
ownership is dispersed and a free-rider problem arises (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).  
A partial solution to this problem is provided by dividends. Dividends can be a monitoring 
device for shareholders, because they reduce the amount of cash that CEOs can dissipate in 
non-value maximizing projects (Jensen (1986)) and increase the frequency at which firms seek 
funds on the capital market, which subjects CEOs to stronger scrutiny from outside investors 
(Easterbrook (1984)).  
According to the managerial entrenchment literature, entrenched CEOs can increase payout 
ratios to discourage monitoring from minority shareholders (Hu and Kumar (2004)). However, 
powerful CEOs may not need to pay dividends to discourage monitoring if monitoring from 
minority shareholders is weak, since entrenched CEOs can fend off take-over threats (Stulz 
(1988)). In this case, entrenched CEOs can invest in non-value maximizing projects with cash 
that minority shareholders would prefer to receive in the form of dividends. A possible reason 
for poor external monitoring is weak protection of the rights of minority shareholders (La Porta 
et al. (2000)). Such might be the case in certain parts of Western Europe, where the market for 
corporate control is relatively inefficient.  
In banking, entrenched CEOs may be more worried about external monitoring from banking 
regulators than from minority shareholders. Banking regulators are primarily concerned about 
bank safety and financial stability. Since low dividend payout ratios (dividends to equity) tend 
to increase the bank capital buffer (other things being equal), banking regulators tend to favor 
conservative dividend policies, which may lead to expropriation of minority shareholders in the 
form of lower payout ratios.  
We argue that the entrenchment hypothesis can lead to different predictions, depending on 
whether a ‘monitoring’ or an ‘expropriation’ perspective prevails. The ‘monitoring’ perspective 
posits a positive relation between dividend payout ratios and CEO power. The ‘expropriation’ 
perspective posits a negative relation.  
                                                          
34 Alternatively, bank CEOs can decide not to take projects with positive NPV (Vallascas and Hagendorff (2012)).       
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In section 4.2.1, we develop the entrenchment hypothesis, according to the existing 
literature for non-financial corporations. In section 4.2.2, we develop ancillary hypotheses 
regarding the relation between bank dividend policy and bank ownership structure and board 
characteristics. 
4.2.1  The entrenchment hypothesis: ‘Monitoring’ and ‘expropriation’ 
The entrenchment hypothesis argues that managers who fear disciplinary actions tend to pay 
higher dividends as a protection against such actions (Zwiebel (1996); Fluck (1999); Allen et 
al. (2000)). The literature on nonfinancial firms provides support to the entrenchment 
hypothesis (Hu and Kumar, 2004). The entrenchment hypothesis is closely related to one of the 
classical theories for why firms pay dividends. The ‘monitoring hypothesis’ (Easterbrook 
(1984) and Jensen (1986)) posits that dividends are paid to decrease agency costs between 
managers and shareholders.35 By paying dividends, managers increase the utility of minority 
shareholders and decrease monitoring incentives.36 In the presence of other mechanisms that 
address this issue, dividends may be less important (Noronha et al. (1996); Onali (2012)). 
Alternative monitoring mechanisms may be a large shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), 
such as an institutional investor (Zeckhauser and Pound (1990)), insider ownership (Farinha 
(2003)) and, as a particular case of the latter, CEO ownership (Schooley and Barney (1994)).  
We employ two main proxies for CEO power: Board Duality and CEO Ownership. The 
former is a dummy variable, which takes on the value one if the CEO chairs the board, and 
zero otherwise. The latter is the percentage of shares held by the CEO. In robustness tests, we 
employ alternative proxies for CEO power. 
The literature on managerial entrenchment in non-financial firms has provided evidence of a 
U-shaped relation between CEO ownership and payout ratios. Since CEO ownership decreases 
agency costs between shareholders and the CEO, this finding is consistent with the view that 
CEO ownership and dividends are substitute monitoring devices, until CEO ownership reaches 
a critical level. After this critical level, CEO ownership ceases to be a monitoring device due to 
                                                          
35Alternative hypotheses relating to dividend policy are the signaling hypothesis (Bhattacharya (1979); 
Litzenberger and Ramaswami (1982); John and Williams (1985); Miller and Rock (1985)), and the free-cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen (1986)).   
36 Dividends can mitigate the conflict between strong and weak stakeholders (Bøhren et al. (2012)). This is in line 
with the ‘substitute model’ for dividends: Dividends are paid by insiders to establish a good reputation and reduce 
the conflict with minority shareholders (La Porta et al. (2000)). According to the ‘outcome model’, dividends are 
the ‘outcome’ of regulation that protects the right of minority shareholders (La Porta et al. (2000)). 
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entrenchment-related agency costs, and the relation between CEO ownership and dividend 
payout ratios becomes positive (Farinha (2003)). This interpretation of the U-shaped relation is 
consistent with a ‘monitoring perspective’ of the entrenchment hypothesis. This perspective 
focuses on the monitoring from minority shareholders. 
   While the ‘monitoring perspective’ may explain the U-shaped relation between CEO 
ownership and dividend payout ratios, there is an alternative explanation. CEOs are 
incentivized to decrease dividend payout ratios to expropriate minority shareholders (i.e. use 
cash that could be distributed to shareholders to invest in non-value maximizing projects). As 
CEO ownership increases, CEOs can expropriate minority shareholders to a greater extent, due 
to the higher level of entrenchment that reduces the probability of being fired. However, after a 
critical level of CEO ownership, the benefit of expropriating minority shareholders by 
decreasing payout ratios is offset by the opportunity cost of receiving a larger dividend. This 
interpretation of the U-shaped relation is consistent with an ‘expropriation perspective’ of the 
entrenchment hypothesis.37  
The key difference between the ‘monitoring’ and ‘expropriation’ perspective is that 
according to the former the CEO needs to acquire a minimum percentage of shares to entrench 
himself, while according to the latter expropriation can start from low levels of ownership, 
since monitoring from minority shareholders is of negligible importance relative to monitoring 
from regulators. In other words, in the case of bank CEOs, expropriating minority shareholders 
by distributing low payout ratios has the additional advantage of discouraging monitoring from 
the regulators.  
According to the ‘monitoring’ perspective of the entrenchment hypothesis, insider 
ownership and dividends may be substitute monitoring devices, and therefore Board Duality 
should be positively related to dividend payout ratios, while CEO Ownership should be 
negatively related to dividend payout ratios. However, the benefits of monitoring from insiders 
may become negligible after a certain threshold is reached (Schooley and Barney (1994); 
Farinha (2003)), which implies a U-shaped relation between CEO Ownership and dividend 
payouts. These considerations lead to two testable hypotheses: 
                                                          
37 As Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) point out, as CEO ownership increases, the incentives of the CEO 
converge with the incentives of the minority shareholders. In this respect, the expropriation perspective is 
consistent with a ‘liquidity theory’ of dividends: In cases where the CEO is also a very large owner, he may 




H1a: ‘Entrenchment’ hypothesis using a ‘monitoring’ perspective: Board Duality 
increases dividend payout ratio and there is a U-shaped relation between CEO Ownership 
and dividend payout ratios.   
To allow for a U-shaped relation between CEO Ownership and dividend payouts, we 
include a squared term, CEO Ownership Squared, in our regressions. According to H1a, the 
expected sign on CEO Ownership is negative (since dividends and insider ownership are 
substitute monitoring devices), while the expected sign on Board Duality and CEO Ownership 
Squared is positive. 
Hypothesis H1a derives from the prediction that entrenched managers employ dividends as 
a monitoring device. However, entrenched managers may not be interested in using dividends 
as a monitoring device, provided that they are powerful enough to fend off take-over threats. 
Entrenched managers without strong external monitoring may be able to extract rent from 
minority shareholders. This consideration leads us to posit a negative relation between Board 
Duality and payout ratios. The relation between CEO Ownership and payout ratios, on the 
other hand, remains as predicted by H1a. When the CEO owns a small percentage of shares, he 
may regard dividends as an opportunity cost larger than the benefits deriving from dissipating 
cash in non-value maximizing projects, for instance with the purpose of empire building and 
perquisite consumption. However, as the percentage of shares she owns increases, CEO’s 
incentives converge with the interest of ordinary shareholders (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos 
(1990)). Therefore, a negative coefficient on CEO Ownership and a positive coefficient on 
CEO Ownership Squared are consistent with a trade-off between the benefits from 
expropriation at the expense of shareholders and opportunity costs from not receiving a 
dividend. 
H1b: ‘Entrenchment’ hypothesis using an ‘expropriation’ perspective: Board Duality 
decreases dividend payout ratios and there is a U-shaped relation between CEO Ownership 
and dividend payout ratios.   
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relation between CEO ownership and dividend payout ratios 
according to H1a and H1b. Both of them predict a U-shaped relation. However, the two 
hypotheses disagree on the primary cause of this relation: H1a predicts that it is monitoring 
from minority shareholders (which can be reduced by increasing the dividend payout ratio); 
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H1b predicts that it is the net benefit resulting from expropriation of minority shareholders 
(which can be increased by reducing the dividend payout ratio).   
In the Appendix 2 (Section A2.1), we provide a more detailed explanation of Figure 4.1 by 
examining the relation between CEO ownership, agency costs and expropriation benefits, and 
how dividends affect this relation.  
4.2.2 Other hypotheses  
In cases where the CEO is also a very large owner, he may attempt to diversify his portfolio 
by increasing liquidity in the form of dividend payments (Beck and Zorn (1982)). This 
behavior may lead to larger dividend payout ratios: 
H2: ‘Liquidity’ hypothesis: When the CEO is also the largest bank shareholder, dividend 
payout ratios are higher.  
According to H2, the coefficient on a dummy variable that identifies banks for which the 
CEO is also the largest owner (CEO as the Largest Owner) should be positive. This is 
consistent with Hu and Kumar (2004), who find that executive stock options increase dividend 
payouts. Note that this is also consistent with a U-shaped relation between CEO Ownership and 
dividend payouts (for large levels of ownerships, CEO Ownership increases dividend payout 
ratios), and in particular it is consistent with H1b: for high levels of CEO ownership, the 
incentives of CEOs are similar to those of minority shareholders. However, H2 is inconsistent 
with H1a, since the latter posits that dividends are not determinants of the objective function of 
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A key determinant of the relation between dividend payout ratios and CEO entrenchment is 
the level of external monitoring (Hu and Kumar (2004)). Large investors are able to exert 
stronger monitoring than minority shareholders, and therefore large shareholders on the board 
and institutional investor ownership may act as substitute monitoring devices for dividends:  
H3: ‘Alternative monitoring mechanism’ hypothesis: When a large bank shareholder is 
on the board, or when the largest bank shareholder is a widely-held institutional investor, 
dividend payout ratios are lower. 
To test H3, we construct the following dummy variables: a dummy Large Owner on the 
Management Board (Laeven and Levine (2009)), which takes on the value one if an owner 
holding at least 10% of bank shares is on the management board, and zero otherwise; and the 
dummies Widely-held Financial Institution as the Largest Owner and Widely-held Non-
Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner. These dummies take on the value one if an 
institutional investor (financial institution or non-financial corporation) is the largest 
shareholder and zero otherwise. According to H3, the coefficients on these dummies should be 
negative.  
However, H3 is at odds with some of the recent findings in the empirical literature. As Khan 
(2006) points out, the presence of large institutional investors may lead to larger dividend 
payouts if this is in line with their preferred payout policy. Similarly, Short et al. (2002) find 
that institutional investors are positively associated with dividend payout ratios. Khan (2006) 
and Short et al. (2006) findings may be consistent with an ‘expropriation reduction’ hypothesis. 
It can be argued that the presence of institutional investors increases the degree of protection of 
minority shareholders, reducing the probability of expropriation. Faccio et al. (2001) find that 
in the specific case of Western Europe, group-affiliated corporations (corporations controlled 
by widely held financial institutions or non-financial corporations) pay larger dividend payout 
ratios. Moreover, external monitoring from widely-held institutional investors may push 
entrenched managers with inferior investment opportunities to make higher payouts (Hu and 
Kumar (2004)). Large owners on the management board may also increase the intensity of 
external monitoring on entrenched managers. Following these arguments, we develop an 




H4: ‘Expropriation reduction’ hypothesis: When the largest bank shareholder is a widely-
held institutional investor, or when a large bank shareholder is on the board, dividend 
payout ratios are higher. 
We also examine the effect of government ownership and the presence of a government 
official on the board. According to Gugler (2003), when the government acquires ownership of 
a firm, there is a double principal-agent problem: between the government and the citizens (the 
government is the agent), and between the government and the managers (the government is 
the principal). Since government ownership should result in even stronger agency costs, a 
monitoring hypothesis suggests that government ownership should lead to higher dividend 
payouts: 
H5: ‘Double principal-agent problem’ hypothesis: When the largest bank shareholder is 
the government, dividend payout ratios are higher. 
   We measure the effect of government ownership with a dummy variable Government as 
the Largest Owner. This dummy takes on the value one if the government is the largest 
shareholder and zero otherwise. 
However, the government’s objective could be twofold: 1) maximizing shareholder value; 
2) protecting depositors’ rights. The latter objective could be a consequence of possible 
reputational and political damage in the case of bank liquidation, or could be associated with 
concerns of potential losses deriving from deposit insurance schemes or other types of (implicit 
or explicit) guarantees. Since high dividend payout ratios can reduce the ability of a bank to 
pay back its creditors, government ownership may lead to lower dividend payout ratios. This 
would reduce the possibility that shareholders extract rents from depositors: 
H6: ‘Depositor protection’ hypothesis: When the largest bank shareholder is the 
government, dividend payout ratios are lower.  
 According to H5 (H6) the coefficient on Government as the Largest Owner should be 
positive (negative). We employ an additional measure for the effect of government intervention 
on bank dividend policy: Government Official on the Board.38 This is a dummy variable, which 
equals one when there is at least one government official on the board, and zero otherwise. The 
                                                          




expected sign of the coefficient on Government Official on the Board is negative according to 
H6. 
 
4.3.  Methodology and data 
This section describes the methodology and data set. Section 4.3.1 describes the 
econometric framework and the main variables of our models. Section 4.3.2 describes the data 
set. 
4.3.1  Methodology 
The literature on the entrenchment hypothesis for nonfinancial firms is heterogeneous in 
terms of econometric methodology and dependent variable chosen for the empirical analysis. 
Since regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the bank, and common equity is 
a key component of the regulatory capital ratios in banking, we employ the ratio dividend to 
equity as dependent variable, following previous literature on bank dividend policy.39 Using 
equity in the denominator rather than earnings has an additional advantage: it eliminates the 
problem of dealing with negative dividend payout ratios (Acharya et al. (2012); Onali (2010)).   
The baseline specifications to test H1 (regarding the relation between CEO power and 
dividend payout ratios) are as follows: 
DPEi,t = f(Board Dualityi,t, Ci,t)        [1] 
DPEi,t = f(CEO Ownershipi,t, CEO Ownership Squaredi,t, Ci,t)    [2] 
Where i = 1,2,…, N labels panel units (banks), t = 1,2,…, Ti labels time periods (years), and 
Ci,t is a vector of control variables to account for bank-level and country-level characteristics. 
Note that, since our panel is unbalanced, Ti = T does not apply for all banks in the panel. The 
dependent variable, DPE, is dividends to equity.  
                                                          
39 Adjusting for share repurchases does not change substantially our results. 
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Our bank-level control variables are: Bank Size, Tier1 Capital, Growth Opportunities, and 
Profitability.40 We proxy for Bank Size using the natural logarithm of book value of total bank 
assets. Large firms tend to pay more dividends (Fama and French (2001)). The variable Tier1 
Capital proxies for the impact of capital requirements deriving from the Basle Accord (1988 
and subsequent revisions). It is constructed as a ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. 
We expect a positive coefficient on Tier 1 Capital: For banks close to the minimum capital 
requirement, scrutiny from regulators should discourage generous dividend policies.  
We measure Growth Opportunities as market value of bank equity divided by book value of 
bank equity, which also proxies for the quality of a bank investment opportunity set (Hu and 
Kumar (2004)). Since poor investment opportunities should exacerbate CEO incentives to 
discourage monitoring, for unregulated firms Growth Opportunities should have a negative 
effect on DPE. However, in banks the expected relation may be positive if monitoring from 
regulators is more important than monitoring from minority shareholders: Only banks with 
good investment opportunities may afford to pay high payout ratios.  
Finally, we proxy for bank Profitability using a ratio of net income to average total assets 
(Fama and French (2001)). Finally, we use GDP per Head (natural logarithm of country GDP 
her head) to account for differences in time-varying country-level economic conditions,41 and 
year dummies to account for unobservable, time-varying effects for the European banking 
industry, which are assumed to have the same impact on dividend policy in all observed banks.  
To test H2-H6 we change [1] and [2] as follows 
DPEi,t = f(Board Dualityi,t,Qi,t, Ci,t)       [3] 
DPEi,t = f(CEO Ownershipi,t, CEO Ownership Squaredi,t, Qi,t, Ci,t)   [4] 
Where Qi,t is a vector of variables controlling for the impact of different characteristics of 
bank i’s ownership structure or board (we insert each variable one at a time, to reduce 
collinearity). The introduction of Qi,t allows testing hypotheses H2-H6.  
                                                          
40 Size, profitability, and growth opportunities are believed to be the main drivers of dividend policy for non-
financial firms (Fama and French (2001)). Onali (2012) employs Tier 1 Capital as a proxy for capital 
requirements.  
41 We cannot employ country dummies, since their coefficients would be unidentified in fixed-effect regressions. 
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To allow for unobservable, time-invariant bank-specific characteristics, for all specifications 
we employ a Within-Group model (also named Fixed-Effect model).42 The WG model is an 
OLS regression that uses transformed variables rather than the original ones. The dependent 
and independent variables are demeaned (by subtracting the average value for each panel unit 
from each observation) to eliminate the time-invariant component of the error term, which 
allows for unobservable bank-specific characteristics. Since demeaning eliminates any time-
invariant component at the bank level, this technique allows for endogeneity due to correlation 
between an explanatory variable and the time-invariant component of the error:  











     [5] 
where yi,t is the dependent variable, xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables, vi is the time-
invariant component of the error term for bank i, ui,t is the idiosyncratic component of the error 

















43 and similarly for 
xi,t and ui,t.  
Since vi is time-invariant, it disappears after the demeaning procedure, and this eliminates 
endogeneity in the form: E(xi,t, vi) ≠ 0. Other forms of endogeneity (e.g. simultaneity bias) are 
unlikely to affect our analysis. As argued by Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), banks can 
adjust their ownership structure and board characteristics only in the long run. However, 
dividends can easily be adjusted in the short run. As a result, it is unlikely that changes in 
dividend payout ratios cause short-run changes in bank ownership structure and board 
characteristics, rendering the probability of endogeneity trivial. Hu and Kumar (2004) also 
argue that corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure that determine 
managerial entrenchment are exogenous in the short and medium run.  
We adjust the standard errors using the ‘Huber sandwich estimator’. The WG model with 
cluster-robust standard errors can address inconsistency of the OLS estimator (if E(xi,t, vi) ≠ 0) 
                                                          
42 The same results can be obtained including bank dummies in the equations (Least Squares Dummy Variables 
model). Hausman tests (for specifications without robust standard errors) suggest that the WG model be preferred 
to the Random Effect model. 
43 Adding the grand means y , x , andε  has the desirable advantage to provide an intercept estimate (Cameron 
and Trivedi (2010)). 
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and corrects the downward-bias (due to intra-group correlation) of the OLS standard errors 
(Cameron and Trivedi (2010)).44   
4.3.2  Data and descriptive statistics 
We build a new hand-collected data set with information on board composition and 
ownership structure for 109 listed banks (commercial banks, bank holding companies, and 
cooperative banks)45 located in 15 EU countries for the period 2005-2010.46   
We start with the universe of European publicly quoted banks listed on Bankscope (EU-15). 
For the sake of comparability, we focus on banks that use International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as accounting standards. We home in on institutions classified as: 
commercial banks, cooperative banks, and bank holdings and holding companies. A total 
number of 127 banks satisfy these selection criteria. Next, we exclude institutions for which 
data on gross loans is unavailable (6, resulting in 121 remaining banks).47 Finally, to allow 
hand-collection of information on corporate governance and ownership structure, we stipulate 
that there is at least one annual report (available on the bank’s web site) 48 for the period 2005–
2010. These criteria result in a sample of 109 banks.  
The sample banks are mostly located in Italy, consistent with Vallascas and Hagendorff 
(2012).49 Data availability for bank ownership structure varies considerably depending on the 
country. For Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, 
information on ownership structure and in particular on insider ownership is generally 
available (e.g., number of shares held by the CEO, management board members, and members 
of the Board of Directors, henceforth BoD). For Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
and Italy ownership structure data is generally available, but insider ownership data is scarce. 
                                                          
44 Since the average number of observations available for each bank is less than five, and for consistency with the 
managerial entrenchment literature for non-financial firms (e.g. Farinha (2003), and Hu and Kumar (2004)), we 
refrain from using a partial-adjustment model á la Lintner (1956).   
45 All cooperative banks in our sample are publicly traded and, therefore, are partly owned by non-members. In 
Section 4.3, we offer robustness tests excluding cooperative banks from the sample.  
46 We collect information from different sources: bank annual reports (including notes to financial statements), 
corporate governance reports, and other documents available from the web sites of the banks, banking regulators 
and authorities, and other publicly available sources.  
47 Our purpose is to exclude firms that are not in the lending business, as in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).   
48 The data is collected on an annual basis. 
49 The geographic distribution of our sample differs from that of Vallascas and Hagendorff (2012) due to different 
selection criteria. In particular, Vallascas and Hagendorff (2012) stipulate that data on CEO compensation be 
available for at least five years. 
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Finally, for Greece and Luxembourg, data on ownership structure is generally available, but 
there is no information on insider ownership.50  
Table 4.1 presents the main steps of our sample construction.  Our final sample is an 
unbalanced panel with 598 bank-year observations.51 Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the 
number of banks per country and type of bank, and the sample representativeness relative to 
the population of listed banks in the EU-15 countries over the sample period.  
Table 4.1  Steps of sample construction. 
 Search criterion Number of banks 
Step 1 Listed banks 2,454 
Step 2 World region: European Union (15)  255 
Step 3 Accounting standards: IFRS 187 
Step 4 Specialization: Commercial banks, Cooperative banks, Bank 
holdings & Holding companies 
127 
Step 5 Information availability: gross loans 121 




Table 4.2 Sample composition and representativeness. 
Country Banks Sample % Observations Sample % 
Austria  7 6% 35 6% 
Belgium 3 3% 16 3% 
Denmark 11 10% 64 11% 
Finland 4 4% 20 3% 
France 8 7% 48 8% 
Germany 9 8% 54 9% 
Greece 11 10% 47 8% 
Ireland 2 2% 12 2% 
Italy 22 20% 121 20% 
Luxembourg 2 2% 8 1% 
Netherlands 5 5% 25 4% 
Portugal 4 4% 23 4% 
Spain 8 7% 48 8% 
Sweden 4 4% 24 4% 
United Kingdom 9 8% 53 9% 
Total: 109 100% 598 100% 
   
                                                          
50 Two Greek banks do not disclose any information on ownership structure.  
51 We exclude from our sample the observations with missing data on DPE and control variables. This operation 




  BHC Commercial Cooperative Total: 
Total Bankscope sample in 2010 (listed banks, EU-15) 
1 Banks 36 95 24 155 
2 Sample % 23.23 61.29 15.48 100.00 
Sample banks 
3 Banks 30 68 11 109 
4 Sample % 27.52 62.39 10.10 100.00 
5 Representativeness, % (3/1) 83.33 71.58 45.83 70.32 
 
Total Bankscope sample in 2010 (listed banks, EU-15) 
1 Millions of Euros 10,391,355 13,175,756 2,405,691 25,972,802 
2 Share of total assets, % 40.00 50.73 9.27 100.00 
Sample banks 
3 Millions of Euros 10,285,447 13,032,494 2,247,875 25,565,816 
4 Share of total assets, % 40.23 50.97 8.80 100 
5 Representativeness, % (3/1) 98.98 98.90 93.44 94.78 
 
We calculate the dividend payout ratio (DPE) as dividends paid for a given year divided by 
bank equity.52 Table 3 reports statistics for DPE and proxies for the variables that we use to 
test H1-H6. For convenience, we also report the descriptive statistics for two alternative 
proxies of CEO power that will be employed in robustness tests: CEO Tenure and CEO 
Unforced Turnover. We reduce the effect of outliers by winsorizing all continuous variables at 
the 5th and 95th percentile. Winsorizing is common in studies dealing with financial ratios, 
because observations for which the denominator is close to zero may create severe outliers 
(Jacobson et al. (2011)). In the specific case of DPE, for which the numerator is small relative 
to the denominator, relatively small reductions in equity can result in large fluctuations of 
DPE. We prefer winsorizing to trimming as it retains more information.53 
 
                                                          
52 Only five banks do not pay dividends at all during the sample period. 
53 Some of the variables present considerable skewness and leptokurtosis even after winsorization at the 1st and 
99th percentile. For instance, the sample skewness and kurtosis for DPE is 3.48 and 21.42 without winsorization, 
respectively. These values drop to 2.80 and 13.67 after winsorization at the 1st and 99th percentile, suggesting that 
outliers may bear a strong influence on estimation even after winsorizing. On the other hand, after winsorizing at 
the 5th and 95th percentile, DPE has a kurtosis of around 3. In unreported tests, we also inspect more closely the 
influence of winsorization on the distribution of the residuals of the WG regressions, and conclude that 
winsorizing at the 5th and 95th percentile results in a much higher goodness-of-fit than winsorizing at the 1st and 
99th percentile. In particular, the R-squared within increases by around 6-7%. 
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Table 4.3  Summary statistics for DPE, ownership structure and board characteristics (DPE and CEO Ownership winsorized at the 5th 
and 95th percentile).  
  Observations Banks Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum  
 Panel A B A B A B A B A B A B 
DPE Dividends for a given year divided by bank equity (%) 598 537 109 99 3.581 3.441 3.377 3.225 0 0 11.730 11.730 
Board Duality 
Dummy variable: 1 if CEO 
chairs the board, and 0 
otherwise 
587 526 108 98 0.109 0.101 0.312 0.301 0 0 1.000 1.000 
CEO Ownership Percentage of shares held by CEO 483 433 98 90 2.765 2.617 4.601 4.453 0 0 10.810 10.810 
CEO Tenure 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of years for which the 
CEO has been in office 
590 530 109 99 1.430 1.409 0.906 0.899 0 0 3.434 3.434 
CEO Unforced Turnover 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is 
an unforced CEO turnover (see 
definition in the Appendix 2) 
and, 0 otherwise 
598 537 109 99 0.117 0.119 0.322 0.324 0 0 1.000 1.000 
CEO as the Largest Owner 
Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO 
is the largest shareholder, and 0 
otherwise 
597 536 109 99 0.054 0.054 0.225 0.226 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Large Owner on the Management 
Board 
Dummy variable: 1 if owner 
holding at least 10% of bank 
shares is on management board, 
and 0 otherwise 
586 525 107 97 0.116 0.110 0.321 0.314 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Widely-held Financial Institution 
as the Largest Owner 
Dummy variable: 1 if a widely-
held financial institution is the 
largest shareholder, and 0 
otherwise 
553 492 101 91 0.718 0.726 0.450 0.447 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Widely-held Non-Financial 
Corporation as the Largest 
Owner 
Dummy variable: 1 if a widely-
held non-financial corporation 
is the largest shareholder, and 0 
otherwise 
553 492 101 91 0.022 0.018 0.146 0.134 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Government as the Largest 
Owner 
Dummy variable: 1 if the 
government is the largest 
shareholder, and 0 otherwise 
553 449 101 91 0.080 0.082 0.271 0.275 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Government Official on the 
Board 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is 
government official on the 
board, and 0 otherwise 
554 496 105 95 0.070 0.077 0.256 0.266 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Panel A: All available observations. Panel B: only observations for which data on the control variables and the proxy for CEO power is available.
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We report the statistics for the variables before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) excluding 
observations for which data on the control variables and the proxy for CEO power are missing. 
For Panel A, the number of observations (banks) ranges from 507 (90) to 598 (109). For Panel 
B, the number of observations is between 449 and 537, depending on the specification. The 
sample characteristics do not change substantially from Panel A to Panel B. This suggests that 
sample selection bias due to lack of data for the control variables is unlikely to bear an 
influence on our findings.  
The average CEO Ownership is around 2.7%, and the percentage of banks for which the 
CEO is also the chairman of the bank is around 10%. Unreported statistics also show that the 
within bank variation for our proxies of CEO power is moderate, but far from being 
insignificant: the within standard deviation for CEO Ownership is around 0.77%, and for 
Board Duality is around 12.9%. 
Correlation analysis (unreported, for the sake of space) suggests that our proxies for CEO 
power are strongly positively correlated (28%, significant at the 1% level). For cases for which 
Board Duality takes on the value one, the average CEO Ownership is 1.7%, significantly larger 
than for cases for which Board Duality takes on the value zero (0.35%).  
Figure 4.2 shows the geographical distribution of DPE, at the beginning (2005) and end 
(2010) of the sample period. The reduction in the mean of DPE occurred to a similar extent 
in most countries, with sharper declines for the countries that were most affected by the crisis 
(in particular, the PIIGS). For Portugal, the mean DPE dropped from 4.77% in 2005 to 
0.50% in 2010. For Italy, the mean of DPE dropped from 4.48% to 2.36% and, for Spain, 
from 5.22% to 3.22% (with peaks in 2007 of 4.99% and 6.64%, respectively). For Greece, 
the mean DPE was 1.83% in 2005, 4.35% in 2007, and 0% in 2010. However, Irish banks 
were the most affected: the mean DPE was 7.95% in 2005 and 0% in 2010. On the other 
hand, for Germany the drop was relatively small (from 3.27% in 2005 to 3.09% in 2010). ).  
In the subsequent multivariate analysis, we investigate whether the crisis has had a 




Figure 4.2: Average DPE (winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile) across countries 
at the beginning and at the end of the sample period. 
 
 
4.4.  Results 
In this section, we report the results of the tests of H1-H6. We employ the econometric 
procedure described in Section 4.3.1 to investigate whether CEO power, proxied by Board 
Duality and CEO Ownership, results in lower payout ratios due to managerial entrenchment. 
Section 4.4.1 reports the main results. Section 4.4.2 reports the results when we employ two 
alternative proxies for CEO power: CEO tenure and ‘unforced’ CEO turnovers. Section 4.4.3 
provides an investigation of potential reverse causality issues, as well as a battery of robustness 
checks.  
4.4.1  Main results 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report the results for seven WG regressions run according to equations 
[1]-[4]. Equations [1] (without the Qi,t) and [3] test H1 using Board Duality as a proxy for CEO 
power, while equations [2] and [4] use CEO Ownership as a proxy for CEO power. All 
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Table 4.4 Results considering Board Duality as a proxy for CEO power. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: DPE        
        
Board Duality -1.489*** -1.488*** -1.510*** -1.223*** -1.357*** -0.701 -1.803*** 
 (0.501) (0.502) (0.502) (0.449) (0.484) (0.448) (0.560) 
CEO as the Largest Owner  1.766***      
  (0.284)      
Large Owner on the Management Board   -1.856     
   (1.501)     
Widely-held Financial Institution as the Largest Owner    1.699**    
    (0.714)    
Widely-held Non-Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner     -0.535   
     (0.487)   
Government as the Largest Owner      -2.025**  
      (0.836)  
Government Official on the Board       -2.287** 
       (0.974) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 526 525 515 482 482 444 494 
R-squared within 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.407 0.385 0.425 0.428 
Number of banks 98 98 96 90 90 90 94 
The regressions are run using a Within-Group model for panel-data at the bank level. The dependent variable is DPE - dividend payout as a ratio of dividends to equity.  All 
specifications include time dummies and the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity), Tier1 Capital (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.5 Results considering CEO Ownership as a proxy for CEO power. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: DPE        
        
CEO Ownership -2.610*** -2.488*** -2.452*** -2.595*** -2.585*** -2.585*** -2.456*** 
 (0.854) (0.867) (0.866) (0.941) (0.913) (0.935) (0.820) 
CEO Ownership Squared 0.234*** 0.214*** 0.220*** 0.234*** 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.220*** 
 (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.085) (0.082) (0.084) (0.074) 
CEO as the Largest Owner  2.454***      
  (0.589)      
Large Owner on the Management Board   -1.544     
   (1.646)     
Widely-held Financial Institution as the Largest Owner    1.944**    
    (0.925)    
Widely-held Non-Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner     -0.369   
     (0.531)   
Government as the Largest Owner      -2.506**  
      (1.017)  
Government Official on the Board       -2.018* 
       (1.167) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 433 432 423 388 388 366 408 
R-squared within 0.406 0.407 0.402 0.410 0.382 0.435 0.426 
Number of banks 90 90 88 82 82 82 87 
The regressions are run using a Within-Group model for panel-data at the bank level. The dependent variable is DPE - dividend payout as a ratio of dividends to equity.  All 
specifications include time dummies and the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity), Tier1 Capital (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote 




In Table 4.4, the coefficient on Board Duality is negative and highly significant for all 
regressions except for one (the specification including Government as the Largest Owner, for 
which the coefficient is negative but insignificant). For the cases for which the coefficient on 
Board Duality is significant, it ranges from 1.223% to 1.803%. Considering that the average 
DPE in our sample is 3.441%, the economic impact of Board Duality is significant. In Table 5, 
the coefficient on CEO Ownership is negative and highly significant while the coefficient on 
CEO Ownership Square is negative and highly significant for all seven specifications.  
A negative coefficient on Board Duality and a U-shaped relation between CEO Ownership 
and payout ratios support H1b and refute H1a. Therefore, our results are consistent with 
expropriation in the form of lower dividend payout ratios, at the expense of minority 
shareholders. The coefficients on CEO Ownership and CEO Ownership Squared for the first 
regression reported in Table 4.5 suggest that the benefits of expropriation peak when CEO 
Ownership is 5.58%, and then decline. Since 5.58% is relatively large as compared to the mean 
of CEO Ownership (2.617%), the relation tends to be negative for a large portion of the 
sample. This lends further support to the hypothesis that CEO power decreases dividend payout 
ratios.   
Figure 4.3 illustrates the average marginal effects of CEO Ownership on DPE for different 
values of CEO Ownership, along with the 95th confidence intervals (i.e. the first derivative of 
DPE with respect to CEO Ownership, for different values of CEO Ownership). The average 
marginal effects are significant at the 5% level when they are calculated at different values of 
CEO Ownership (we choose values between 1% and 10% of CEO Ownership).54 Consistent 
with the results reported in Table 5, average marginal effects are negative for CEO Ownership 
≤ 5.5%, and positive for CEO Ownership > 5.5%. 
The results for the other variables are as follows. The coefficients on CEO as the Largest 
Owner are positive and significant, supporting H2. The coefficients on Widely-held Financial 
Institution as the Largest Owner are positive and significant, supporting H4 and refuting H3. 
However, the coefficient on Widely-Held Non-Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner is 
insignificant for both equation [3] (Board Duality regressions) and [4] (CEO Ownership 
regressions). These results suggest that the effect of institutional investors as largest 
shareholders of the bank depends on whether the investor is a financial institution or a non-
                                                          
54 When the marginal effects are calculated at CEO Ownership = 6%, they are significant at the 10% level. 
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financial corporation.55 The coefficient on Large Owner on the Management Board is 
insignificant. Finally, the coefficients on Government as the Largest Owner and on 
Government Official on the Board are negative and significant (the latter is weakly significant 
for the CEO Ownership regressions). These results support H6.56 




4.4.2  CEO tenure and CEO unforced turnover as a proxy for CEO power  
Our main findings may be sensitive to the proxy for CEO power. To address this concern, 
we employ two alternative measures of CEO power: the natural logarithm of the number of 
years for which the CEO has been in office (CEO Tenure), and unforced turnovers of the CEO 
(CEO Unforced Turnover).  
                                                          
55 However, the results for the Board Duality regressions may be due to a very low number of observations 
available for Board Duality when Widely-Held Non-Financial Corporation is equal to one. 
56 The coefficients on the control variables are either insignificant or with a sign consistent with expectations. In 
particular, the coefficient on Growth Opportunities tends to be positive, consistent with the view that only banks 
























Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) argue that some determinants of CEO power take time to 
develop, and for this reason CEO power tends to increase with tenure.57 Since the relationship 
between tenure and dividend payout ratios may be nonlinear (Hu and Kumar (2004)), we 
consider the natural logarithm of tenure (in years).58  
The results for CEO Tenure are reported in Table 4.6. The coefficients on CEO Tenure are 
negative. However, they are only weakly significant in five of the seven regressions. The 
coefficients on the other variables are very close to those in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. Although 
weaker, these results substantially confirm that powerful CEOs tend to distribute lower 
dividend payout ratios.  
If CEO tenure is likely to increase CEO power, CEO turnover events should decrease it. 
This is because the new CEO may need some time to entrench herself and pursue policies that 
do not maximize shareholder value. However, CEO turnover may depend on dividends, since 
dividend cuts may lead to CEO dismissal (Schaeck et al. (2012)). For this reason, we consider 
only unforced CEO turnovers as a proxy for CEO power, by creating a dummy equal to one if a 
turnover that cannot be defined as a forced turnover takes place, and zero otherwise (CEO 
Unforced Turnover).59 There is a strong and significant correlation between CEO Tenure and 
CEO Unforced Turnover (–0.5813, significant at the 1% level).  
The results for CEO Unforced Turnover are reported in Table 4.7. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, CEO Unforced Turnover has a positive effect on payout ratios, and the coefficients 
are significant for all seven specifications, confirming the negative relation between CEO 
power and payout ratios. The sign and significance of the coefficients on the other explanatory 
variables remain substantially the same as those in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6.   
 
                                                          
57 CEO Tenure may also increase moral hazard, since for CEOs close to retirement reputational damages resulting 
from dismissal are less important (Murphy (1986); Hu and Kumar (2004)). 
58 Using the number of years as a proxy (without the log transformation) results in insignificant results, even when, 
similar to the specifications for CEO Ownership, we include a squared term in the regressions. 
59 In the Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.4), we give a more detailed explanation of how we distinguish between forced 
and unforced CEO turnovers. 
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Table 4.6 Robustness checks: CEO Tenure as a proxy for CEO power. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: DPE        
        
CEO Tenure -0.307* -0.334* -0.307* -0.370** -0.366** -0.319* -0.315* 
 (0.170) (0.171) (0.173) (0.168) (0.170) (0.173) (0.176) 
CEO as the Largest Owner  2.405***      
  (0.396)      
Large Owner on the Management Board   -1.821     
   (1.458)     
Widely-held Financial Institution as the Largest Owner    1.745**    
    (0.735)    
Widely-held Non-Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner     -0.426   
     (0.498)   
Government as the Largest Owner      -2.136***  
      (0.795)  
Government Official on the Board       -2.152** 
       (1.008) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 530 529 518 485 485 445 494 
R-squared within 0.402 0.404 0.401 0.409 0.385 0.430 0.422 
Number of banks 99 99 97 91 91 91 95 
The regressions are run using a Within-Group model for panel-data at the bank level. The dependent variable is DPE - dividend payout as a ratio of dividends to equity.  All 
specifications include time dummies and the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity), Tier1 Capital (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The 
continuous variables (except for CEO Tenure) are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, 





Table 4.7 Robustness checks: CEO Unforced Turnover as a proxy for CEO power. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: DPE        
        
CEO Unforced Turnover 0.554*** 0.602*** 0.604*** 0.492** 0.575** 0.517** 0.654*** 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.217) (0.209) (0.220) (0.251) (0.240) 
CEO as the Largest Owner  2.420***      
  (0.364)      
Large Owner on the Management Board   -1.685     
   (1.329)     
Widely-held Financial Institution as the Largest Owner    1.687**    
    (0.751)    
Widely-held Non-Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner     -0.706   
     (0.508)   
Government as the Largest Owner      -2.049**  
      (0.814)  
Government Official on the Board       -2.106** 
       (1.009) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 461 452 423 423 396 434 461 
R-squared within 0.425 0.426 0.426 0.411 0.448 0.449 0.425 
Number of banks 99 97 91 91 91 95 99 
The regressions are run using a Within-Group model for panel-data at the bank level. The dependent variable is DPE - dividend payout as a ratio of dividends to equity.  All 
specifications include time dummies and the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity), Tier1 Capital (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The 
continuous variables (except for CEO Tenure) are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.4.3  Robustness checks 
As said earlier with respect to the relation between dividends and CEO turnover, a possible 
concern for the results reported in sections 4.1 and 4.2 is reverse causality between payout 
ratios and CEO power. While this concern is relatively weak for Board Duality and CEO 
Ownership (a change in payout ratios is unlikely to lead to a higher probability for the CEO to 
become the chairman or to increase his shareholding), a dividend cut may reduce CEO tenure, 
because it may increase the probability of dismissal (Schaeck et al. (2012)). To address this 
concern, we repeat estimation of the seven models reported in Tables 4.4–4.7 after lagging all 
the explanatory variables (including the controls) by one period. To exclude the possibility that 
causality runs in the opposite direction, we also run regressions where Board Duality, CEO 
Ownership, and CEO Tenure are the dependent variables, and the lag of DPE is the main 
explanatory variable. In Table 4.8, we report our estimation results, which confirm our main 
findings qualitatively and quantitatively for Board Duality and CEO Ownership, while the 
coefficients on the first lag of CEO Tenure and CEO Unforced Turnover are insignificant, but 
maintain the expected sign (negative for the former and positive for the latter). It is not 
surprising that the coefficients on the lags of CEO Tenure and CEO Unforced Turnover are 
insignificant, since using the lag rather than the current value of these variables is likely to 
introduce noise in the data.60 As for the issue of reverse causality, in the regressions on Board 
Duality, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, and CEO Unforced Turnover the lag of DPE is 
insignificant, suggesting that reverse causality should not be a serious problem.   
 
                                                          
60 Consider an example using CEO Unforced Turnover as a proxy for CEO power. Assume that in period t the 
CEO of bank i has been replaced (the value for CEO Unforced Turnover is one), and the new less-powerful CEO 
accepts to increase the payout ratio. This will have a positive effect on the coefficient on CEO Unforced Turnover, 
consistent with expectations. However, the lag of CEO Unforced Turnover (whose value is zero) will have a 
negative effect on the estimated coefficient (since the increase in DPE will be associated with a low value for 
CEO Unforced Turnover). Therefore, using the lag rather than the current value for CEO Unforced Turnover 
introduces noise in the data that is likely to be the reason for our insignificant result. The same thing is likely to 
occur for CEO Tenure, since replacement of a CEO will result automatically in shorter tenure. If tenure of the 
departing CEO is, for instance, 10 years in period t – 1, using the lag rather than the current value of CEO Tenure 
introduces noise in the data, since a large payout ratio at time t (due to a very short tenure for the new CEO) is 
associated with the observation for CEO Tenure at time t – 1 (which reflects long tenure). These effects are 
unlikely to occur for Board Duality or CEO Ownership. Unless there is a CEO turnover, it is unlikely that a CEO 
will gain or lose a substantial amount of power in one year simply because she has been nominated (or dismissed 
as) Chairman of the board, and large swings in the level of CEO Ownership after only one here are unlikely.  
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Table 4.8 Robustness checks: Summary of results for reverse causality test. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Additional explanatory 
variable 
None CEO as Largest 
Owner 










the Largest Owner 
Government as 
the Largest Owner 
Government 
Official on the 
Board 
Dependent variable: DPE – Proxy for CEO power and  other explanatory variables lagged  
Proxy for CEO power: 1. Board Duality; 2. CEO Ownership; 3. CEO Tenure; 4. CEO Unforced Turnover 
       
1. Board Duality -1.474*** -1.481*** -1.506*** -1.334** -1.323*** -0.319 -1.619*** 
(lagged) (0.455) (0.455) (0.466) (0.553) (0.469) (0.601) (0.514) 
2. CEO Ownership -1.122*** -1.128*** -1.017*** -1.126*** -1.151*** -1.270*** -1.006*** 
(lagged) (0.353) (0.354) (0.324) (0.371) (0.360) (0.388) (0.309) 
2. CEO Own. Squared 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.112*** 0.085*** 
(lagged) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.029) 
3. CEO Tenure -0.185 -0.179 -0.207 -0.273 -0.261 -0.296 -0.199 
(lagged) (0.162) (0.163) (0.168) (0.175) (0.173) (0.179) (0.183) 
4. CEO Unforced Turnover 0.224 0.220 0.270 0.341 0.372 0.381 0.341 
(lagged) (0.240) (0.241) (0.246) (0.257) (0.249) (0.262) (0.276) 
Dependent variable: Board Duality – DPE and other explanatory variables lagged 
DPE (lagged) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Dependent variable: CEO Ownership – DPE and other explanatory variables lagged 
DPE (lagged) -0.040 -0.040 -0.038 -0.031 -0.034 -0.035 -0.044 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) 
Dependent variable: CEO Tenure – DPE and other explanatory variables lagged 
DPE (lagged) -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 -0.013 0.005 -0.007 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
Dependent variable: CEO Unforced Turnover – DPE and other explanatory variables lagged 
DPE (lagged) -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
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- Table 4.8 continued - 
The regressions are run using a Within-Group model for panel-data at the bank level. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. All specifications include time 
dummies and the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity), Tier1 Capital 
(ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 







To further examine the issue of endogeneity, we employ matching techniques in 
combination with a difference-in-Differences (DID) approach. Matching techniques can 
overcome several problems of a multiple regression framework. In particular, they are not 
sensitive to functional form, and increase comparability of the units in the treatment and 
control group, improving identification of causal effects. However, matching techniques do not 
allow for differences in the two groups due to unobservable characteristics. On the other hand, 
DID can allow for such differences, by incorporating bank fixed effects, time effects, and their 
interaction in the analysis. In so doing, it can correctly identify the remaining effect for each 
bank over time. 
We define two groups of banks as the treatment and control group, respectively: The banks 
in the treatment group are defined as those for which there in an event of increased CEO power 
in year t (i.e. Board Duality or CEO Unforced Turnover equals 1); the banks in the control 
group are defined as those for which there are no such events in year t. To allow for inertia in 
the treatment effects, we consider the effects of the treatment over three years (i.e. the year of 
the event and the following two years). Therefore, we have a DID setup whereby we compare 
the average outcome for treated and untreated banks (w = 1 for the former and w = 0 for the 
latter) before and after the treatment (τ = 0 before and τ = 1 after). The interaction term I = w ×
τ is the variable of interest to determine whether the treatment has had an effect on the treated 
banks or not. In our setup, Ii,t = 1 for bank i  at time t if for such bank the CEO power proxy 
(Board Duality or CEO Unforced Turnover) takes on the value one in that year or in any of the 
two previous years, and Ii,t = 0 otherwise. 
The usual DID approach entails running the OLS regression (Bertrand et al. (2004)): 
DPEi,t = Ai + Bt + βIi.t + cCi.t + ei,t        [6] 
Where Ai and Bt are fixed effects for banks and years, respectively, Ci.t are control variables, 
and ei,t is an error term. The coefficient β is the estimated impact of the treatment.  
Since we have different periods for treatments across different treated banks, we follow 
Bertrand et al. (2004) and run an OLS regression of DPE on bank dummies and year dummies. 
The residuals are employed in the following analysis for identification of the treatment effects. 
While Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest that the second stage be simply an OLS regression on the 
resulting residuals, we combine the DID procedure with matching techniques to further 
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increase the reliability of our results. Through matching, we are able to discern the effect of the 
treatment through a comparison of the outcome for each treated bank with the outcome for a 
group of banks very similar to it. This is a clear improvement over a simple comparison of the 
overall mean of the outcome for treated and untreated banks in the pre- and post-treatment 
periods (i.e. simple DID approach). 
In particular, to allow for the possibility that the two groups differ in the probability of 
receiving treatment, we employ the Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) estimator (Abadie and 
Imbens (2002)), which permits adjusting for differences (in observable characteristics) between 
the treatment and control group. In short, let Yi,t(0) and Yi,t(1) denote two potential outcomes 
for bank i at period t: Yi,t(1) is the outcome when the bank receives the treatment, and Yi,t(0) is 
the outcome when it does not receive the treatment. In our case, Yi,t is DPE for bank i at time t. 
If both Yi,t(0) and Yi,t(1)  were observable, the effect of the treatment on unit bank i would be 
observed directly as Yi,t(1) – Yi,t(0). Since it is unobservable, it has to be estimated. If 
assignment to the treatment is random for banks with similar values of the pre-treatment 
covariates, the average outcome of similar untreated banks can be employed to estimate the 
untreated outcome (Abadie et al. (2004)).  
For convenience, let us denote each observation for the outcome Yz, where z = 1, 2, … , NT 
(we assume that the sample is balanced). Then, the Sample Average Treatment Effect (SATE) 
is estimated as follows:  







1 01            [7] 
SATE can be interpreted as the impact of the treatment on the whole sample of banks, not 
only on the treated banks. The Sample Average Treatment effect for the Treated (SATT) can 
be defined as:  








        
[8] 
Where wi = 1 denotes that bank i belongs to the sub-sample of treated banks. We prefer 
using the SATE rather than the SATT, since any bank could be exposed to the treatment in a 
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certain year. In other words, we are not dealing with cases for which only certain banks are 
subject to the treatment, for instance because of a regulation targeting only certain banks.61  
When we estimate average treatment effects only one of the two outcomes is observed, and 
the unobserved potential outcome (i.e. the counterfactual treatment outcome) must be estimated 
for each sample bank-year observation. For each bank-year observation, NNM: 1) minimizes 
dM(i,t), or the distance between the covariates for that observation and the Mth closest match (in 
terms of value of the covariates) in the opposite treatment group (Abadie et al. (2004)), and 2) 
estimates the unobserved outcome, by averaging the observed outcomes for the m observations 
of the opposite treatment groups that are selected as matches for that observation. In other 
words, the covariates adjust for observable differences between the two groups.62  
We match the treatment observations with observations that as similar as possible along the 
following dimensions: 
1) For Board Duality, we choose two additional covariates: an index of the degree of 
shareholder protection against possible abuse of power from insiders (Anti-Director 
Rights)63 and the ratio of bank credit to GDP (Bank Credit). These variables are 
constructed according to Beck et al. (2001) and Levine (2002). The variable Anti-
Director Rights could decrease the probability of receiving treatment, since high 
values for this index suggest that the rights of minority shareholders are well 
protected. On the other hand, high values for Bank Credit could increase the 
probability of receiving the treatment, since in bank-based countries the market for 
corporate control may be ineffective (Köke (2004)).  
2) For CEO Unforced Turnover, we choose one additional covariate: the age of the 
CEO (CEO Age). While the probability of an unforced turnover of course increases 
with age (since the CEO is likely to retire sooner).  
                                                          
61 Abadie et al. (2004) take as an example the case of a program targeting post-graduation earnings of youth from 
poor neighborhoods. In this case, estimating the SATT makes sense, since the potential impact of the program on 
youth from non-poor neighborhoods is of negligible importance. 
62 We prefer matching on covariates to matching on propensity score, since the former provides the finest 
balancing score (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)). For more details on NNM, see Abadie et al. (2004). 
63 We construct this index as follows. We assign a value of zero for countries for which none of the following 
conditions exists: (1) it is possible for shareholders to send via mail their proxy vote; (2) there is no requirement 
for shareholders to deposit their shares before the general shareholders’ meeting; (3) it is permitted to cumulate 
votes as well as to have proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors; (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent; or (6) shareholders have preemptive 
rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. For every condition that is satisfied, we add one to the 
value of the index. Therefore, the index can take on values from zero to six (following La Porta et al. (2000)). 
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3) For both proxies, we also match on the variables previously employed as controls 
(Ci,t). This is to increase the plausibility of the assumption of unconfoundness (i.e. 
conditional on the covariates used for the matching, treatment is basically 
randomized). 
Moreover, since the probability of receiving treatment may also depend on other bank 
characteristics related to corporate governance and ownership structure, for robustness we 
match also on the following variables (one for each specification, for consistency with the 
previous analysis): CEO as the Largest Owner, Widely-held Financial Institution as the 
Largest Owner, Large Owner on the Management Board, Widely-held Non-Financial 
Corporation as the Largest Owner, Government as the Largest Owner, and Government 
Official on the Board. In our estimations, we report the results for two and four matches, and 
we adjust for finite-sample bias due to inexact matching (this bias increases with the number of 
covariates) and for heteroskedastic errors (Abadie et al. (2004)).  
Table 4.9 reports the results for the SATE resulting from the DID associated with NNM. 
The results strongly support the previous findings with respect to both Board Duality and CEO 
Unforced Turnover. The coefficients for SATE are negative and significant for the all seven 
specifications with Board Duality, and positive and significant for all seven specifications with 







Table 4.9 Robustness Checks: Difference-in-differences with matching (Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: DPE        
 Sample Average Treatment Effects 
Two matches (m = 2) 
        
Treatment 1: Board Duality -0.694*** -0.806*** -0.750*** -0.514*** -0.559*** -0.406** -0.978*** 
 (0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.198) (0.198) (0.197) (0.207) 
Treatment 2: CEO Unforced Turnover 0.348*** 0.436*** 0.363*** 0.369*** 0.413*** 0.444*** 0.478*** 
 (0.129) (0.125) (0.124) (0.13) (0.133) (0.133) (0.131) 
 
Four matches (m = 4) 
        
Treatment 1: Board Duality -0.780*** -0.902*** -0.825*** -0.622*** -0.659*** -0.558** -1.062*** 
 (0.219) (0.228) (0.221) (0.236) (0.237) (0.236) (0.237) 
Treatment 2: CEO Unforced Turnover 0.406*** 0.465*** 0.420*** 0.455*** 0.449*** 0.492*** 0.505*** 
 (0.124) (0.125) (0.12) (0.133) (0.129) (0.128) (0.12) 
SATE is estimated on the residuals of a regression of DPE on bank and year fixed effects. The estimated SATE is bias-adjusted , and the standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity-robust. 
The treatment, Ii,t , is defined as follows:  
Treatment 1: Ii,t = 1 if Board Dualityi,t = 1 in year t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
Treatment 2: Ii,t = 1 if CEO Unforced Turnoveri,t = 1 in year t, t-1, or t-2, and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, the post-treatment period for treated banks (wi = 1) can last for three years at most, and one year at least. The following covariates are used to estimate the 
potential outcomes for both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 and for all seven specifications: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Market-to-Book (ratio of market value of 
equity to book value of equity), Tier1 Capital (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per capita (natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita). For Treatment 1, the additional covariates Bank Credit and Anti-Director Rights are employed in all seven specifications. For Treatment 2 the additional 
covariate CEO Age is employed in all seven specifications. Finally, the following additional covariates are employed for both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 in specifications 
(2) to (7), respectively (separately for each specification): CEO as the Largest Owner, Widely-held Financial Institution as the Largest Owner, Large Owner on the 
Management Board, Widely-held Non-Financial Corporation as the Largest Owner, Government as the Largest Owner, and Government Official on the Board. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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We perform additional robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results to the 
specification of our models. The results of these tests are not reported, but are available upon 
request from the authors. 
First, we investigate the effect of board independence on dividend payout ratios. Sharma 
(2011) provides evidence that board independence affects the propensity to pay dividends. 
Boards with a large number of independent directors64 should be able to exert stronger 
monitoring on entrenched CEOs. Internal monitoring from independent directors could lead to 
higher payout ratios (Hu and Kumar (2004)). However, higher board independence could be 
an alternative monitoring mechanism to dividends, similar to H3. We construct a dummy 
variable Strong Board Independence, equal to one if at least 50% of the board members 
consist of independent directors, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on Strong Board 
Independence is negative and significant or weakly significant for the regressions on Board 
Duality, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, and CEO Unforced Turnover suggesting that 
independent directors may act as alternative monitoring devices. The coefficients on Board 
Duality, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, CEO Unforced Turnover, and the other variables 
remain virtually the same as those reported in Tables 4.4–4.7. 
Second, we investigate the effect of being close to the capital requirements on dividend 
payout ratios. Recent contributions (Onali (2012)) find that for banks whose regulatory capital 
ratio is close the minimum requirement payout ratios are lower. We include a dummy 
variable, Capital Requirements, which takes on the value one if Tier 1 Capital is less than six 
percent, and zero otherwise. Capital Requirements enters all the regressions with a negative 
coefficient. The coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level in most cases, 
confirming Onali’s findings. The coefficients on Board Duality, CEO Ownership, CEO 
tenure, CEO Unforced Turnover and the other variables remain virtually unaltered.  
Third, we include a dummy variable, Crisis, which takes on the value one for the years 
2008 and 2009, and zero otherwise.65 The dummy is negative but insignificant in most cases. 
The reason for this is that during the crisis bank share prices dropped, and therefore the effect 
of the crisis is already picked up by the control variable Growth Opportunities (market-to-
                                                          
64 In the Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.3), we give a more detailed explanation of how we define ‘independent 
directors’. 
65 To avoid multicollinearity, we exclude the year dummies. 
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book ratio).66 When Growth Opportunities is excluded from the regressions, the coefficient 
on Crisis becomes negative and significant for most of the specifications. The coefficients on 
Board Duality, CEO Ownership, CEO Tenure, CEO Unforced Turnover, and the other 
variables remain virtually unaltered.  
We also create two interaction variables between Crisis and the variables related to CEO 
ownership: CEO Ownership and CEO Ownership Squared. The overall effect of CEO 
ownership on dividend payout ratios during the crisis is measured by the sum of the 
coefficients of CEO Ownership and CEO Ownership Squared and the respective interaction 
terms. The coefficients on the interaction terms tend to offset the impact of CEO Ownership 
on DPE, although they tend to become insignificant for specifications including Qi,t. For the 
equation excluding Qi,t, the coefficients on Crisis×CEO Ownership and Crisis×CEO 
Ownership Squared are 0.682 and –0.063, respectively. These results imply that during the 
crisis the critical level of CEO ownership after which the relation becomes positive was 
4.70%, instead of 5.50%. Thus, the incentive for CEO-owners to pay themselves a dividend 
exceeded the opportunity costs for a much lower level of CEO ownership. This finding is 
consistent with the view that during the crisis many banks attempted to shift risk to creditors 
by paying dividends (Acharya et al. (2011); Onali (2012)).   
Fourth, we exclude from the sample Italian banks, which are the most numerous in the 
sample, and the results remain qualitatively the same as those reported in Tables 4.4–4.7. 
Similarly, when we exclude from the sample the 11 cooperative banks, the results remain 
substantially the same as those reported in Tables 4.4–4.7. 
Finally, we assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in our econometric specification.  
First, to allow for outliers without winsorizing the response variable (DPE), we employ 
quantile regressions, with both bank and year fixed effects. We run the regressions so that the 
conditional median of DPE (not winsorized) is estimated, instead of the conditional mean. 
The results confirm those reported in Tables 4.4–4.7. The coefficients remain significant. 
Second, since for a significant number of observations DPE is equal to zero (about 20% of 
the total number of observations), we repeat the analysis using a Tobit model, with both bank 
                                                          
66 The average of Growth Opportunities for Crisis =1 is 0.92, while for Crisis = 0 it is 1.54.  
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and year fixed effects, as before.67 The results remain substantially the same as those reported 
in Tables 4.4–4.7.  
Third, we take the natural logarithm of DPE to reduce skewness and kurtosis, instead of 




In this paper, we have investigated the effect of CEO power on dividend policy in banks 
from EU-15 (Western Europe) countries. According to the managerial entrenchment 
literature, dividend payout ratios are positively related to CEO power (Hu and Kumar (2004)), 
since dividends discourage monitoring from minority shareholders. In Western Europe, 
dividends dampen expropriation of minority shareholders (Faccio et al. (2001)), consistent 
with a positive relation between dividend payout ratios and expropriation incentives. 
However, due to monitoring from banking regulators, who dislike generous dividend policies, 
the relation between CEO power and dividend payout ratios in Western European banks may 
be negative. Entrenched bank CEOs may catch two birds with a stone by paying lower 
dividend payout ratios: In doing so, they are less likely to attract undesired attention from the 
banking regulators, and can employ excess cash for non-value maximizing project that may 
increase their personal utility. 
We have taken advantage of a unique and painstakingly hand-collected data set with 
information on board (BoD and management board) composition and ownership structure for 
European listed banks for the period 2005-2010. This data set has been merged with data from 
Bankscope and bank annual reports with information on dividends and other financial 
characteristics of the banks.  
We have provided evidence of a U-shaped relation between CEO ownership and dividend 
payout ratios: for percentages of CEO ownership below (above) around five and a half 
percent, CEO ownership is negatively (positively) related to dividend payout ratios. This may 
                                                          
67 The estimates of unconditional fixed effect estimators for binary-choice models are known to be biased, due to 
the ‘incidental parameters problem’. However, Greene (2004) shows that the slope estimates for the 
unconditional fixed effect Tobit estimator are virtually unbiased.  
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suggest that insider ownership and dividends cease to be substitute monitoring devices after a 
certain level of CEO ownership is reached. However, we find a negative relation between 
board duality and dividend payout ratios and between CEO tenure and payout ratios, and a 
positive relation between unforced CEO turnover events and dividend payout ratios. We 
argue that these results suggest expropriation of CEOs at the expense of minority shareholders 
in the form of lower dividend payout ratios. The results for board duality and unforced CEO 
turnover events hold even when we employ a combination of difference-in-differences and 
matching techniques to sharpen identification of the causality between CEO power and 
dividend payout ratios. 
 We also provide robust evidence that when a widely-held financial institution is the largest 
owner of the bank, payout ratios increase, indicating that financial institutions can decrease 
expropriation. However, internal monitoring from independent directors does not seem to 
reduce expropriation, suggesting that internal monitoring in banks could have bank safety as 
the primary objective.  
In line with the view that regulators may put the interest of depositors before that of bank 
shareholders, we find that banks where government is the largest shareholder, or where there 
is a government official on the board, make lower dividend payout ratios.  
 
We further analyze how connection to government and government intervention affect 
banking corporate governance and dividend policy in Chapters 5 and 6. We provide 
descriptive statistics on government bailout in the EU-15 countries during 2007-2010 in 
Chapter 5. We test whether bailed banks benefited from the government bailout measures, 
and whether government support was followed by increased control over the management of 









Government bailout in European banking 
 
 
Banking regulation has strong relationships with both dividend policy and corporate 
governance. Banking regulation affects banking corporate governance and dividend policy 
but also changes itself adapting to the needs of the banking sector. During the pre-crisis years, 
deregulation of banks caused the basic restructuring of banking regulators themselves 
(Wilcox (2005)). This, in turn, helped maintaining poor corporate governance policies – the 
policies that encouraged excessive risk-taking and inefficient distribution of wealth in banks 
(Levine (2012)). The crisis of 2007-2008 increased regulation over banking and caused a 
series of government bailouts accompanied by restrictions on dividends and executives’ 
compensation, and other managerial disciplining measures in bailed banks. As a result, 
banking corporate governance, ownership structure and dividend policy experienced 
significant changes. 
The literature lacks investigation on the effects of government bailout during 2007-2010 on 
corporate governance and dividend policy of banks. One possible reason is a dearth of 
corporate governance data for European banks.  
We develop this chapter in order to give more information on government bailouts in 
European countries and their consequences for European banking. This chapter describes the 
research context for the third study (Chapter 6). The description is based on our hand-
collected data set for 129 listed banks68 located in 15 EU countries for the period 2005-
2010.69 
                                                          
68 We have already described the main steps of our sample construction in Chapter 4. Analyzing bailouts and 
their effects requires taking into account the banks delisted during the period of observations. Therefore, we 
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First, we provide statistics on the amounts of bailout money distributed by national 
regulators and the amounts of bailout money repaid by banks, during 2007-2010 across 15 EU 
countries and four legal origins.70 Second, we compare characteristics for banks that have 
received a bailout and for banks that have not, both before and after bailout. We focus on such 
characteristics of banks as dividend policy, board composition, ownership structure, 
management compensation, and others that will be analyzed in the third study. Finally, we 
distinguish a group of delisted banks and analyze the effectiveness of government bailout for 
saving troubled institutions.  
 
Table 5.1 provides statistics on government bailouts across 15 EU countries and four legal 
origins.  The first column shows the amounts of bailout money distributed in each country and 
legal origin during 2007-2010.71 The countries that distributed the largest amounts of bailout 
money are: the UK, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium (1106, 418, 158, 143 and 
138 bil.EUR, correspondingly). The only country that did no bailout is Finland. 
The second column shows a number of bailouts in our sample banks. A total number of 
bailouts in the sample banks are 58. The banks in Denmark, the UK, Greece, Germany and 
Italy have relatively large number of bailouts (11, 9, 7, 6 and 6, correspondingly). The number 
of bailouts is relatively small in the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and 
Portugal. There was no bailout in the sample banks in Finland, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Sweden. 
Next three columns illustrate the amounts of gross bailout, gross repay, and net bailout in 
the sample banks. The amounts of gross bailout are relatively large in the UK, Germany and 
Belgium (600, 247 and 124 bil.EUR, correspondingly). Although banks in these countries 
have repaid significant part of bailout money, their net bailout debt as of 31st December 2010 
was still large. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
increase our sample by another 20 banks delisted during 2005-2010. The sample of delisted banks satisfies 
selection criteria used for a sample of listed banks. 
69 We describe our sampling procedure in Chapter 6.  
70 We use data on banking bailouts from Public Support Measures in Europe and in the United States (updated 
at as 15 November 2011), available on the web site of Mediobanca. 
71 The first column provides statistics for all banks in a country, while other columns provide statistics for our 
sample banks only. 
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Table 5.1  Bailout and repay across countries and legal origins. 
Country Country Bailout 
Number of 
bailouts Gross Bailout Gross Repay 
Net Bailout 
(2010) 
Austria  33.00 3 18.70 0 18.70 
Belgium 137.50 3 124.44 -65.01 59.43 
Denmark 40.24 11 8.88 -0.89 7.99 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 
France 25.80 3 10.70 -5.60 5.10 
Germany 417.50 6 247.14 -15.00 232.14 
Greece 3.40 7 3.26 0 3.26 
Ireland 157.70 3 16.60 0 16.60 
Italy 4.10 6 10.05 -6.00 4.05 
Luxembourg 2.66 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 143.00 4 37.90 -7.00 30.90 
Portugal 6.20 3 3.55 0 3.55 
Spain 19.70 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0.50 0 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 1106.25 
9 600.34 -90.97 509.37 
Total: 2097.55 58 1081.56 -190.47 891.09 
      
Legal origin      
English 883.63 12 616.94 -90.97 525.97 
French 26.23 26 189.90 -83.61 106.29 
German 255.23 9 265.84 -15.00 250.84 
Scand 25.47 11 8.88 -0.89 7.99 
 
Next, we compare characteristics for banks that have received a bailout and for banks that 
have not, both before and after bailout. In order to save space, we observe banks on the level 
of legal origins only. We consider the effect of bailout over three years. For the bailed banks 
in our sample, the period after bailout includes the year when the bailout occurs,72 and 
following two years. For the non-bailed banks in our sample, the period after bailout includes 
the year when national regulator starts bailouts in a country, and following two years.73 For 
the countries where no bailout takes place, the period after bailout includes the year when 
European regulators start bailouts in their countries, and following two years (i.e., 2008, 2009, 
and 2010).  
                                                          
72 The bailout event precedes the reporting date (end-year). 
73 The exception is the UK, where the only bailout in 2007 was followed by a series of bailouts during 2008, 
2009 and 2010. Therefore, we assume the period after bailout includes the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 for non-
bailed banks in the UK. 
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We observe such characteristics as ownership structure, board composition, management 
compensation structure, CEO turnover, gross lending and dividend payout.  
Figures 5.1-5.3 compare these characteristics before and after government bailout for non-
bailed (0) and bailed (1) banks. Looking at Figure 5.1, we find that government ownership 
increases in bailed banks (the exception is a group of Scandinavian countries) and decreases 
in non-bailed banks (the exception is a group of English origin countries) following the 
bailout. Financial institution ownership decreases in bailed and non-bailed banks following 
the bailout, although it decreases more strongly in bailed banks. We conclude that 
government bailout during 2007-2010 caused strong changes in ownership structure of bailed 
banks. 
The amount of gross loans decreases in non-bailed banks following the bailout (the 
exception is a group of Scandinavian countries). However, there is no common trend in gross 
loans between bailed banks: gross loans increase in English and French origin countries, and 
decrease in German and Scandinavian countries. The percentage of reserves for impaired 
loans to gross loans decreases in bailed and non-bailed banks after bailout (the exception is a 




Figure 5.1: Ownership structure and lending by non-bailed (0) and bailed (1) banks 
before and after government bailout, by legal origins. 
 
 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 focus on several managerial disciplining measures implemented by 
government during 2007-2010. Figure 5.2 analyzes the restriction on dividends, assignment of 
state representative on the board, and CEO replacement.  
We observe that dividend payout ratios drop down following the bailout in bailed and non-
bailed banks, although the decrease is significantly stronger in bailed banks. Next, we find an 
increased probability of state representation on the boards of bailed banks in English and 
French origin countries, and non-bailed banks in French origin countries. Finally, we observe 
an increased probability of CEO turnover in bailed banks (the exception is a group of 
Scandinavian countries), and a decreased probability of CEO turnover in non-bailed banks 
following bailout. However, the probability of forced CEO turnover increases in both bailed 
and non-bailed banks after bailout (the exception is a group of Scandinavian countries). We 
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Figure 5.2: Managerial disciplining measures in non-bailed (0) and bailed (1) banks 
before and after government bailout, by legal origins. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 analyzes the dynamics of management compensation in bailed and non-bailed 
banks. We observe that managers of bailed banks have higher cash and share-based 
compensation before government intervention, than managers of non-bailed banks.  
Management cash compensation decreases in bailed and non-bailed banks following the 
bailout. The decrease in management cash compensation is mostly driven by the decrease in 
management bonuses, and is significantly stronger in bailed banks. Management salary drops 
down in bailed banks after bailout. For English and German legal origin countries, 
management salary in non-bailed banks decreases, however, for French and Scandinavian 
origin countries, it increases. 
Management share-based compensation decreases in bailed and non-bailed banks (the 
exception is a group of non-bailed banks in French origin countries). The decrease is 
significantly stronger in bailed banks. We conclude that an overall effect of government 
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Figure 5.3: Management compensation in non-bailed (0) and bailed (1) banks before 
and after government bailout, by legal origins. 
 
 
We distinguish a group of delisted banks for analyzing the effectiveness of government 
bailout measures for saving troubled institutions from delisting. Figure 5.4 compares the 
number of bailouts and the amount of gross bailout across listed banks and banks that were 
delisted during 2007-2010.74 The only bailout takes place in 2007. Most bailouts occur during 
2008 and 2009 (18 and 31 bailouts, correspondingly). The number of bailouts during 2010 is 
relatively small (8 bailouts). The amounts of gross bailout are large during 2008 and 2009, 
and relatively small during 2007 and 2010. 
The only bank that received bailout money during the first year of the crisis – 2007 was 
delisted consequently. During 2008, almost one half of bailout money was assigned to banks 
that were further delisted. These evidences show low effectiveness of government bailout 
measures during 2007-2008 for saving the troubled banks. The effectiveness of bailouts 
increases during 2009: around 80% of bailout money helps the banks to avoid delisting. This 
result shows also that assignment of bailout money was preceded by better analysis of 
                                                          
74 Overall, 36% of observation for listed banks and 20% of observations for banks delisted during 2005-2010 















































































troubled banks during 2009. During 2010, the amount of gross bailout was relatively small. 
However, this bailout money helped all entitled banks to avoid further delisting. 
Figure 5.4: Government bailouts across listed and delisted banks, by years. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 compares the number of bailouts and the amount of gross bailout across 15 EU 
countries. The number of bailouts is large in Denmark (11 bailout events), followed by the 
UK, Greece, Germany and Italy (9, 7, 6 and 6 bailout events, correspondingly). There was no 
bailout in the sample banks in Finland, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. Most bailouts helped 
the banks to avoid delisting. However, some bailed banks in Denmark, Germany and the UK 
were delisted consequently. 
The UK government distributed the largest amount of gross bailout money. Large part of 
this money was assigned to banks that were further delisted. Germany distributed large 
amount of bailout money, too. Most part of German government money was assigned to a 
bank that consequently was delisted: Hypo Real Estate Holding AG was bailed out by other 
German banks in October 2008 in the midst of the global financial crisis, before approving a 






























received significant government help. All banks in these countries were listed during the 
entire period of observations. 
Figure 5.5: Government bailouts across listed and delisted banks, by countries. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Panel A illustrates the differences in gross bailout, gross repay and net bailout 
across listed (0) and delisted (1) banks. The amount of gross bailout in listed banks 
significantly exceeds the amount of gross bailout in delisted banks during 2008, 2009 and 
2010. Not surprisingly, the amount of gross repay is also higher in listed banks. Although, the 
dynamics of gross repay are very different in listed and delisted banks. Delisted banks start 
repaying earlier – in 2008, but make no repayment in 2009 and 2010. In the contrary, no listed 
bank makes repayment during 2008. Listed banks start to repay bailout money in 2009 and 













































Figure 5.6: Gross and average bailout and repay across listed (0) and delisted (1) 
banks, by years. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Panel B compares average bailout and average repay per bank across listed (0) 
and delisted (1) banks. We observe that in average one delisted bank receives more bailout 
money than one listed bank. This result shows that, on the one hand, more troubled banks 
receive more bailout money and, on the other hand, assignment of bailout money does not 
help resolving problems in delisted banks. This result provides evidence for inefficiency of 
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Did government money discipline bank managers?  
The consequences of government bailout in European banking75 
 
 
In this chapter, we test several hypotheses on potential outcomes of government bailout in 
European banking. First, we analyze whether bailed banks benefited from government bailout 
measures using a Helping Hand hypothesis. Second, we analyze whether government support 
was followed by increased control over the management of bailed banks using a Managerial 
Disciplining hypothesis.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature on banking bailout focuses on the reasons of the financial crisis (Faccio et al. 
(2006); Vallascas and Hagendorff (2012)) and compares government bailout measures used in 
different countries (Petrovic and Tutsch (2009); Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011)). However, 
the literature on the consequences of government bailout in banking is rather scarce. 
Did government bailout help troubled banks? Were bailout measures accompanied by an 
increased government control over bailed institutions? 
In this paper, we test two hypotheses on potential outcomes of government bailout in 
banking. We use the first hypothesis – Helping Hand hypothesis – for analyzing whether 
bailed banks benefited from government intervention. The literature finds different types of 
                                                          




the interaction between government and firm (Cheung et al. (2009); Frye and Iwasaki (2011); 
La Porta et al. (2002)). We focus on a typology by Cheung et al. (2009), in particular on the 
‘helping hand’ hypothesis, which is efficient for describing the government-bank interaction 
that took place during and after the crisis. 
Cheung et al. (2009) test two alternative hypotheses on government-firm interaction. 
According to the ‘helping hand’ hypothesis, firm benefits from a connection with 
government. The alternative hypothesis – the ‘grabbing hand’ hypothesis – implies that 
government expropriates minority shareholders. Cheung et al. (2009) find that connection to 
central government performs as a helping hand, while connection to local government works 
as a grabbing hand. The literature on non-financial firms finds that connection to central 
government benefits a firm, although is associated with poor firm performance (Miwa and 
Ramseyer (2005); Cheung et al. (2009)). The ‘managerial discipline’ ideal type of business-
state relationships of Frye and Iwasaki (2011) complements the ‘helping hand’ hypothesis: 
when internal corporate governance is weak, government intervention helps to save the 
troubled institution from a failure. Frye and Iwasaki (2011) analyze three types of business-
state relationships.76 In the ‘managerial discipline’ ideal type government intervenes into poor 
performing firm for constraining firm managers from looting the firm. 
The second hypothesis we test is the Managerial Disciplining hypothesis. We use it for 
analyzing whether government support was followed by increased control over the 
management of bailed banks. The literature analyzes different regulatory measures used for 
managerial disciplining. Wilson and Wu (2012) analyze the restrictions on executives’ 
compensation in TARP recipient banks, and find that these restrictions are the main reason for 
the banks’ early exit from the program. Frye and Iwasaki (2011) analyze such managerial 
disciplining measure as putting government representative on the board.77 The literature on 
takeovers finds that takeovers are associated with restrictions on firm dividends (Francis et al. 
(2011)).  
We test the Helping Hand hypothesis and the Managerial Disciplining hypothesis using a 
new hand-collected dataset on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation 
                                                          
76 Alternative ideal types are ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘collusion’ ideal types. In the ‘rent-seeking’ ideal type 
government seeks its own interests by supporting the firms at the expense of society. In the ‘collusion’ ideal type 
government supports the firms that provide important goods or services for the state (Frye and Iwasaki (2011)). 
77 This is consistent with the ‘managerial discipline’ ideal type of business-state relationships. 
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structure for 129 listed banks78 from EU-15 countries. We combine this dataset with data 
collected from Mediobanca on government bailouts, and data collected from Bankscope on 
bank financials and other variables that are believed to be relevant for our research. 
We home in on the relation between government bailout and corporate governance of EU-
15 (i.e. Western Europe) banks for several reasons. First, the consequences of government 
bailout on European banking are an under-researched topic. Evaluating government bailout 
measures in banks has drawn attention from both academics and policy makers, because poor 
governance of bailouts exacerbated financial and corporate governance problems in banks.79 
However, the empirical literature was often limited to U.S. banks, because of a lack of 
corporate governance data for European banks. Second, we focus on EU-15 banks because of 
the heterogeneity in banking regulation and government intervention across different 
countries (Petrovic and Tutsch (2009)). This heterogeneity offers a good background for 
investigating the impact of government intervention for national banking and provides more 
opportunity for generalizing our findings for other countries. 
By way of preview, our findings can be summarized as follows. 
First, we find that state ownership increases in bailed banks following government bailout. 
This finding is consistent with the Helping Hand hypothesis: government support during 
2007-2010 helps to overcome capitalization problems in bailed banks. In addition, we find 
that ownership by a widely-held financial institution decreases in bailed banks after 
government bailout. The literature reports that institutional owners require high risk-taking 
and high stock returns from bank managers, while state owner seeks for long-term stability in 
all banks in a country (Mülbert (2010)). Our results demonstrate the character of changes in 
ownership structure of bailed banks after government bailout. 
Second, despite an overall drop in the lending market, gross loans in bailed banks 
experience no significant changes following bailout. This result is also consistent with the 
Helping Hand hypothesis: government bailout helps to keep lending by bailed banks at the 
pre-crisis level. However, we find no significant improvement of the quality of new loans in 
bailed banks after bailout. Therefore, our results only partly confirm the efficiency of 
government bailout measures for lending by bailed banks.  
                                                          
78 This number includes 109 listed banks and 20 banks delisted during 2005-2010. 
79 The bailed banks were criticized for spending bailout money on distributing high dividends (Acharya et al. 
(2011)) and high executive compensation (Bebchuk et al. (2010)). 
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Third, we provide robust evidence for increased control over the banks that receive 
government money. Government appoints its representatives as ‘watchdogs’ on the boards of 
bailed institutions after bailout. Government implements restrictions on dividends, and 
managerial bonuses and share-based compensation for bailed banks following bailout. These 
evidences are consistent with the Managerial Disciplining hypothesis, which argues that state 
increases control over the management of bailed firm to constrain firm managers from looting 
the firm. However, we find no significant effect of government bailout on forced CEO 
turnover. This result is consistent with the literature that finds no support for regulators-driven 
executives’ turnover in banks (Schaeck et al. (2012)). 
We structure the rest of the paper as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 6.3 describes the methodology and the data set. Section 6.4 
reports the results and robustness checks. Section 6.5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
6.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed weaknesses of national banking systems 
worldwide.  European regulators responded to the crisis by using different emergency 
measures, such as deposit guarantees, state guarantee schemes, recapitalization measures, 
loans to banks, acquisition of impaired assets, and nationalization of banks.80 On the one 
hand, government bailout of troubled banks helped to avoid high social cost associated with 
banking failure. On the other hand, government intervention could result in increased moral 
hazard problem in bailed banks. The literature finds that government safety nets decrease 
capital solvency of a bank (Nier and Baumann (2006)). According to Ianotta et al. (2013), 
government ownership decreases the risk of default but increases operating risk of banks. 
Implementation of government bailout was often followed by increased control over the 
bailed institution. The literature shows that, in the absence of such control, bailout moneys 
can be spent on top executives’ compensation (i.e., managerial looting) or dividend payouts 
(e.g., ‘risk shifting’) (Acharya et al. (2009)). 
                                                          
80 For details, see Petrovic and Tutsch (2009). 
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We use two hypotheses for testing the effect of government bailout on banking. First, we 
analyze whether bailed banks benefited from government support measures using the Helping 
Hand hypothesis. Next, we analyze whether government support was followed by increased 
control over the bailed banks’ management using the Managerial Disciplining hypothesis.  
6.2.1 Helping Hand hypothesis 
The Helping Hand hypothesis implies that connection to central government works as a 
‘helping hand’ since firm benefits from the presence of government shareholders (Cheung et 
al. (2009)). Government support performs two important functions in a bailed bank. First, 
government financing helps a bank to overcome capital deficiency problem. Second, state 
ownership aims to limit excessive risk-taking in a bank: state owner is interested in long-term 
stability of all banks in a country, while private and institutional owners require high risk-
taking and high stock returns (Mülbert (2010)). 
The literature finds that large share ownership changes occur after economic shocks and 
firm restructuring (Denis and Sarin (1999)). Accordingly, ownership structure of European 
banking changes after the crisis: such government bailout measures, as capital injection and 
nationalization, increase government share ownership in bailed banks.81 State becomes full 
owner of several banks as a result of nationalization.82 We analyze the changes in state 
ownership in bailed banks following government bailout by testing Hypothesis 1. 
H1: The probability of the largest state ownership in bailed banks increases following 
government bailout. 
In addition, we test whether institutional ownership decreases in bailed banks after bailout. 
The literature finds that institutional investors decrease their shareholdings in troubled firms 
(Parrino et al. (2003)). Parrino et al. (2003) use four potential explanations for this finding. 
First, some institutional investors are momentum traders: they sell stocks that recently 
performed poorly. Second, institutional investors favor securities of dividend-paying firms 
(‘prudent securities’). Third, institutions are better informed and sell shares of troubled firm in 
anticipation of negative abnormal returns. Since institutions have larger holdings, they have 
                                                          
81 Government capital injection (or recapitalizations) implies that a bank issues common or preferred stocks for 
state owner; while nationalization considers that state acquires the majority of equity stakes in a bank (Calderon 
and Schaeck (2012)).  
82 For example, Northern Rock, Bradford & Bingley plc, and Fortis Bank Nederland Holding. 
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greater incentives to monitor a firm. Finally, some institutions sell the shares if influencing 
board decisions becomes too costly (for example, in case of forced CEO turnover and 
appointment of new outside CEO). Since government bailout during the crisis was associated 
with poor banking performance, restriction on dividends, negative abnormal returns, and 
sometimes CEO changes, we expect that institutional ownership decreases in bailed banks 
after bailout. 
Since most banks in our sample are owned by widely-held financial institutions,83 we use a 
dummy for largest financial institution ownership for testing changes in the banks’ 
institutional ownership. 
H2: The probability of the largest financial institution ownership in bailed banks 
decreases following government bailout. 
Next, we test whether government bailout helped to keep lending by bailed banks at the 
pre-crisis level. The ‘helping hand’ of national regulators intended to avoid possible recession 
in the economy caused by the banking crisis. Thus, keeping the amounts of bank lending at 
the pre-crisis level was of crucial interest. We analyze whether the lending by bailed banks 
experiences significant changes following the bailout by testing Hypothesis 3. 
H3: Gross loans do not change significantly in bailed banks following government 
bailout. 
The literature finds that bailed banks did not reduce the riskiness of their new lending more 
than non-bailed banks in response to government bailout (Brei and Gadanecz (2012)). Brei 
and Gadanecz (2012) estimate the riskiness of new lending by a ratio of impaired loans to 
gross loans. Calderon and Schaeck (2012) also employ a similar measure – loan impairment 
charge to loans. We analyze the improvement of new loans’ quality in bailed banks after 
bailout using Hypothesis 4. 
H4: In bailed banks the ratio of reserves for impaired loans to gross loans increases 
following government bailout. 
 
                                                          
83 A widely-held financial firm is the largest shareholder in 72% of our bank-year observations. 
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6.2.2 Managerial Disciplining hypothesis 
State financial support alone is not enough for enhancing financial and corporate 
governance improvements in bailed banks. Control mechanisms should ensure the appropriate 
use of bailout money. Such mechanisms include representation of government on the board, 
and restrictions on dividends, executives’ bonuses and share-based compensation in bailed 
banks. 
The literature finds that the government sends its directors to poor performing firms (Miwa 
and Ramseyer (2005); Frye and Iwasaki (2011)). According to ‘managerial discipline’ ideal 
type of business-state relations of Frye and Iwasaki (2011), government directors constrain 
firm managers from looting the firm. We expect that relations of bailed banks with 
government will follow the ‘managerial discipline’ ideal type described by Frye and Iwasaki 
(2011): government appoints its representatives as ‘watchdogs’ in some banks that received 
the money. We test whether the probability of government representation on the board of 
bailed bank increases following bailout, using Hypothesis 5. 
H5: The probability of state representation on the boards of bailed banks increases after 
government bailout. 
Bank executives’ compensation was one of the most discussed topics during the financial 
crisis. Literature and media sources criticized the excess compensation for executives, short-
term orientation of remuneration programs and guaranteed bonuses for top-management of 
troubled banks (Bebchuk et al. (2010)). 
Government intervention was accompanied by the adoption of restrictions on 
compensation of executives in bailed banks. Primarily, these restrictions considered 
managerial bonuses and equity-based compensation.84 Banking regulation in different 
European countries followed a similar trajectory: it initially focused on management 
compensation at bailed institutions and only then extended across national banking sector 
(Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011)). The literature finds that, although bailed banks had a 
higher probability of equity-based compensation than non-bailed banks both before and after 
the crisis, they decreased share-based compensation during 2009, while non-bailed banks did 
not (Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011)).  
                                                          
84 For example, no cash bonuses were paid in Lloyds Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland after bailout (Ferrarini 
and Ungureanu (2011)). 
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Moreover, some literature suggests that government intervention serves as a substitute for 
banking corporate governance: in the presence of powerful regulator the level of overall 
compensation and performance-based compensation for bank top-management decreases 
(Mülbert (2010)). Considering the arguments above, we expect that bailed banks will 
demonstrate significantly lower levels of bonuses and share-based compensation after 
bailout.85 
H6: Management bonuses in bailed banks decrease following government bailout (while 
management salary in bailed banks experiences small or no changes). 
H7: Management share-based compensation in bailed banks decreases following 
government bailout. 
Government bailout was accompanied by the restriction on dividends in bailed banks. 
These restrictions aimed to limit such moral hazard problem as risk-shifting86 in banks that 
received bailout money. Restriction on dividends in bailed banks is consistent with the 
‘managerial discipline’ ideal type of business-state relations described by Frye and Iwasaki 
(2011): firms that have a connection to government distribute fewer dividends. 
The literature finds negative effect of bailout on dividends. Francis et al. (2011) show that 
dividend payout ratios and propensities drop down following takeovers. However, Avkiran 
and Goto (2011) identify inefficiency of bailout moneys’ use on the level of dividends. We 
expect that bailed banks will demonstrate significantly lower levels of dividend payout after 
bailout. 
H8: Dividend payout in bailed banks decreases following government bailout. 
                                                          
85 We control for the effect of banking compensation regulation on bailed banks. During the crisis, the Financial 
Stability Board principles and the Capital Requirements Directive were main documents in executives’ 
compensation regulations. In September 2009, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) prepared the principles of 
Sound Compensation Practices aimed to improve poor compensation practices in banks (Mülbert (2010); 
Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011)). The same year the Committee on European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
developed principles on remuneration policies applicable across financial institutions. One year later the 
Commission issues the principles through a directive, including them in the revised Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD III). The CRD III even went beyond the FSB Principles and introduces more rigidity in pay 
structures in Europe (Ferrarini and Ungureanu (2011)). We control for the effect of regulation of management 
compensation by using the dummies for years when the FSB standards and the CRD III were issued (years 2009 
and 2010, correspondingly). 
86 Risk-shifting is characterized by the situation when poor performing firms shift risks from owners to creditors 
by distributing large dividends (Acharya et al. (2010); Onali (2012)). 
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Finally, we test whether managerial disciplining measures increase the probability of 
forced CEO replacement. The literature finds no support for regulators-driven executives’ 
turnover in banks (Schaeck et al. (2012)). Moreover, Schaeck et al. (2012) show that 
executives’ replacement does not improve firm performance. We expect that government 
bailout will not increase the probability of forced CEO turnover. 
H9: The probability of forced CEO turnover does not change significantly in bailed 
banks following government bailout. 
 
6.3 Methodology and data 
This section describes the methodology and data set. Section 6.3.1 describes the 
econometric framework and the main variables of our models. Section 6.3.2 describes the data 
set. 
6.3.1  Methodology 
We compare treated banks, i.e., banks which receive treatment (here: government bailout) 
with banks in a control group both before and after the treatment. The control group consists 
of banks that did not receive a treatment (i.e., non-bailed banks) (Bertrand et al. (2003)). 
The baseline regression model to test H1 is as follows: 
Government as the Largest Owneri,t = f(Treati,t, Posti,t,  Post*Treati,t, Ci, t,  Yeart) [1] 
Where = 1,2,…, N labels panel units (banks), and t = 1,2,…, Ti labels time periods (years).  
Treat is a dummy that equals one for the banks affected by the treatment, and zero otherwise. 
Post equals one if the observation is in the post-treatment period, and zero otherwise.87 Post-
Treat is a dummy that equals one if treated bank is observed in the post-treatment period, and 
zero otherwise. Post*Treat equals zero if a non-treated bank is observed in the pre- and post-
                                                          
87 For the treated banks in our sample, Post equals one for the period when the treatment occurs and following 
two years. Post equals one for the first year of the treatment since the event of treatment precedes the reporting 
date (end-year). We consider the effect of treatment over three years. For the non-treated banks in our sample, 
Post equals one for the year when national regulator starts bailouts, and following two years (The exception is 
the UK, where the only bailout in 2007 was followed by a series of bailouts during 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
Therefore, we assume Post equals one for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 for non-treated banks in the UK). For 
the countries where no bailout takes place, Post equals one for the year when European regulators start bailouts 
in their countries, and following two years (i.e., 2008, 2009, and 2010). 
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treatment period. The slope of Post-Treat provides information about the effect of treatment. 
A positive coefficient suggests an increase in the outcome variable, while a negative 
coefficient signals a decrease. Ci,t is a vector of control variables to account for bank-level and 
country-level characteristics. 
Our bank-level control variables are: Bank Size, Tier1 Capital, and Profitability. We proxy 
for Bank Size using the natural logarithm of book value of total bank assets. Banking literature 
refers to bank size as one of major banking characteristics. The variable Tier1 Capital proxies 
for the impact of capital requirements deriving from the Basle Accord (1988 and subsequent 
revisions). It is constructed as a ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets. We proxy for 
bank Profitability using a ratio of net income to average total assets (Fama and French 
(2001)). Finally, we use GDP per Capita (natural logarithm of country GDP her head) to 
account for differences in time-varying country-level economic conditions.88 
The panel structure of our data permits inclusion of time (Year) and bank (Bank) dummy 
variables to capture year and bank fixed effects, correspondingly. The year fixed effects 
account for unobservable, time-varying effects for the European banking industry (trends), 
which are assumed to have the same impact on treatment and control group banks. The bank 
fixed effects account for unobservable time-invariant bank-specific factors. 
To test H2-H9 we change the dependent variable in equation [1] according to the 
hypotheses tested. 
We use difference-in-difference (DID) estimations for our main analysis. This technique 
compares treated banks with banks in a control group both before and after the treatment. DID 
is a ‘quasi-experimental technique used to understand the effect of a sharp change in the 
economic environment or government policy’ (Roberts (1996)). DID estimates the following: 
yi,t = b0 +b1I(Treati,t) + b2I(Posti,t) + b3I(Treati,t) * I(Posti,t) + ei,t    [2] 
We use a full panel of banks consisting of bailed (I(Treat) = 1), and non-bailed (I(Treat) = 
0) banks observed before (I(Post) = 0) and after (I(Post) = 1) initiation of government bailout. 
b3 is the parameter of our interest (i.e., the DID estimator).  
                                                          
88 We cannot employ country dummies, since their coefficients would be unidentified in fixed-effect regressions. 
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DID approach computes the conditional expectations and, then, the difference over time in 
average outcome for the treatment group minus the difference over time in average outcome 
for the control group gives the difference-in-difference estimator (Roberts (1996)). 
{E(yi,t | I(Treati,t) = 1, I(Posti,t) = 1) – E(yi,t | I(Treati,t) = 1, I(Posti,t) = 0)} – 
{E(yi,t | I(Treati,t) = 0, I(Posti,t) =1) – E(yi,t | I(Treati,t) = 0, I(Posti,t) = 0)} = b3. [3] 
DID estimations require a key assumption. The average change in the response variable 
has to be the same for both the treatment and control groups in the absence of treatment (the 
so called ‘parallel trends’ assumption) (Calderon and Schaeck (2012); Roberts (1996)).  
We examine the parallel trends assumption, focusing on corporate governance 
characteristics in the three years prior to the treatment. The assumption requires that we 
observe similar changes in corporate governance characteristics between banks affected by 
the treatment and those in the control group. Importantly, this assumption does not require 
identical levels of the outcome variable for the two groups of banks in the pre-treatment 
period. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates similar patterns that support the existence of parallel trends. All 
panels show similar trends in corporate governance characteristics from year three to year one 
prior to intervention except for the panel for Management Share-Based Compensation. Right 
after the treatment, sharp changes in most analyzed variables occur for the treatment group, 
while no or relatively small changes occur for the control group. 
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6.3.2  Data and descriptive statistics 
We build a new hand-collected data set with information on board composition and 
ownership structure for 129 listed banks (commercial banks, bank holding companies, and 
cooperative banks)89 located in 15 EU countries for the period 2005-2010.90  
We start with the universe of European publicly quoted banks listed on Bankscope (EU-
15). For the sake of comparability, we focus on banks that use International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) as accounting standards. We home in on institutions classified as: 
commercial banks, cooperative banks, and bank holdings and holding companies. A total 
number of 127 banks satisfy these selection criteria. Next, we exclude institutions for which 
data on gross loans is unavailable (6, resulting in 121 remaining banks).91 Then, to allow 
hand-collection of information on corporate governance and ownership structure, we stipulate 
that there is at least one annual report (available on the bank’s web site)92 for the period 
2005–2010. These criteria result in a sample of 109 listed banks.  
Analyzing the effect of bailout measures on banking requires taking into account the banks 
delisted during the period of observations. Therefore, we increase our sample by another 20 
banks delisted during 2005-2010. These banks satisfy the selection criteria used for listed 
banks.  
Table 6.1 presents the main steps of our sample construction. A total number of banks in 
our sample are 129, which includes 109 listed banks, and 20 banks delisted during 2005-2010. 
Our final sample is an unbalanced panel with 744 bank-year observations.93 Table 6.2 
provides a breakdown of the number of banks per country and type of bank, and the sample 
representativeness relative to the population of listed banks in the EU-15 countries over the 
sample period. 
 
                                                          
89 All cooperative banks in our sample are publicly traded and, therefore, are partly owned by non-members. In 
Section 6.4.2, we offer robustness tests excluding cooperative banks from the sample.  
90 We collect information from different sources: bank annual reports (including notes to financial statements), 
corporate governance reports, and other documents available from the web sites of the banks, banking regulators 
and authorities, and other publicly available sources.  
91 Our purpose is to exclude firms that are not in the lending business, as in Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).   
92 The data is collected on an annual basis. 
93 We use bank-year observations since data on bank corporate governance, remuneration policy, and ownership 
structure is available on a yearly basis. 
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Table 6.1 Steps of sample construction. 
 Search criterion Number of banks 
Step 1 Listed banks 2,454 
Step 2 World region: European Union (15)  255 
Step 3 Accounting standards: IFRS 187 
Step 4 Specialization: Commercial banks, Cooperative banks, Bank 
holdings & Holding companies 
127 
Step 5 Information availability: gross loans 121 
Step 6 Information availability (annual reports on the banks’ web sites 
and market capitalization) 
109 
   
Step 1 Delisted banks 1366 
Step 2 World region: European Union (15)  245 
Step 3 Accounting standards: IFRS 117 
Step 4 Specialization: Commercial banks, Cooperative banks, Bank 
holdings & Holding companies 
68 
Step 5 Information availability: gross loans 64 
Step 6 Delisted date: 1/1/2005 – 31/12/2010 25 
Step 7 Information availability (annual reports on the banks’ web sites 
and market capitalization) 
20 
   
 Final sample: 129 
 
Table 6.2 Sample composition and representativeness. 
Country Banks Sample % Observations Sample % 
Austria  8 6% 46 6% 
Belgium 3 2% 18 2% 
Denmark 14 11% 82 11% 
Finland 4 3% 24 3% 
France 8 6% 48 6% 
Germany 10 8% 63 8% 
Greece 10 8% 66 9% 
Ireland 4 3% 23 3% 
Italy 26 20% 145 19% 
Luxembourg 2 2% 12 2% 
Netherlands 6 5% 34 5% 
Portugal 5 4% 30 4% 
Spain 9 7% 54 7% 
Sweden 4 3% 24 3% 
United Kingdom 14 11% 75 11% 






  BHC Commercial Cooperative Total: 
Total Bankscope sample in 2010 (listed banks, and banks delisted during 2005-2010, EU-15) 
1 N of banks 41 121 31 193 
2 Sample % 21.24 62.70 16.06 100.00 
Analyzed sample 
3 N of banks 35 81 13 129 
4 Sample composition, % 27.13 62.79 10.08 100.00 
5 Sample representativeness, % (3:1) 85.37 66.94 41.94 66.84 
 
Our measure of intervention Bailout is a dummy that equals one for the observations when 
the treatment was assigned to banks, and zero otherwise. We collect data on government 
bailout from Public Support Measures in Europe and in the United States (updated at as 15 
November 2011) available on the web site of Mediobanca. 
Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of Bailout across years and different countries. There is 
only one bailout event in 2007. Most bailouts take place during 2008 and 2009 (18 and 31 
bailouts, correspondingly). The number of bailouts is relatively small during 2010 (only 8 
bailouts). Denmark, the UK, Greece, Germany and Italy have relatively large number of 
bailouts (11, 9, 7, 6 and 6 bailout events, correspondingly). There was no bailout event in our 
sample banks in Finland, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. 
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of government bailouts across years and countries. 
 
 
Table 6.3 reports statistics for the variables that we use to test H1-H9. We reduce the effect 
of outliers by winsorizing all continuous variables at the 5th and 95th percentile. 
We report the statistics for the variables before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) excluding 
observations for which data on the control variables are missing. For Panel A, the number of 
observations (banks) on independent variables ranges from 343 (83) to 720 (128). For Panel 
B, the number of observations on independent variables is between 307 and 640, depending 
on the specification. The sample characteristics do not change substantially from Panel A to 
Panel B. This suggests that sample selection bias due to lack of data for the control variables 































Table 6.3  Summary statistics (all continuous variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile).  
  Observations Banks Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum  
 Panel A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Bailout 
Dummy variable: 1 if treatment is 
assigned to a bank, and 0 
otherwise 
744 656 129 119 0.078 0.087 0.268 0.282 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Government as the Largest 
Owner 
Dummy variable: 1 if the 
government is the largest 
shareholder, and 0 otherwise 
581 517 115 105 0.086 0.083 0.281 0.276 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Financial Institution as the 
Largest Owner 
Dummy variable: 1 if a widely-
held financial institution is the 
largest shareholder, and 0 
otherwise 
581 517 115 105 0.719 0.727 0.450 0.446 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Gross Loans Natural logarithm of gross loans (bil.EUR) 713 645 129 119 16.562 16.799 2.368 2.260 12.023 12.023 19.999 19.999 
Reserves for Impaired 
Loans 
Percentage of reserves for 
impaired loans to gross loans 612 570 123 113 2.590 2.599 1.885 1.802 0.350 0.350 7.780 7.780 
Government Official on the 
Board 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is 
government official on the board, 
and 0 otherwise 
675 608 128 119 0.076 0.079 0.264 0.270 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Management Cash 
Compensation 
Natural logarithm of  
management cash compensation 
(th.EUR) 
586 532 113 105 7.950 7.927 1.002 1.013 6.129 6.129 9.642 9.642 
Management Salary Natural logarithm of  management salary (th.EUR) 488 446 100 93 7.580 7.606 0.815 0.827 6.023 6.023 8.901 8.901 
Management Bonus Natural logarithm of  management bonus (th.EUR) 343 307 83 77 7.025 7.016 1.790 1.859 -1.204 -1.204 9.274 9.274 
Management Share-Based 
Compensation 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a 
share-based management 
compensation, and 0 otherwise 
547 494 103 95 0.490 0.460 0.500 0.499 0 0 1.000 1.000 
DPE Dividends for a given year divided by bank equity 684 616 126 117 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.032 0 0 0.112 0.112 
CEO Forced Turnover 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a 
forced CEO turnover (see 
definition in the Appendix 3), and 
0 otherwise 
709 631 128 118 0.041 0.041 0.198 0.199 0 0 1.000 1.000 
Panel A: All available observations. Panel B: only observations for which data on the control variables is available. 
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A widely-held financial institution is the largest owner of sample banks in around 72% of 
observations, while the state is the largest owner of the banks in less than 9% of observations. 
The average reserves for impaired loans are around 2.6% of the sample banks’ gross loans. 
Government officials94 are present on the boards of the banks in around 8% of observations. 
Management receives share-based compensation in no less than 46% of observations. The 
average DPE of sample banks is around 3.5%. Finally, the average percentage of forced CEO 
turnovers95 is only 4%.   
 
6.4 Results 
In this section, we report the results of the tests of H1-H9. Section 6.4.1 reports the main 
results achieved using the econometric procedure described in Section 6.3.1. Section 6.4.2 
reports the results when we employ propensity score matching method based on the Nearest 
Neighbor Matching estimator, and provides a battery of robustness checks. 
6.4.1  Main results 
Table 6.4 reports the results for nine DID regressions, run according to equation [1]. 
Equations [1]-[4] test the Helping Hand hypothesis, while equations [5]-[11] test the 
Managerial Disciplining hypothesis. All regressions include Post*Treati,t, controls, and year 
dummies and bank dummies.96 
 
                                                          
94 In the Appendix 3 (Section A3.1.1), we give a more detailed definition of the variable Government Official on 
the Board. 
95 In the Appendix 3 (Section A3.1.2), we give a more detailed explanation of how we distinguish between 
forced and unforced CEO turnovers. 
96 Treati,t,is dropped from the regressions since the difference between the banks in treatment and control groups 
is already fixed by bank dummies. 
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Table 6.4 Difference-in-difference regressions: The effect of government bailout on banking corporate governance and ownership 
structure.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES Government 





























            
Post*Treat 0.177** -0.224*** 0.048 0.220 0.128** -0.312*** -0.126 -0.486* -0.282*** -0.009* 0.070 
 (0.074) (0.081) (0.039) (0.216) (0.050) (0.117) (0.096) (0.263) (0.096) (0.005) (0.044) 
            
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank 
dummies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 517 517 645 570 608 532 446 307 494 616 631 
R-squared 0.656 0.839 0.996 0.829 0.758 0.901 0.901 0.906 0.651 0.720 0.205 
Number of 
banks 
105 105 119 113 119 105 93 77 95 117 118 
The regressions are run using a difference-in-difference model for assessing of the effect of government bailout on bank corporate governance variables. The dependent 
variables are reported in the first row. All specifications include time dummies, bank dummies and the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Tier1 
Capital (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per Capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The exception is Gross 
Loans: we do not use Size as control in the regression due to high correlation between gross loans and total assets. The continuous variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th 







In Table 6.4, the effect of Post*Treat on Government as the Largest Owner is positive and 
highly significant: the probability of state largest ownership increases by 18% in bailed banks 
following bailout. The effect of Post*Treat on Financial Institution as the Largest Owner is 
negative and highly significant: the probability of the largest ownership by a financial 
institution decreases by 22% in bailed banks after bailout. These results support H1 and H2 
and the Helping Hand hypothesis. Despite overall significant drop in the lending market, 
lending by bailed banks does not change significantly: the coefficient of Post*Treat in the 
regression for Gross Loans is positive but not significant. The effect of government bailout on 
Reserves for Impaired Loans of bailed banks is also not significant. These results support H3 
and reject H4 and only partly confirm the efficiency of government bailout measures for 
lending by bailed banks.  
The equations [5]-[11] test the hypotheses [5]-[9], which analyze the Managerial 
Disciplining hypothesis. The effect of Post*Treat on Government Official on the Board is 
positive and highly significant: the probability of state representation on the boards on bailed 
banks increases by 13% following bailout. Although in bailed banks managerial salary does 
not change significantly after bailout, managerial bonuses and share-based compensation drop 
down: the coefficient of Post*Treat in the regressions for Management Bonus and 
Management Share-Based Compensation is negative and highly significant. The effect of 
Post*Treat on DPE is also negative and highly significant. Despite a significant increase in 
the probability of forced CEO turnover in all observed banks, in bailed banks the probability 
of forced CEO turnover does not change significantly: the coefficient of Post*Treat is 
positive but not significant in the regressions for CEO Forced Turnover.  
6.4.2  Robustness checks 
We use propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching 
estimator to allow for the possibility that the two groups of banks (bailed and non-bailed 
banks) differ in the probability of receiving the treatment. 
The propensity score matching (PSM) method constructs a control group of banks that 
have a similar probability of receiving treatment but no treatment occurs (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). The propensity score is defined as the probability of being subject to 
government bailout conditional on pre-treatment characteristics. It is calculated based on 
probit models with bailout event as a dependent variable. The pre-treatment variables used for 
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calculating the propensity score include the control variables used above (Grilli and 
Rampichini (2011)).97 
Then, the predicted probabilities from the probit models are used to match each bank-year 
observation to observations from the control group of banks with similar characteristics based 
on the absolute value of the difference between the propensity scores. The Nearest Neighbor 
Matching (NNM) estimator restricts the set of matches to those whose propensity scores are 
the closest to the treated bank’s propensity score, and then computes the difference between 
the outcome of the treated banks and the outcome of the matched control banks (Grilli and 
Rampichini (2011)). By averaging these differences, we obtain the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT). 
ATT is useful for explicitly evaluating the effect of the treatment on those for whom the 
treatment was actually intended: 
ATT = E[Y(1) - Y (0) | Treat = 1]        [4] 
Then, we check balancing of the variables before and after matching. We use t-tests for 
equality of means in the treated and non-treated groups, both before and after matching: for 
good balancing, t-tests are not significant after matching (Grilli and Rampichini (2011)). We 
consider the standardized median bias before and after matching as another measure of 
balancing: it should be less than 10% after matching. These tests include the control variables 
used before.98 
Our propensity score matching results in Table 6.5 confirm the main results. That is, after 
taking into account the non-random assignment of the treatment, banks that received 
government support show increased probability of government representation and state 
ownership, and reduced probability of financial institution ownership, dividends, managerial 
share-based compensation and bonuses. The overall matching performance is good: after 
matching the median absolute bias is less than 10% for all variables.   
                                                          
97 When we exclude GDP per Capita from the probit model in order to avoid an over-parameterization problem, 
the results remain qualitatively the same. GDP per Capita is not significant in the propensity score specification 
model. Although its inclusion does not bias the propensity score estimates or make them inconsistent, it can 
increase their variance. 




Table 6.5 Robustness check: Propensity score matching method based on the Nearest Neighbor Matching estimator. 
































            
ATT 
Difference 
0.176*** -0.297*** -3402.325 0.798*** 0.143*** -1627.781** 47.96 -2042.889*** -0.250*** -0.021*** 0.055 
 (0.060) (0.073) (25750209) (0.288) (0.048) (723.053) (328.454) (557.506) (0.081) (0.003) (0.043) 
z-stat (-2.669) (-3.719) (1.262) (-2.524) (-2.716) (-1.962) (1.179) (-3.432) (-2.848) (-3.719) (-0.8253) 
            
Observations 517 517 645 570 608 532 446 419 494 616 631 
R-squared 0.066 0.034 0.063 0.037 0.034 0.001 0.019 0.016 0.005 0.097 0.027 
Absolute bias 
(median): 
3.7 3.7 9.2 8.4 9.4 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.8 6.6 6.3 
Pstest: YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
The regressions are run using a Propensity score matching model for assessing of the effect of government bailout on bank corporate governance variables. The dependent 
variables are reported in the first row.  We calculate propensity score using the following control variables: Size (log of total assets of the bank), Tier1 Capital (ratio of Tier 1 
capital to risk-weighted assets), Profitability (return on average asset), GDP per Capita (natural logarithm of GDP per capita). The exception is Gross Loans: we do not use 
Size as control in the regression due to high correlation between gross loans and total assets. We use the same controls for propensity score test (pstest). The continuous 









We perform several additional robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results to the 
specification of our models. The results of these tests are not reported, but are available upon 
request from the authors. 
First, we repeat our DID analysis using different measures for independent variables. We 
use percentage of state ownership instead of the dummy for the largest state ownerships, and 
percentage of financial institution ownership instead of the dummy for the largest financial 
institution ownership. We employ different measure for banking Gross Loans also: the ratio 
of gross loans to total assets. We use several substitutes for the loans’ quality measure: the 
ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, and the natural logarithm of loan loss provision. 
We employ management fixed compensation and performance-related compensation 
measures as alternatives for Management Salary and Management Bonuses, correspondingly.  
Next, we split Management Share-based Compensation into two different variables: dummy 
for management option grant and dummy for management stock grant. The dummies are 
equal one for observations when corresponding type of share-based compensation takes place, 
and zero otherwise. Further, we use dividend dummy, which equals one for observations of 
positive dividend, and zero otherwise, instead of DPE. Finally, we substitute CEO Forced 
Turnover with the measure for CEO turnover. When we repeat our analysis using the 
substitute measures listed above the results of DID analysis reported in Table 6.4 remain 
virtually the same. 
Second, we investigate the effect of being delisted on the outcome variables. Following 
Boyallian and Ruiz-Verdu (2012) we distinguish troubled and delisted banks. We include a 
dummy variable, Delist, which equals one if a bank is delisted during observed year, and zero 
otherwise. The dummy is insignificant in most cases. The coefficients on the outcome 
variables remain virtually the same as those reported in Table 6.4. 
Third, we exclude from the sample Italian banks, which are the most numerous in the 
sample, and the results remain qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 6.4. Similarly, 
when we exclude from the sample the thirteen cooperative banks, the results remain 






In this study, we have tested whether bailed banks benefited from government bailouts 
during 2007-2010 using the Helping Hand hypothesis. Government financial support alone is 
not enough for enhancing financial and corporate governance improvements in bailed banks. 
We have tested also whether government support was followed by increased control over the 
bailed banks using the Managerial Disciplining hypothesis. 
We have taken advantage of a unique and painstakingly hand-collected data set with 
information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure for 129 
European listed banks for the period 2005-2010. This data set has been merged with data from 
Mediobanca on government bailouts, and data from Bankscope on bank financials and other 
variables relevant for our research. 
We have provided robust evidence for the increased state ownership in bailed banks 
following government bailout. Moreover, we have found that ownership by a widely-held 
financial institution decreases in bailed banks after government bailout. These findings are 
consistent with the Helping Hand hypothesis: government ownership helped to overcome 
capitalization problems in bailed banks, while institutional investors tried to get rid of shares 
of troubled banks.  
National regulators tried to avoid possible recession in the economy caused by the banking 
crisis. Thus, keeping bank lending at the pre-crisis level was of crucial interest. We find that 
government financial support helped to keep gross loans in bailed banks at the pre-crisis level, 
although it did not enhance significant improvement of the new loans’ quality. We conclude 
that government bailout measures had limited efficiency for lending by bailed banks. 
We have also provided robust evidence for the increased control over banks that receive 
bailout money. Government appointed its representatives as ‘watchdogs’ on the boards of 
bailed banks and implemented restrictions on dividends and managerial compensation in 
bailed institutions following bailout. This evidence is consistent with the Managerial 
Disciplining hypothesis. However, we did not find a significant effect of government bailout 
on forces CEO turnover. This result is consistent the literature, which finds no support for 
regulators-driven executives’ turnover in banks. We conclude that governance of public 











In this dissertation, we investigated corporate governance and dividend policy in banking. 
First, we generalized the main achievements of the study on banking dividend policy using 
the meta-analysis approach. Next, we analyzed the effect of banking corporate governance on 
dividend payout using the managerial entrenchment theory. Finally, we investigated the effect 
of government bailout during 2007-2010 on corporate governance, dividend policy and other 
key characteristics of European banking. 
The core of the dissertation was constituted by three papers: the meta-analysis paper, and 
two empirical papers that investigated corporate governance and dividend in the context of 
the European banking sector. 
The first study investigated the relationship between dividend policy and value in a bank. 
Using the approach of meta-analysis we grouped and analyzed the relevant empirical studies 
developed during the last twenty years according to precise research questions and similar 
constructs used for value and dividend policy in a bank. By summarizing the results of 
relevant empirical papers, we confirmed that distributing dividends increases bank value. 
Thus, the study supported the ideas of the positive theorists’ school, who predict positive 
effect of paying dividends on firm value, and provided momentum for resolving the conflict 
between two opposite schools. Next, we confirmed a negative relationship between the bank’s 
market-to-book ratio and dividends per share. This result serves as an important practical 
guidance for equity investors. Finally, we confirmed a negative and significant effect of 
cutting dividends on market value of large banks. This result supported the Too-Big-To-Fail 
argument, implying higher stability and reliance on regulatory help for large banks. This 
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result showed also that Too-Big-To-Fail problem should be seriously analyzed and addressed 
by implementation of adequate regulatory measures. 
The second study analyzed the relationship between CEO power and dividend policy in 
European banking using the entrenchment hypothesis. We discriminated between the 
‘monitoring’ and the ‘expropriation’ perspectives on managerial entrenchment and employed 
two different proxies for CEO power: CEO ownership, and board duality. We investigated the 
role of CEO power on bank dividend policy using a new hand-collected data set for a sample 
of 109 listed European banks for the period 2005-2010. We employed a Within-Group model 
as our main model. The second study provided evidence that CEO power is associated with 
lower dividend payout ratios: external monitoring from a widely-held financial institution has 
a positive effect on payout ratios, while internal monitoring from independent directors 
decreases payout ratios. We found also that when the government is the largest owner or there 
is a government official on the board, dividend payout ratios are lower. These results 
supported the view that banking regulators are prevalently concerned about the safety of the 
bank, and powerful bank CEOs can afford to distribute low payout ratios, at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Our results were found robust to different econometric techniques, 
including fixed-effect panel data estimators, and a combination of difference-in-differences 
with matching techniques. 
Finally, the third study investigated the effect of government bailout on banking. We 
analyzed whether bailed banks benefited from government support measures implemented 
during 2007-2010 using the Helping Hand hypothesis. Then, we investigated whether 
government support was accompanied by increased control over the management of bailed 
banks using Managerial Disciplining hypothesis. We used a unique hand-collected data set 
with information on corporate governance, ownership structure and compensation structure 
for a sample of 129 European listed banks for the period 2005-2010. We used difference-in-
difference technique for our main analysis. We found that government bailout helped to 
overcome capitalization problems in bailed banks and to keep the lending by bailed banks at 
the pre-crisis level. However, we found no significant improvement of the new loans’ quality 
in bailed banks following bailout. Next, we provided robust evidence for increased control 
over the banks that received government money: government implemented restrictions on 
dividend payouts and managerial compensation, and appointed its representatives as 
‘watchdogs’ on the boards of bailed banks following bailout. These results are consistent with 
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the Helping Hand and the Managerial Disciplining hypotheses. Our results were found robust 
to different econometric techniques, including propensity score matching method based on the 
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We build a new hand-collected data set with information on corporate governance and 
government bailout for listed banks (commercial banks, bank holding companies, and 
cooperative banks) located in 15 EU countries for the period 2005-2010.  
The primary data source for accounting data is the Bankscope electronic database. This 
database contains financial data for over 8000 European banks.  
In addition, we hand collect part of missing accounting data from the banks’ annual 
reports. Such hand data collecting resulted in an increase of the number of observations on 
total capital ratio and Tier 1 capital ratio by 10.28% and 9.36%, correspondingly. 
We hand collect data on bank corporate governance, remuneration policy, bank ownership 
structure, and some bank-specific and country-specific characteristics from different sources. 
They are: bank annual reports, notes to bank annual reports, corporate governance reports, 
remuneration reports and other reports and documents available from the banks’ corporate 
web sites, web sites of bank regulators and authorities, open information web sites, and other 
sources.  
We collect data on government bailouts from Public Support Measures in Europe and in 
the United States (updated at as 15 November 2011) available on the web site of Mediobanca.  




Table A1 Description of data and variables. 
This table provides information on our data variables. The table uses several abbreviations for our data sources: 
B – Bankscope, AR – Annual reports, CWS – Corporative web sites, OOS – Other open sources for particular 
information, and M – Public Support Measures in Europe and in the United States (updated at as 15 November 
2011) available on the web site of Mediobanca. 




Bank 109 listed banks for the 
second paper. 129 banks for 
the third paper (includes 109 
listed banks, 19 banks 
delisted during 2007-2010, 
and Northern Rock) 
B Final number of banks 




Year Dummies for years 2005- 
2010 
B   
Country  Dummies for: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom 
B EU-15 countries 




Specialization Dummies for Commercial 
bank (Commbank), 
Cooperative bank 
(Coopbank), and Bank 
Holding and Holding 
Companies (Bhc) 






Year the bank was founded AR, CWS 
and OOS  
Hand collected. We 
define Bank founding 













Hand collected. Bank 
history from equals 
Bank founding year if 
no data on bank’s earlier 
history is available. 
Bank history from 
precedes Bank founding 
year if a bank reports as 
a founding year the year 
of M&A, reorganization 
or restructuration 
(usually followed by 
bank name change). 
 
Founder on the Dummy equals 1 if the AR and Hand collected. We Laeven and 
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board founder or the descendents of 
the founder are on the board 
or management board. 
CWS define Founder on the 
board as reported by a 
bank. It equals 0 if no 







index, takes values from A to 
D, with U for unknown 
indexes (line variable). 
B Downloaded from 
Bankscope 
 




Hand collected. When 
weighted average data is 
not available we use 
data on a number of 




Widely held Dummy equals 1 if there is 
no owner with more than 
10% of bank share rights 
(first large owner).99 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected. The 
dummy was generated 
based on information on 
bank’s major 
shareholders (name, 




Family owned Dummy equals 1 if an 








Dummy equals 1 if the state 




(as above) Caprio et 
al. (2004) 




Dummy equals 1 if a widely 
held financial institution is 
the controlling shareholder. 
AR and 
CWS 
(as above) Caprio et 
al. (2004) 




Dummy equals 1 if a widely 
held non-financial institution 
is the controlling shareholder. 
AR and 
CWS 
(as above) Caprio et 
al. (2004) 
Owned by other 
type of 
shareholder 
Dummy equals 1 if the 
controlling owner is a trust, 











Percentage of the share rights 




Hand collected Laeven and 
Levine 
(2009) 
                                                          
99 Here and below we use ‘First large owner’ and ‘Second large owner’ for the shareholders with more than 10% 
of bank share rights, while ‘First largest owner’ and ‘Second largest owner’ do not necessarily have 10% or more 






Line variable for the first 
largest ownership type: 
family, state, financial 
company, non-financial 
company, or other type. 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
First largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if the first 
largest shareholder owns 
more than 10% of bank share 
rights (first large owner). 
AR and 
CWS 
The dummy was 
generated based on 
information on First 
largest share ownership. 
 
Family as the 
first largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if an 
individual or family is the 
first largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 
The dummy was 
generated based on 
information on First 
largest share ownership 




the first largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if the state 








the first largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if a widely 
held financial institution is 
the first largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 




the first largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if a widely 
held non-financial institution 
is the first largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 
(as above)  
Other type of 
the first largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if the first 
largest owner is a trust, 










Percentage of the share rights 








Line variable for the second 
largest ownership type: 
family, state, financial 
company, non-financial 
company, or other type. 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
Second largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if the 
second largest shareholder 
owns more than 10% of bank 




The dummy was 
generated based on 
information on Second 
largest share ownership. 
 
Family as the 
second largest 
owner 
Dummy equals 1 if an 
individual or family is the 
second largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 
The dummy was 
generated based on 




largest share ownership 





Dummy equals 1 if the state 
(or foreign state) is the 
second largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 






Dummy equals 1 if a widely 
held financial institution is 
the second largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 






Dummy equals 1 if a widely 
held non-financial institution 
is the second largest owner. 
AR and 
CWS 
(as above)  
Other type of 
the second 
largest owner 
Dummy equals 1 if the 
second largest owner is a 






(as above)  
Large owner on 
the management 
board 
Dummy equals 1 if the first 
and/or the second largest 




Hand collected. The 
dummy was generated 
based on information on 
individual management 





Large owner on 
the board 
Dummy equals 1 if the first 
and/or the second largest 




Hand collected. The 
dummy was generated 









Hand collected  
Preference 
shares 
Dummy equals 1 if there are 





equals 1 if bank reports 
data on shares other than 
ordinary shares, 
common shares, or A 




One-tier board Dummy equals 1 if bank has 
one-tier governance structure 
(one-tier board) 
AR Hand collected. Bank 
has one-tier governance 
structure if board 





functions (i.e. comprises 
executive directors or 
CEO). 
Two-tier board Dummy equals 1 if bank has 
two-tier governance structure 
(two-tier board) 
AR Hand collected. Bank 
has two-tier governance 
structure if there are two 
different boards for 
supervisory and 
executive functions (i.e. 
non-executive Board of 
Directors/supervisory 
Board and management 
board). 
 
BoD size Number of board members 
(executive and non-
executive) for one-tier board, 
and number of supervisory 




Hand collected. This 




(consistent with usual 




Full BoD size Full board size. Total board 
size (including number of 




Hand collected. This 








Number of executive 
directors for one-tier boards, 
and number of management 




Hand collected. We use 
full number of 
management board 
members if ownership 
and compensation data 
is also available for 
them. Otherwise, we use 
a number of chief 
executives for which 





Full management board size. 
Number of executive 
committee members for one-
tier boards, and number of 
management board members 
(or broader management 
committee members) for 
two-tier board.  
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
Executive Number of executive AR and Hand collected.  
                                                          
100 We distinguish board size with and without representatives, because some sample banks include them in the 
total number of the BoD members, while other banks do not.  
101 Some banks in our sample have management boards consisting of chief executives only (for example, Chief 
Executive and Deputy Chief Executives, or CEO, CFO and COO). In these banks, a broader management 
committee (executive committee) comprises a large number of subordinated officers also. 
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directors directors on the board 
(excluding number of 
employee and government 
representatives) 
CWS Executive directors 
equals number of 
executive directors on 
the board as reported by 
a bank. It equals 0 if 
bank does not report this 
information and has 
two-tier board (all 
supervisory board 
members are considered 




Number of independent 
directors on the BoD 
(including number of 






equals number of 
independent directors on 
the board as reported by 
a bank. It equals total 
number of supervisory 
board members if bank 
does not report this 
information and has a 
tier two-tier board (all 
supervisory board 




Board duality Dummy equals 1 if CEO 




Hand collected. The 
dummy was generated 
based on information on 
bank CEO (name) and 
BoD chairman (name). 
Pathan 
(2009) 
CEO on the 
BoD 
Dummy equals 1 if  CEO is 
present on the BoD 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
Supervisory 
board 
Dummy equals 1 if there is a 
supervisory board in a bank 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected.  
Remuneration 
committee 
Dummy equals 1 if there is 




Hand collected.  Setting 
up remuneration 
committee was one of 
regulatory requirement 
in European banking 
starting from 2008. 
 
REPRESENTATIVES ON BOARD 
Government 
representative 
Dummy equals 1 it there is at 
least one government 
representative on the board. 
AR and 
CWS 




Number of government 
representatives on the board 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
Employee Dummy equals 1 it there is at AR and Hand collected  
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representative least one employee 






Number of employee 
representatives on the board 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
GENDER STRUCTURE 
Females on the 
BoD 
Number of women on the 
board (excluding number of 




Hand collected  
Females on full 
BoD 
Number of women on full 
board (including number of 








Number of women on the 
management board 
(excluding number of 




Hand collected  
Females on full 
management 
board 
Number of women on full 
management board 
(including number of 




Hand collected  




Hand collected  
INTERNAL OWNERSHIP 




Hand collected. An 
aggregate percentage of 
BoD share ownership 
was used if available 
from bank reports. 
Otherwise, BoD 
ownership was 
calculated as a sum of 
shares hold by 
individual BoD 
members divided by a 
weighted average 







Number of individual BoD 
members holding shares 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
                                                          
102 We qualify a board member as an employee representative any person who is described in the annual report 
of the bank by one of the following combination of words: ‘Employee representative’, ‘Employee representative 
member’, [member] ‘delegated by the Staff Council’, [member] ‘elected by the employees’, [member] ‘elected 
by the staff’. 
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Hand collected. An 
aggregate percentage of 
CEO share ownership 
was used if available 
from the reports. 
Otherwise, the 
percentage was 
calculated as a sum of 
shares hold by CEO 
divided by a weighted 
average number of 





CEO as the 
largest owner 
Dummy equals 1 if CEO is 
the largest owner. 








Percentage of management 
board members’ share 
ownership (including CEO) 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected. An 
aggregate percentage of 
management board 
share ownership was 
used if available from 
the reports. Otherwise, 
the percentage was 
calculated as a sum of 
shares hold by 
individual management 
board members divided 
by a weighted average 
number of shares for a 
given year. When no 
data on Management 
board ownership was 
available, we used data 







Number of individual 








Percentage of non-executive 




Hand collected. This 
variable is important 
when large values of 
BoD shareholdings are 
driven by large share 
ownership of CEO or 
other executives who 






Number of the non-executive 
BoD members holding shares 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  
CEO CHARACTERISTICS 
CEO birth Year of CEO birth AR, CWS 
and OOS 
Hand collected  
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Hand collected  
CEO since CEO appointment year AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected. CEO 
since equals 1 if a new 
CEO was appointed 
from the 1st January till 
the 31st December 
(including) of a given 
year.  
 




Hand collected. We 
indicate the year when 
CEO was appointed as 
the first year of his 
service, and the year 
preceding his retirement 









Hand collected Hu and 
Kumar 
(2004) 
CEO turnover Dummy equals 1 if CEO 




Hand collected. We 
indicate a year of CEO 
change as a year when 
old CEO stepped down 




Dummy equals 1 if forced 




Hand collected. We 
indicate a year of forced 
CEO turnover as a year 
when old CEO stepped 
down from the position. 
In order to distinguish 
between forced and non-
forced turnover we 
employ the procedure 
described by Schaeck et 
al. (2009). 
 
Founder CEO Dummy equals 1 if CEO is 
also a founder of the bank 
AR, CWS 
and OOS 
Hand collected  
CEO previous 
career in the 
same bank 
Dummy equals 1 if CEO has 




Hand collected  
CEO Ph.D. 
degree 
Dummy equals 1 if CEO 
holds Ph.D. degree 
AR, CWS 
and OOS 




Total cash compensation of 
CEO, th.EUR.  
AR Hand collected. CEO 
cash compensation was 




                                                          
103 However, when old CEO retired on the 31st of December 2007, and new CEO took on the position starting 
from the 1st of January 2008, we indicate 2008 as a year of CEO change. 
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CEO salary, CEO 
bonus, and other CEO 
cash compensation. For 
this and following CEO 
compensation variables: 
all values in currency 
other than EUR were 
converted into EUR 
using year-end exchange 
rates. 
CEO salary CEO cash salary, th.EUR. AR Hand collected. CEO 
salary equals amount of 




CEO bonus CEO cash bonus, th.EUR. AR Hand collected. CEO 
bonus equals amount of 







Dummy equals 1 if CEO 
stock grant took place 




Estimated value of CEO 
stock grant, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. CEO 
stock compensation 
value equals amount of 
stocks granted to CEO 




Dummy equals 1 if CEO 
option grant took place 




Estimated value of CEO 
option grant, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. CEO 
option compensation 
value equals amount of 
options granted to CEO 
in a given year.  
 
CEO pension CEO pension or post-
retirement benefits, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. Note: 
most bank in our sample 






Other CEO compensation, 
th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. Note: 
most banks in our 
sample do not report this 
data. Although, where 
possible we collected 





CEO fixed compensation, 
th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. We 
distinguish this variable 
from CEO cash salary 













AR Hand collected. We 
distinguish this variable 
from CEO cash bonus 
since CEO performance-
related compensation 
could include non-cash 
compensation also. 
 




Total cash compensation of 
management board,104 
th.EUR.  
AR Hand collected. 
Management board cash 
compensation was 
calculated as a sum of 
management board 
salary, bonus, and other 
cash compensation. For 
this and following 
management board 
compensation variables: 
all values in currency 
other than EUR were 
converted into EUR 





Management board cash 
salary, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. 
Management board 
salary equals amount of 
management board cash 





Management board cash 
bonus, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. 
Management board 
bonus equals amount of 
management board cash 
bonus, variable or 
performance-related 





Dummy equals 1 if 
management board stock 
grant took place 





Management board stock 
grant, estimated value, 
th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. 
Management board 
stock compensation 
value equals amount of 
stocks granted to 




                                                          
104 Data refers to the compensation of the management board members for two-tier boards, and executive 
members of BoD for one-tier boards. 
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Dummy equals 1 if 
management board option 
grant took place 





Management board option 
grant, estimated value, 
th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. 
Management board 
option compensation 
value equals amount of 
options granted to 





Management board pension 
or post-retirement benefits, 
th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. Note: 
most bank in our sample 







Other management board 
compensation, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. Note: 
most banks in our 
sample do not report this 
data. Although, where 
possible we collected 






Management board fixed 
compensation, th.EUR. 
AR Hand collected. We 
distinguish this variable 
from management board 
cash salary since 
management board fixed 
compensation could 
include non-cash 










AR Hand collected. We 
distinguish this variable 
from management board 











AR Hand collected. BoD 
compensation includes 
compensation to all 




values in currency other 
than EUR were 
 
                                                          
105 Data refers to the compensation of all BoD members for two-tier boards, and non-executive members of BoD 
for one-tier boards. 
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converted into EUR 





Dividends paid for a given 
year. Dividends paid for 
includes interim dividends 
for a given year (paid out 
during the analyzed year) and 
final dividends for a given 
year (proposed to be paid 




Hand collected. We 
distinguish dividends 
paid for a given year 
from dividends paid 
during the year. We 
think that the former one 
should have stronger 
relationship with bank 






Dividends paid during a 
given year. Dividends paid 
fact includes interim 
dividends for a given year, 
and final dividends for the 
former year/years which 
were distributed during the 
analyzed year.  
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected  




Hand collected. We 
calculate DPE for as 
Dividends paid for 
divided by bank equity.  
 
DPE fact Dividends during a given 
year to equity, % 
AR and 
CWS 
Hand collected. We 
calculate DPE fact as 
Dividends paid fact 











Hand collected  
Shares 
outstanding 
Weighted average number of 
shares outstanding 
B and AR We hand collect data on 
Shares outstanding from 
bank annual reports. 
When data is not 
available we download 
data on number of 
shares outstanding at the 







B and AR We download data on 
Market capitalization 
from Bankscope. For 
missing data we collect 
additional data from 






Gross bailout Gross Bailout, bil.EUR M Hand collected  
Gross bailout 
cumulative 
Gross Bailout Cumulative 
(sum of previous bailouts), 
bil.EUR 
M Hand collected  
Gross repay Gross Repay (some banks 
repay the State), bil.EUR 
M Hand collected  
Gross pay 
cumulative 
Gross Repay Cumulative 
(sum of previous 
repayments), bil.EUR 
M Hand collected  
Nbail Net Bailout=Gbail-Grpay, 
bil.EUR 
M Hand collected  
Nbailc Net Bailout Cumulative, 
bil.EUR 
M Hand collected  
Total country 
bailout 
Total Country Bailouts by 
Country and by Year, 
bil.EUR 
M Hand collected  
Gross bailout 
share 




M Calculated based on 
data on Gross bailout 






Gross Bailout Cumulative as 
a % of Country Bailouts, % 
M Calculated based on 
data on Gross bailout 





Gross Repay as a % of 
Country Bailouts, % 
M Calculated based on 
data on Gross repay and 





Gross Repay Cumulative as a 
% of Country Bailouts, % 
M Calculated based on 
data on Gross repay 





Net Bailout as a % of 
Country Bailouts, % 
M Calculated based on 
data on Net bailout and 





Net Bailout Cumulative as a 
% of Country Bailouts, % 
M Calculated based on 
data on Net bailout 




Size Bank size as a natural 
logarithm of total assets 
B   
Tier 1 capital Tier 1 capital to risk 





Market-to-book Market value of bank equity 
divided by book value of 





Profitability Ratio of net income to 
average total assets of bank 
(Return of average assets) 
B   
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of country 
GDP per head constant 
growth rate 
B   
Deposit 
insurance 

















Following Cariboni et 
al. (2010) we assume 
200 thousand euro for 




Legal origin Line variables for legal 
origins: English, French, 




Generated based on data 
on Country 
Beck et al. 
(2006), La 











A2.1  CEO ownership, agency costs, and expropriation  
We define agency costs as the costs incurred by the CEO as a result of divergences 
between the incentives of the CEO and those of shareholders. We define expropriation 
benefits as the net benefits to the CEO deriving from projects that do not maximize 
shareholder wealth (i.e. any project with NPV<0), but increase CEO’s individual utility, for 
instance because they are related to perquisite consumption or empire building. Since the 
CEO is also a shareholder, any project that does not maximize shareholder wealth (i.e. any 
project with NPV<0) will decrease the CEO’s individual utility – that is, expropriation has an 
opportunity cost for the CEO that is positively related to CEO ownership. 
Assume that CEO ownership influences agency costs, ϕ, according to the quadratic 
function: 
( )2321 OwnershipCEOOwnershipCEO αααφ ++=     [A1] 
where α1 > 0, α2 < 0, and α3 > 0, i.e. ϕ is convex in CEO Ownership. We name α2 
propensity to reduce agency costs. For low levels of CEO Ownership agency costs and CEO 
Ownership are negatively related. However, after a critical level of ownership, the CEO 
becomes entrenched and agency costs increase with ownership (monitoring perspective).  
On the other hand, net benefits from expropriating shareholders, ψ, are concave in CEO 
Ownership: 
( )2321 OwnershipCEOOwnershipCEO βββψ ++=     [A2] 
where β1 > 0, β2 > 0, and β3 < 0. We call β2 propensity to expropriate shareholders. For low 
levels of CEO Ownership, the net benefits from expropriation and CEO Ownership are 
negatively related. However, after a critical level of ownership, the marginal opportunity cost 
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of expropriation is larger than the marginal benefit, and therefore the net benefits from 
expropriation decrease (expropriation perspective). 
Assume that dividend payout ratios depend on CEO Ownership because of the impact that 
CEO Ownership bears on agency costs and on the benefits from expropriation. Since agency 
costs should decrease as DPE increases, CEO Ownership and dividends are substitute 
monitoring devices. However, this substitution effect disappears after a critical level for ϕ is 
reached (H1a). For this reason, α2 < 0 and α3 > 0 of the agency costs function maintain their 
respective sign in the DPE function.    
What about expropriation (net) benefits? As CEO Ownership increase, the net benefits 
from expropriation by reducing dividends increase. After a minimum critical level for ψ, the 
net benefits from expropriation by reducing dividends decrease (H1b). Since expropriation 
occurs by decreasing dividends, the coefficients β2 > 0, and β3 < 0 should have an opposite 
sign in the regressions on DPE. This can be formalized as follows: 
( )233221 )()( OwnershipCEOOwnershipCEODPE βαβαγ −+−+=   [A3] 
where γ1 > 0. It is clear that, since α2 < 0 and β 2 > 0, (α2  – β 2 < 0), while α3 > 0 and β3 < 0 
results in (α3 – β 3 > 0). Therefore, DPE is always convex in CEO Ownership.   
A.2 Definition of government officials, board members, independent directors, and forced 
and unforced CEO turnovers 
In this section, we briefly describe the criteria employed to determine whether there is a 
government official on the BoD, whether a member of the BoD is ‘independent’, and whether 
CEO turnover is ‘forced’. 
A2.2.1 Government Officials  
We qualify a board member as a government representative any person who is described in 
the annual report of the bank by one of the following combination of words: ‘Government 
commissioner’, ‘Government representative’, ‘State commissioner’, ‘Representatives of the 
Regulatory Authority’, ‘State commissioner’, and ‘Deputy state commissioner’. In certain 
cases, the government official is identified by a combination of words that include the name 
of the state/country. For instance, for Lloyds Banking Group Plc, the government official is 
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identified by the words ‘Board Representative for Scotland’, while for Alpha Bank AE, the 
government official is identified by the words ‘representative of the Hellenic Republic’. For 
13 banks in our sample, the variable Government Official on the Board is equal to one in at 
least one year during the sample period, for a total of 39 bank-year observations  (as reported 
in Table 4.3, for which 7% of the total available observations for Government Official on the 
Board (554) take on the value one). Out of these 39 observations, 31 refer to the period 2008-
2010, suggesting that in most cases government officials were appointed as a result of the 
financial crisis and the recent sovereign debt crisis in the EU. The countries for which the 
dummy variable is equal to one in at least one year are: Austria, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, 
and the UK. 
A2.2.2 Board members 
EU banks can have a one-tier or a two-tier corporate governance structure (or board 
structure). Two-tier corporate governance structure is a corporate structure with two boards of 
directors. The management and monitoring function are performed by the two boards in a 
separate fashion in the two-tier case, and by different members of the board in the one-tier 
case (Arnaboldi and Casu (2011)).  
The definitions of one-tier and two-tier structure change according to the country. For 
banks in our sample, the management function is performed by a board usually named 
‘management board’ or ‘executive board’, while the monitoring function is performed by a 
board usually named ‘Board of Directors’, or ‘non-executive supervisory board’.  
For banks with a two-tier board structure, we use the following keywords to identify 
members of the ‘management board’: ‘Management board’, ‘Executive board’, ‘Executive 
management’, ‘Executive team’, ‘Executive committee’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘CEO & CFO’, 
‘Managing director’, and ‘General manager’. For banks a with one-tier board structure, we 
use the following keywords to identify members of the ‘management board’: ‘Executive 
committee’, ‘Management committee’, ‘Delegated committee’, ‘Executive board’, 
Management board’, ‘General management’, ‘General manager’, ‘Management’, ‘General 
directors’, ‘Group executive management’, and ‘Group executive committee’. 
For banks with a two-tier board structure, we use the following keywords to identify 
members of the ‘supervisory board’: ‘Supervisory board’, ‘Board of Directors’, ‘Advisory 
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board’.  As explained in section A.2.3, we consider all members of the ‘supervisory board’ as 
‘independent directors’ for banks with a two-tier board structure. 
For banks with a one-tier board structure, we use the criteria set out in section A.2.3 to 
identify ‘independent directors’, i.e. directors with a monitoring role. 
A2.2.3 Independent directors  
We define ‘independent directors’ as reported in a bank’s annual report. A member of the 
BoD is deemed to be independent if such person does not have any business or personal 
relations with the company or its management board, and these relations would constitute a 
conflict of interests. In many cases, banks self-report the degree of board independence of 
their own BoD. This is usually defined as the number of independent directors divided by the 
number of BoD members excluding employee representatives and government 
representatives. We use the same approach for board independence calculation for 
comparability of the results across different banks. For example, in the annual report of 
Nordea Bank, independent directors are defined as ‘[…] the number of Board members who 
are independent in relation to the Company and its executive management as well as 
independent in relation to the Company’s major shareholders.’ For banks with a two-tier 
corporate governance structure, we consider as independent directors the members of the 
supervisory board. For banks with a one-tier board structure, we define independent directors 
according to the criteria listed above.  
In Table A2, we report the average board size and the average level of board independence 
(percentage of independent directors on the board) for each country, as well as the proportion 
of banks with a one-tier or two-tier structure. All sample banks in Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Netherland have a two-tier board structure. All sample banks in Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, and the UK have a one-tier board structure. For France, 
Italy, and Portugal, we find that both the one-tier and the two-tier board structure are used. All 
banks in a country from ‘English origin’ (La Porta et al. (1998)) have a one-tier system, while 
all those in a country from ‘German origin’ have a two-tier system. 
A2.2.4 Forced and unforced CEO turnovers 
To collect data on CEO turnovers, we use LEXIS/NEXIS, and employ a key-word search 
procedure based on Schaeck et al. (2012) to discern between forced and unforced CEO 
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turnovers during 2005-2010.  After collecting data on the year of the CEO turnover and the 
CEO name, we look for CEO turnovers based on the following keywords: ‘management 
change’, ‘forced resignation’, ‘turnover’, ‘separation’, ‘ousted’, ‘early retirement’, ‘step 
down’, ‘mandatory separation’, ‘voluntary separation’, ‘fired’, ‘made redundant’, ‘departure’, 
‘management succession’, ‘executive change’ and ‘tenure’. These data are matched with the 
bank name. 
Following Schaeck et al. (2012), we classify a turnover as ‘forced’ if the CEO is reported 
to have been dismissed, forced to resign or to have left the bank due to undisclosed policy 
differences. We define all remaining CEO turnovers as unforced, unless they meet at least one 
of the following criteria (Schaeck et al. (2012)):  
a) the reason for the CEO turnover is declared not to be: death, poor health, or 
acceptance of a position either elsewhere or within the bank; 
b) it is reported that the reason for the CEO turnover is retirement, but retirement is not 
announced until at least six months prior to succession. 
Moreover, if a reason for the CEO turnover is not provided, we assume that the turnover is 
forced due to disciplining actions or due to company policy disputes.  
Following criteria listed above, we classify 82 CEO turnovers, of which 18 CEO turnovers 
are forced (which occurred mainly in the period 2008-2010). We classify the remaining 64 





Table A2  Board characteristics: Country comparison. 
Country Average size of BoD Average Board Independence One-tier board Two-tier board 
Austria  14.20 99.16% 0% 100.00% 
Belgium 18.81 32.96% 100.00% 0% 
Denmark 6.51 84.09% 0% 100.00% 
Finland 8.25 68.04% 20.00% 80.00% 
France 13.00 48.11% 50.00% 50.00% 
Germany 9.44 92.45% 0% 100.00% 
Greece 13.27 26.20% 100.00% 0% 
Ireland 15.00 70.76% 100.00% 0% 
Italy 14.61 51.40% 87.00% 13.00% 
Luxembourg 12.33 28.00% 100.00% 0% 
Netherlands 8.04 93.75% 0% 100.00% 
Portugal 19.00 58.49% 74.00% 26.00% 
Spain 14.26 50.63% 100.00% 0% 
Sweden 11.18 70.18% 100.00% 0% 
United Kingdom 13.96 51.81% 100.00% 0% 
     
Legal origin     
English 14.15 55.31% 100.00% 0% 
French 14.17 50.20% 77.38% 22.62% 
German 11.36 95.10% 0% 100.00% 








A3.1 Definition of government officials, and forced and unforced CEO turnovers 
A3.1.1 Government Officials  
We described the criteria employed to determine whether there is a government official on 
the BoD in Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.1). 
For 17 banks in our sample, the variable Government Official on the Board is equal to one 
in at least one year during the sample period, for a total of 51 bank-year observations  (as 
reported in Table 6.3, for which around 8% of the total available observations for Government 
Official on the Board (675) take on the value one). Out of these 51 observations, 37 refer to the 
period 2008-2010, suggesting that in most cases government officials were appointed as a 
result of the financial crisis and the recent sovereign debt crisis in the EU. The countries for 
which the dummy variable is equal to one in at least one year are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Sweden, and the UK. 
A3.1.2 Forced and unforced CEO turnovers 
We described the criteria employed to determine whether CEO turnover is ‘forced’ in 
Appendix 2 (Section A2.2.4). 
Following the criteria, we classify 122 CEO turnovers, of which 29 CEO turnovers are 
forced (which occurred mainly in the period 2008-2010). We classify the remaining 93 CEO 
turnovers as unforced. 
 
 
 
